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Summary
The thesis addresses devolution under three broad headings. Initially, it surveys the historic 
background of the United Kingdom as a coming together of different nations. The Union- 
state, although making different arrangements for its component nations, has developed 
alongside the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, a doctrine which is completely 
unfamiliar with any sharing of power. However, the experiences of Home-Rule for Northern 
Ireland and the nationalist movements leading to a first devolution legislation in the 1970s 
have influenced the development of Britain’s constitutional future.
The contents of devolution are summarised as a second step. The three assemblies in Belfast, 
Cardiff and Edinburgh have different, asymmetrical powers. Two main issues arise, however, 
in the context of their creation. First, the integration of England in the devolution model is not 
achieved. Secondly, the inter-governmental arrangements between these bodies and their 
relationship with central government are addressed.
Devolution affects especially the centre, where the new bodies and their underlying principles 
are to be inserted into the structure of the British state. This leads to the consideration, how far 
reaching these arrangements at the centre are to become. Do they represent some form of 
quasi-federalism or is it more appropriate to define the current legislation as a form of 
muddling through, whilst the initiation of a clear federal structure could resolve the main 
problems of an “asymmetrical structure”? It is argued that asymmetrical devolution is the 
right start to the development of a more powerful sub-national governance. However, the 
regionalisation may not stop there as it was the experience of other European states in the 
1980s. Obviously, the nations want their powers entrenched in a written Constitution, which 
may lead to the complete abandonment of parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, the United 
Kingdom may evolve to federalism.
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I. Introduction
Devolution has potentially significant implications for the United Kingdom. It was not only 
the most significant measure on the political agenda of the Labour government elected in 
1997, but “arguably [one part of] the most radical programme of constitutional change”1 ever 
undertaken in the United Kingdom since the Great Reform Act 1832. After the 1997 General 
Election, the Referendums Bill2 was the first constitutional proposal introduced in the House 
of Commons and the referendums themselves were rapidly held. The government’s proposals 
have been endorsed by a comfortable yes vote in that referendums. Devolution represents an 
important change in government. This is because it attempts to combine two conflicting 
principles3: the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, the granting of self-government in a restricted realm for three geographic units. The 
devolved bodies in Cardiff, Edinburgh, and Belfast are able to exercise a wide range of 
powers and competences, which previously were wielded by Westminster. Scotland enjoys 
the strongest model, whilst Northern Ireland’s devolution is dependent on the future peace 
process. Wales got a particular type of devolution -  a unique administrative model of 
devolved competences. As “devolution is a process, not an event”4, these developments may 
not fail to influence England in the mid-term.
Hence, the United Kingdom clearly cannot be seen as a unitary state anymore, but how are we 
to characterise the purpose and nature of the new constitutional arrangements? Britain might 
be seen to be on the way to a written and (de facto) federal constitution with all implications 
this may have. At the time being, however, this scenario was not yet to happen, as there are 
only the Acts legislating for devolution. Thus, this thesis considers first the historical 
background to devolution and outlines its main constitutional challenges. Secondly, it 
analyses the initial implementation of devolution in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and, 
England. Thirdly, it considers the problems of devolution from a comparative standpoint: 
How do they fit with the conditions of federalism? By all meanings, devolution changes the
1 Lord Irvine of Lairg, Keynote Address, presented at the inaugural conference of the Cambridge Centre for 
Public Law, 17 January 1998, see: Cambridge University, Centre for Public Law, Constitutional Reform in the 
United Kingdom: Practice and Principles. Hart, Oxford 1998, p 1
2 Referendums (Scotland and Wales) Bill, published on 15 May 1997
3 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution: the constitutional aspects, in: Cambridge University, Centre for Public Law, 
Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom: Practice and Principles, op cit, p 9
4 Davies, Ron: Devolution: A process not an event, in: The Gregvnog Papers. Vol 2 (2), Institute of Welsh 
Affairs, Cardiff 1997
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United Kingdom considerably, but does it relinquish all features of a unitary state? Does it 
make quasi-federal arrangements for a Union-state? The thesis seeks to summarise the precise 
type of constitutional settlement devolution represents and the essential questions that arise. It 
will be argued that devolution raises various questions, which could be better handled by a 
really federal structure.
The constitutional identification of devolution needs to be addressed on the basis of the 
different constitutional schemes of territorial organisation. For the precise definition of the 
United Kingdom’s territorial structure, the competing models of state organisation need to be 
approached and determined. A first point to be made is that all observations are principally 
based on the fact that the nation-state is at least in Europe the appropriate form of territorial 
organisation5. However, the organisation of the state underlies a variety of factors, which 
differ from one state to another. Thus, the centre-periphery polarity can be observed 
historically and politically. This is because the main characteristics of every territorial 
structure can be related to a more or less clear development of unification6. One form of 
classification for territorial structures is offered by Rokkan and Urwin7. There, a unitary state 
is “built up around one unambiguous political centre which is economically dominant and 
pursues a policy of administrative standardisation”. All areas are to be treated equally under 
the direct control of the centre. This model might be best exemplified by the III and IV French 
Republic. In contrast to the model of a unitary state, the union state is not the “result of 
straightforward dynastic request, but the incorporation of at least parts of its territory by way 
of personal dynastic union”. Integration is, hence, less than perfect. The consequences of 
personal union entail the survival in some areas of pre-union rights and institutional 
infrastructures, which preserve some degree of regional autonomy. Thus, Belgium could be 
taken as an example for a union state. That model can finally be opposed to federalism. 
Federalism means a pattern of territorially diversified structures, with more or less centralised 
control mechanisms8. Germany is an examples of a federal state9.
Conversely, the relationship between centre and periphery can be distinguished referring to a
5 Rokkan, Stein; Urwin, Derek: Introduction: Centres and Peripheries in Western Europe, in: The politics of 
territorial identity: Studies in European Regionalism. Sage, London 1982, p 1; Recently, the “nation-state” UK 
has even been questioned, see: Davies, Norman: The Isles. Macmillan, London 1999, pp 1039
6 So Davies, Norman: The Isles, op cit; also Bulpitt, Jim: Territory and power in the United Kingdom. MUP, 
Manchester 1981
7 For the following see: Rokkan, Stein; Urwin, Derek: Introduction, op cit, p 11
8 Rokkan, Stein; Urwin, Derek: Introduction, op cit, p 11
9 Rokkan, Stein; Urwin, Derek: Figure 2, op cit, p 12
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constitutional approach. Thus, one can identify the organisation as a unitary state, a federation 
or a confederation according to the structures and connections within the organisation of the 
state. Under these conditions, the unitary state concentrates sovereignty with the central 
institutions10. Its structures are administrative sub-units or local authorities, but these 
structures are not sovereign. There is only one sovereign body, even if differences between a 
centralised unitary state and a decentralised unitary state may exist. Federalism, as a 
constitutional principle, means in contrast to the unitary model an autonomous unification of 
distinguished equal states11. In a federation both levels have “sovereign” powers: the 
federation itself and the component parts also. Power is clearly defined and distributed 
between these two levels of government12 and this division of powers is only possible to 
amend by a common decision. Whilst the European federal states developed to a form of co­
operative federalism between the different levels of government, the American model of
13federalism is based on a strict division of powers . Federalism can appear in different colours 
and its meaning may develop in time despite the clear theoretical definition14. The function 
and idea of a federal scheme can be the creation or the maintenance of political unity without 
abolishing the diversity of its components. Conversely, it can be introduced to diversify a 
previous unitary structure, which is thus to be preserved from its break-up15. A confederation 
is oppositely an association of states, which transfer a part of their business to common 
institutions16. Whilst the confederation appears as a unity, it is constitutionally not a state, as it 
does not touch upon the sovereignty of its members. Switzerland is organised as a 
confederation, for example.
In defining powers of different levels of government a key principle is subsidiarity. 
Subsidiarity implies that functions should be performed at the lowest level of community 
structures as far as they can be performed “more effectively” than at any other level. The 
appropriate level is, however, not defined, but has to be found for each issue. The principle of 
subsidiarity has long tradition in cultural history. It dates back to the old Greek philosophy of
10 Maunz, Theodor; Zippelius, Reinhold: Staatsrecht. op cit, p 106
11 Hesse, Konrad: Grundziige des Verfassungsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. C.F. Muller, Heidelberg 
1993,p 90
12 Maunz, Theodor; Zippelius, Reinhold: Staatsrecht. op cit, p 106
13 See for example Watts, Ronald L.: Comparing federal systems. 2nd edition, McGill- Queen’s University Press, 
Montreal 1999, pp 35
14 Hesse, Konrad, op cit, p 91; also: Barnett, Eric, op cit, p 64; Brazier, Rodney: The Constitution o f the United 
Kingdom, in: C.L.J., Vol 58(1), Cambridge 1999, p 125
15 Hesse, Konrad, op cit, p 91; also Wheare, K.C.: Federal Government, op cit, p 244
16 Maunz, Theodor; Zippelius, Reinhold: Staatsrecht, C.H. Beck, Munchen 1998, p 106
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Platon and Aristotle17. The catholic encyclical “Quadragesimo Anno” (1931) of Pope Pius VI 
has most commonly featured it by referring partly to the bible. It is true that the principle can 
best be understood within the context of a federal state, as there are different levels, which are 
necessary for the definition of the most “effective” layer. The German Grundgesetz (Basic 
Law), for example, is based on the general concept of federalism that means that the written 
constitution attributes powers to different levels of government18. However, whether a federal 
constitution implies that subsidiarity applies between the different levels is a divisive question 
in Germany19. At least, there is no general definition of the principle, which is precisely 
enough to give it a specific significance. More recently, subsidiarity has been introduced in 
the European Treaty. There, it has been sought to define the principle. Article 5 stipulates 
that, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take 
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
20therefore [...] be better achieved by the Community . However, this definition was not able to 
give a clear legal concept to the principle of subsidiarity21.
Devolution -  as a specific British expression in the context of constitutional structures- 
involves the transfer of powers from a superior to an inferior political authority22. It is the 
delegation of central government powers without the relinquishment of sovereignty23. Or, less 
vaguely, devolution includes the transfer of functions at present exercised by ministers and 
Parliament to a subordinate elected geographically based body, whilst leaving Westminster as 
the only sovereign Parliament24. Though such a transfer of power encountered thorny critics 
in the 1990s25, the United Kingdom is not unfamiliar with this idea as we will see in the 
example of Northern Ireland.
17 Hoffe, in: Riklin, Alois: Subsidiaritat, Nomos, Baden-Baden 1994, pp 21
18 Barnett, Eric, op cit, p 59
19 In favour: Wiirtenberger, Thomas: Das Subsidiaritatsprinzip als Verfassungsprinzip, in: Staatswissenschaft 
und Staatsrecht. 1993, p 622; Isensee, Josef: Subsidiaritatsprinzip und Verfassungsrecht, C.H. Beck, Miinchen 
1968, S. 143; against: Herzog, Roman: Subsidiaritatsprinzip und Staatsverfassung, in: Per Staat. 1963. pp 401; 
Oppermann, Thomas: Subsidiaritat als Bestandteil des Grundgesetzes, in: Juristische Schulung, 1996, p 569
20 Treaty of European Community, Article 5
21 Craig, Paul; de Burca, Grainne: EU Law, 2nd edition, OUP, Oxford 1998, pp 128
22 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 2
23 Report of the Roval Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), Cmnd. 5460-1, HMSO, London 1973, p. 
165
24 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 2
25 In the words of John Major: ’’One of the most dangerous proposals ever put to the British Nation” cited in: 
Bradbury, Jonathan: British Regionalism, op cit, p 4
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II. The British Constitution and the historical experience of devolution
A. The constitutional background
The constitutional reform in territorial organisation of the United Kingdom might be seen as a 
very recent and innovative development. This view was notably stressed by way of the 
overwhelming comments for the recent political decisions “having no precedent since 1688”1. 
However, the United Kingdom has already had some experience with devolution and the 
discussion about the best governance of the United Kingdom is not really new. Therefore, 
devolution must be seen in the historical context of a highly centralised state, whose 
constitutional basements might have obstructed to devolve power to sub-national 
governments for different reasons.
It is hard to define the terms “British Constitution”2 or “British Constitutional Law” as there 
is no written document, which could represent it3. A Constitution -  whether written or not4 - 
is the “systems of law, customs and conventions which define the composition and powers of 
organs of the state, and regulate the relations of the various state organs to one another and to 
the private citizen”5. Separately, the United Kingdom came into existence, not through the 
growth of a single national or linguistic consciousness, but as the outcome of a series of 
historical contingencies. It was created by ordinary acts of Parliament and not by a 
constitutional document6. Its “Constitution” has traditionally been characterised by the unity 
of its several parts: Wales became united with England through being conquered in 1262, 
while the acts of Union 1706 and 1707 marked the end of the separation between Scotland 
and England under two sovereign parliaments. Therefore, the United Kingdom did not appear 
as a state by a Nation-based movement like other European States, but was formed through 
the coming-together of different nations, England, Wales and Scotland with one supreme
1 See for example Dewar, Donald quoted in: Hassan, Gerry: A guide to the Scottish Parliament. HMSO, 
Edinburgh 1999, p 143
2 Walter Bagehot entitled his book even “English Constitution”
3 Yardley, David: Introduction to British Constitutional Law. 7th edition, London, Butterworths 1990, p 3
4 Barnett, Antony: This Time, Our constitutional revolution, London, Vintage 1997, p 149; Barnett, Hilaire, op 
cit, pp 219
5 Philips, Hood: Constitutional and Administrative Law, 7th edition, London 1987, p 5; Yardley, D., op cit, p 4
6 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the United Kingdom, OUP, Oxford 1999, pp 3
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parliament7. This parliament enjoyed a long dominance throughout the centuries. Ireland was 
initially integrated through the Acts of Union 1800, but only the Northern part of the Isle 
remained under the control of the Union Parliament. The Westminster parliament has 
therefore always been the “centre” of the state. Under these conditions, the Parliament 
developed to an institution whose main characteristics is to be the supreme institution of the 
state. This is the fundamental rule of British Constitutional Law8.
In the United Kingdom the concept of parliamentary sovereignty has regularly been taken to 
mean, that there can be no substantive legal limitations on the capacity of Parliament9. Thus, 
it has been said that it is the fundamental -  perhaps the only -  constitutional principle of the 
United Kingdom10. John Austin systematically advanced the theory of parliamentary 
sovereignty11. In his view it appears that a sovereign lawmaker cannot be subject to any legal 
restriction. Austin presumes, that “the position that sovereign power is incapable of legal 
limitation will hold universally and without exception. The immediate author of a law of the 
kind, or any of the sovereign successors to that immediate author, may abrogate the law at 
pleasure”12. However, the “classical” view of parliamentary sovereignty is generally 
associated with the academic work of another famous English lawyer, A. V. Dicey. He was 
critical of Austin’s proposal because of the lack of difference between political and legal 
sovereignty13. In his view, “a sovereign power cannot, whilst retaining its sovereign character, 
restrict its own powers by any particular enactment. ‘Limited sovereignty’, in short, is in the 
case of a Parliament, as of every other sovereign, a contradiction in terms”14. For Dicey the 
Queen in Parliament has “the right to make or unmake any law whatever” and nobody outside 
Parliament was “recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside 
the legislation of parliament”15, which is therefore legally sovereign16. Consequently, 
Parliament is firstly, the supreme law making body and may enact laws on any subject matter. 
Secondly, no Parliament may be bound by a predecessor or bind a successor. And thirdly, no 
person or body -including a court of law -  may question the validity of Parliament’s
7 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 2
8 Yardley, D., op cit, p 33; Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 1; Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 222
9 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, pp 208
10 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution, in: Halpem, David (ed.): Options for Britain. Dartmouth 1996, p 298
11 Marshall, Geoffrey: Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth. Clarendon, Oxford 1957, p 4
12 Austin, John: The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Weidenfeld. London 1954, p 254
13 Dicey, A.: Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th edition, London, Macmillan 1959, p 
39
14 Dicey, A., op cit, p 68
15 Dicey, A., op cit, p 40
16 Wade, H.: The Basis o f Legal Sovereignty, in: Cambridge Law Journal. Cambridge 1955, pp 172
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enactments17. However, even Dicey was obliged to classify the Treaties o f Union as they were 
expressively concluded “for ever” and “in all time”. Dicey argued, albeit these stipulations 
could not bind, that they had a special purpose, and that
“the enactment of laws which are described as unchangeable, immutable, or the like, is 
not necessarily futile. ... A sovereign Parliament ... although it cannot be logically 
bound to abstain from changing any given law, may, by the fact that an Act when it 
was passed had been declared to be unchangeable, receive a warning that it cannot be 
changed without grave danger to the Constitution of the country”18.
Since these views have been put forward at the end of the 19th century, some empirical and 
normative assumptions which underlie this constitutional vision were questioned19. In this 
perspective, Lord Jennings admits that “the legal sovereign may impose legal limitations upon 
itself, because its power to change the law includes the power to change the law affecting 
itself’20.
This current interpretation of the doctrine has been affected by various constitutional changes, 
which have occurred more recently. The first change arose from Britain’s Membership in the 
European Union21. Initially, the courts of the United Kingdom have time after time attempted 
to avoid any conflict with Community law22. This was made by the use of principles and 
juridical constructions, which should oblige the courts to read the law of the United Kingdom 
as to be compatible with European law requirements23. However, such an interpretation of the 
law was not always possible as the Case Duke v. GEC Reliance24 proves. The crucial case 
might have been the famous “Factortame”25, where an unequivocal decision about 
sovereignty was to be made. On the substance of this case, there was a clash between the EC- 
Treaty itself and the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, which was enacted later. Especially one
17 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 224
18 Dicey, A.V.; Rait, S.: Thoughts on the Union between England and Scotland. Macmillan, London 1920, p 253
19 Jennings, Ivor: The Law and the Constitution. 5th edition, Hodder, London 1959, p 152; Marshall, Geoffrey: 
Constitutional Theory. Clarendon, Oxford 1972; Craig, Paul: Constitutionalism, Regulation and Review, in: 
Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 68
20 Jennings, Ivor, op cit, p 152
21 See Bradley, Anthony W.: The Sovereignty o f Parliament, in: Jowell, Jeffery; Oliver, Dawn: The Changing 
Constitution. Clardendon, Oxford 1995, pp 90
22 Craig, P.: Constitutionalism, Regulation and Review, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 68
23 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 253; Craig, Paul: Constitutionalism, Regulation and Review, in: Hazell, Robert: 
Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 68
24 Duke v. GEC Reliance [1988] A.C. 618 and in: Craig, Paul; de Burca, Grainne: op cit, pp 285
25 R. v. Secretary o f State for Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd. [1990] 2 A.C. 85 and later R. v. Secretary o f State 
for Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd. [1991] 1 A.C. 603.
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feature of the concept of sovereignty was put in question, which entailed that if there is a 
clash between a later statutory norm and an earlier legal provision the former takes 
precedence (implied repeal). Naturally, the application of this rule was very problematic, as 
the European Court of Justice held that Community law as far as there is a conflict with 
national provision must take precedence. Therefore, the dictum of the House of Lords in this 
case (.Factortame II) is important as it stipulated, that
“if the supremacy within the European Community of Community law over the 
national law of member states was not always inherent in the European Economic 
Community Treaty it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the Court 
of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined the Community. Thus, whatever 
limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the European 
Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary. ... the protection of rights under 
Community law, national courts must not be prohibited by rules of national law from 
granting interim relief in appropriate cases is no more than a logical recognition of that 
supremacy.”27
The consequence of this decision was that the concept of implied repeal has no longer been 
applicable to clashes of Community and national law28 and that judges have had to disapply 
legislation which contravened European Community Law29.
A second change to the doctrine of sovereignty was introduced by the implementation of the 
Human Rights Act30 in 199831. Its main approach to solving clashes between national 
(primary or secondary) legislation and the European Convention of Human Rights is also 
applied to European Community Law: the courts must interpret the national legislation in a 
way which is compatible with the Convention . As far as such an interpretation is not 
available, the courts are allowed to make a declaration of incompatibility33, albeit such
26 Bradley, Anthony W.: The Sovereignty o f Parliament, op cit, p 95
27 [1991] 1 A.C. 603, 658
28 Craig, P., Constitutionalism, Regulation and Review, op cit, p 69
29 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution and the British Constitution, op cit, p 63
30 Craig, Paul: Constitutionalism, Regulation and Review, op cit, p 69
31 See for example Leigh, Ian; Lustgarten, Laurence: Making rights real: The courts, remedies, and the Human 
Rights Act, in: C.L.J.. Vol 58 (3), November 1999, pp 509
32 Jacobs, F.: Public Law - The impact o f Europe, in: Public Law. Sweet & Maxwell, London, Spring 1999, pp 
232
33 Human Rights Act 1998, section 4
declarations do not affect the validity of the national legislation34. It empowers the responsible 
Secretary of State to start a procedure in order to amend the offending legislation35. However, 
what the Parliament will do if the Secretary of State proposes such an amendment is not clear. 
In this way its sovereignty is not limited.
j
| Devolution questions the constitutional doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty anew. In the
\ traditional conception of sovereignty power devolved is power retained, as it could be taken
i
back by the Westminster Parliament, which remains “the sun, around which the planets 
revolve”36. The practical political reality, however, renders it a very unlikely eventuality37. 
First, there is the creation of new elected bodies in the Nations as “Parliaments” with a 
democratic mandate. This may lead to a form of “reasoned separatism”, based on the doctrine 
of sovereignty: they may have at least political sovereignty. Second, the devolution of power 
to the Nations raises questions concerning the boundary lines of competence between 
Westminster and the other bodies which are provided with legislative power38. Until recently 
there was no functional boundary in the allocation of responsibilities. This lack of assignment 
of competence produced sometimes confusion39. On the other hand, there was a need to make 
special “constitutional” arrangements for the acts, which should empower the devolved 
institutions. The implementation Bills concerning devolution for Scotland and Wales were 
therefore introduced as “first class”40 constitutional measures, i.e. the Committee stage in the 
House of Commons was taken on the floor of the house41. However, as outlined before, in 
traditional terms this cannot bind Parliament for the future. It is therefore unclear, whether the 
acts represent a real and lasting “constitutional” settlement.
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty has therefore ensured that historically the United 
Kingdom incorporated both a high degree of centralisation and integration. It could therefore 
even be regarded as an extreme case of a unitary state42 in that there is no entrenched legal
34 Reed, Robert: Devolution and the Judiciary, in: Cambridge University, Centre for public law, Constitutional 
Reform in the United Kingdom: Practice and Principles, op cit, p. 27; Craig, Paul: Constitutionalism, Regulation 
and Review, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 70
35 Craig, P: Constitutionalism, Regulation and Review, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 70
36 Barnett, Eric, op cit, p 51; Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution and the British Constitution3 op cit, p 55
37 Craig, Paul: Constitutionalism, Regulation and Review, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 70; 
see further below
38 Reed, Robert, op cit, p 22; see further below
39 Loveland, Ian: Local Authorities, in: Blackburn/ Plant: Constitutional Reform, op cit, p 313
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Constitutional Reform, London, Longman 1999, p 264; Hopkins, John: Regional Government in the EU, in: 
Tindale, Stephen (ed): The state and the nations. The politics of devolution, London, Institute for Public Policy
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status for any public body other than Parliament43. It sought to integrate the whole Welsh, 
Scottish and Northern Irish elites44. Despite the fact that different administrative processes 
existed in the Celtic fringe there are no significant variations in policy implementation45. In 
practice, the United Kingdom is not as simple and easy to understand as a unitary state, but 
something blurred and the product of typical British compromise and incremental reform46. 
Despite this non-perfect form of a unitary state, the United Kingdom was a highly centralised 
state47.
It is difficult to distinguish other bodies outside central government which enjoyed general 
democratic powers in the last few decades. The only institutions enjoying such competence 
were local authorities including their power to make by-laws. These authorities, covering 
geographic areas of established boundaries48, are elected, and may raise revenue. Moreover, 
they have a certain degree of discretion in allocating priorities and determining financial 
allocations49. In view of the lack of any other democratic institution outside Westminster, 
these authorities represented the only balance50 to the power of the Centre. However, even 
this role has been increasingly limited by central government due to their constitutionally 
unfixed structure. The legal basis of these authorities is provided by the Local Government 
Act 1972, which established a uniform two-tier system of county and district councils. But 
this structure was changed in 1985 when the Conservative Government of Mrs Margaret 
Thatcher abolished51 the Greater London Council (GLC) and six other metropolitan county 
councils outside London, seemingly because it disliked the focus which they provided for 
opposition to its policies52. Later, in 1994, this two-tier system was replaced in Wales53 and 
Scotland54 by unitary authorities, with respectively 22 and 32 unitary councils being 
established. This rapid and constant change in the structure and organisation of local 
government has been outpaced by the increasing central control over its expenditure and
Research, 1995, pp 13
43 Bulpitt, Jim: Territory and power in the United Kingdom, op cit, p 236; John, Peter, op cit, p 132; also 
Keating, Michael: Nations against the State: the new politics of nationalism in Quebec. Catalonia and Scotland. 
Macmillan, London 1995,
44 Birch, A.: Nationalism and National Integration. Unwin, London 1989
45 Goldsmith, M.: Managing the periphery in a period, o f fiscal stress, in: Goldsmith, M.: New Research in 
Central- Local Relations, Dartmouth, Aldershot 1986
46 Hassan, Gerry: The new Scotland. Fabian Society Pamphlet, N° 586, London, May 1998
47 Bradbury, Jonathan, Introduction, in: Bradbury/ Mawson: British Regionalism and Devolution, op cit, p 19
48 Barnett, Hilaire: Constitutional and administrative Law. Cavendish, London 1998, p 459
49 Barnett, Eric, op cit, p 64
50 Barnett, Eric, op cit, p 64
51 Local Government (interim provisions) Act 1984; Local Government Act 1985
52 Barnett, Eric, op cit, p 64
53 Local Government (Wales) Act 1994
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revenue-raising powers55. Local councils are statutory bodies and are only allowed to incur 
expenditure for those purposes, which have been authorised by parliamentary legislation56. As 
far as these authorised areas are exceeded, the action is “ultra vires’’ and the expenditure can 
be stopped by the courts57; councillors responsible for unauthorised expenditure may be even 
personally liable58. The local councils as the only democratic elected bodies in the United 
Kingdom outside Westminster are entirely creatures of statute59. Local government does not 
have any entrenched remit of independent action. All powers that they can exercise have been 
conferred by statute.
From a comparative perspective, it is obvious that the United Kingdom did not introduce any 
form of elected regional government. Whilst Britain remained a highly centralised state, there 
were a certain number of States in Western Europe which have moved towards a more 
decentralised structure60. The first example for a regionalised state was the German Republic 
after 1945 (Austria followed shortly later) as the new State emerged as a federal state, with a 
constitutional form agreeing a certain range of governmental power to the Lander, the 
institutional units61 below the federal level. Later, other European States, such as Belgium (in 
1994), France (in 1982), Spain (in 1978) and Italy (in 1972) followed62 suit. In these states, 
there is a deep-rooted sub-national or regional tier of government with a wide range of powers 
concerning local and regional matters. The German Federal Model might be the most salient 
case for such regional bodies63: The Lander as the regional units of the federation enjoy an 
important role in the whole decision-making process of the German State except in some 
areas of reserved matters64 to the federation. Another example for a strong regional layer of 
government is Spain. The Spanish communidades autonomas are provided by the
54 Scotland (Local Government) Act 1994
55 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 462, pp 466
56 Barnett, Eric, op cit, p 65
57 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 462
58 Barnett, Eric, op cit, p 65; Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 462-4
59 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 458
60 Roht-Arriaza, Naomi: The CoR and the Role o f Regional Governments in the EU, in: Hastings International & 
Comparative Law Review. Vol 20, University of Hastings, Winter 1997, pp 417
61 Jones, Barry, in: Jones, Barry; Keating, Michael: Regions in the European Communities. Clarendon, Oxford 
1985, p 238
62 Wiedmann, Thomas: Idee und Gestalt der Region in Europa, Nomos, Baden-Baden 1996, pp 254; Hopkins, 
John: Devolution from a comparative perspective, in: European Public Law. Vol 4 (3), Kluwer Law 
International, Amsterdam 1998; Keating, M ichael: Europeanism and Regionalism, in: Keating, Michael; Jones, 
Barry: The European Union and the Regions. Clarendon, Oxford 1995
63 Jeffery, Charlie: The decentralisation debate in the UK: Role-Modell Deutschland?, in: Scottish Affairs. N° 
19, spring 1997, pp 42; Hopkins, John, op cit, pp 13
64 Art. 73-75 GG
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Constitution65 with a wide range of powers. Similar provisions are made in France, Italy, and 
Belgium66. In these countries, all sub-national tiers of government, either the regional or the 
local bodies, have entrenched legal status and they are not in the same way limited as the 
British authorities by the legal doctrine of “ultra vires”. This doctrine means that local 
government is entirely dependent upon the national legislature to carry out an activity67. In 
Germany, for example, both the Lander and the local authorities have a constitutional status,
iTQ
which is provided by the Grundgesetz, the German Constitution . This means that these 
authorities have a restricted realm of responsibility, which cannot be limited by the national 
Parliament69. Any interference of national legislation with this realm can be challenged at the 
Constitutional Court70. In the same manner, the Spanish communidades autonomes are 
constitutionally empowered to ensure the exercise of their constitutional rights71.
The United Kingdom has been a centralised state, but there were at all times discussions about 
the best territorial organisation. Hence, devolution has long been an issue in UK politics for 
consideration in constitutional law. It was raised in respect of treatment of separate nations in 
the United Kingdom. It has thus been connected to the movement based on national identity72. 
However, the question of the relation between British Centre and the other Nations cannot be 
addressed except within the context of the former British Empire. The transformation of the 
British Empire into a “Commonwealth of independent nations” is meaningful in this context, 
as it was undoubtedly a successfully managed challenge for the United Kingdom73. Following 
the shock of the American war of independence in 1776, when the most important colonies of 
the first British Empire dissolved, the United Kingdom was able to find new solutions for 
other colonies with similar problems. The political elite of the United Kingdom was 
apparently capable to take lessons from this secession. At the same time, the British political 
system itself was under enormous pressure of social change due to the industrial revolution. It 
has been argued that this internal success was due to the fact that the British Constitution was 
never limited by a written document74. The successful transformation of the former British
65 Art. 148 of the Spanish Constitution
66 See Wiedmann, Thomas, op cit, or Hopkins, John, Devolution from a comparative perspective, op cit
67 John, Peter, op cit, p 132
68 Art. 30 GG and Art. 28 GG respectively
69 Barnett, Eric, op cit, pp 66 (concerning local government)
70 Art. 93 GG
71 Hazell, Robert; O’Leary, Brendan: A rolling programme o f devolution, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional 
Futures. OUP, Oxford 1999, pp 24; Wiedmann, Thomas, op cit, p 187
72 Drucker, Henry; Brown, Gordon: The politics of nationalism and devolution. Longman, London 1980
73 Davies, Norman: The Isles, op cit, p 911; Ansprenger, Franz: Erbe des Empire -  Bedeutungswandel des 
Commonwealth, in: Kastendiek, Hans: Landerbericht Grossbritannien. Bundeszentrale, Bonn 1998, p 406
74 Ansprenger, Franz, op cit, p 407; see also Thomson, David: England in the nineteenth century. Penguin,
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colonies was based on the policy of progressing autonomy: the developing nations achieved 
gradually more autonomy and self-government, however, before the question of self- 
determination was tabled75.
B. Home Rule, Devolution and Ireland
The issue of devolution of power raised within the United Kingdom first in respect of Ireland. 
Ireland had always a special relationship with the United Kingdom. The Irish country itself 
was originally catholic. However, after a period of implantation of Ulster by Protestants in the 
seventeenth century the indigenous, that means catholic, population became gradually treated
K\as second-class citizens . They were finally excluded from the Irish Parliament in 1692 and 
also disfranchised in 1727. Thus the Irish Parliament represented on the one hand the centre 
of the Nations political life, but the “political” nation at this moment was only the Protestant 
nation77. In 1782 the Irish Parliament was given back a co-ordinate power with the 
Westminster Parliament -  leaving the Catholic majority aside, which had no right to vote78. 
With respect to the fear of an invasion of Napoleon Bonaparte, England proposed in 1800 a 
union under one parliament in Westminster. The Irish catholic majority supporting the union
7 0expected its emancipation . However, the then King George III refused with reference to his 
oath requiring the maintenance of the Protestant religion80. In the middle of the nineteenth 
century after a gradually degrading economic and social situation and a famine81, the catholic 
majority was finally led to believe that only a separation from Britain could bring an 
improvement despite the different efforts to appease catholic opinion82. Consequently, when 
the Irish males could vote for the first time in 1885 the nationalists won most of the seats83.
When the Liberal British Prime Minister W. E. Gladstone had to deal with the “Irish 
question”, he wanted to give Ireland political rights instead of making efforts of kindness. He 
sought a constitutionally balanced solution for Ireland on the one hand, and the safeguard of 
British interests on the other hand. He accepted that Britain could only survive by recognising
London 1978, p 28
75 Ansprenger, Franz, op cit, p 407
76 Kearney, Hugh: The British Isles, A History of four Nations. CUP, Cambridge 1989, p 1489
77 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 16, p 56
78 Kearney, Hugh, op cit, pp 211
79 Kearney, Hugh, op cit, pp 213
80 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 17
81 Kearney, Hugh, op cit, p 241-3
82 Kearney, Hugh, op cit, p 214
83 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 17
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RJ.the multinational character of its union . Gladstone proposed a “home rule” model for Ireland 
to provide a certain degree of autonomy. Actually, “home rule” had the same guiding 
principles as devolution85: it should involve the transfer of certain powers from the superior to 
an inferior political authority, i.e. an Irish body avoiding the term, parliament86. The Irish 
Nationalist leader, John Redmond defined it as “the idea ... [of] the desirability of finding 
some middle course between separation on the one hand and over-centralisation on the
on
other” . From the standpoint of Gladstone, Irish “home rule” should secure the “main ends of 
civilised life”88 by allowing Ireland to govern itself in its domestic affairs whilst remaining 
part of the United Kingdom. As a result, Irish “home rule” was the most divisive question of 
British politics between 1886 and 191489. In this period three “home rule” bills were 
introduced into the Westminster Parliament90. Gladstone’s proposals for Irish home rule were 
essentially based on fundamental values, which had already been successfully applied in 
imperial relations91, i.e. in Canada92. In his view, home rule was an idea, which was especially
Q<5
founded on history and traditions, while aiming to restore, not to alter the Empire . “The 
creation of such legislatures had in certain cases been an instrument, not of dismembering, but 
of consolidating Empire”94, he thought.
This belief rested crucially on the assumption that home rule would cater to a “local 
patriotism” that could be made compatible with remaining in the United Kingdom95. 
However, his proposals for home rule had three main deficiencies: Firstly, there was no clear 
solution to the question of how Ireland should be represented at Westminster after home 
rule96. Should Irish MPs after the implementation of “home rule” continue to vote on the 
domestic affairs for England or Scotland, when English MPs would be no longer able to vote 
on domestic affairs of Ireland? Another problem was the financial arrangements of the “home
84 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 18
85 Brand, Jack; Mitchell, James: Home Rule in Scotland, in: Bradbury/ Mawson: British Regionalism, op cit, p 
36
86 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 19
87 Redmond, John: Historical and Political Adresses, 1883-1897, cited in Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the 
UK. op cit, p 20
88 Gladstone Papers, May 1886, BL Add. MS 44772, cited in Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 
19
89 Kearney, Hugh, op cit, p 234; Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 19
90 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 19
91 See above
92 Hadfield, Brigid: The Constitution of Northern Ireland. Belfast, SLS 1989, p 6
93 Gladstone, William: Special Aspects of the Irish Question. John Murray, London 1892, p 47
94 Memorandum to the Queen, March 1886: Gladstone Papers, BL Add. MS 40469, f. 20 cited in Bogdanor, 
Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 300
95 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution, op cit, p 13
96 Hadfield, Brigid, op cit, p 13
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rule” scheme. Taxation-powers could not be divided in a way which combined equity 
between the different parts of the country and financial autonomy for Ireland97. Finally, 
Gladstone was not able to prove that the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament would 
remain more than a symbolic one98. His proposals were based on the colonial self-government 
in Canada. There, however, a really federal division of powers has been applied99. 
Nonetheless, home rule failed100 not only for its constitutional deficiencies. It was also 
refused from the right and the left for social and economic reasons101. The following refusal 
of home rule did, however, not solve the Irish question102. Nonetheless, all the arguments of 
the “home rule” debate in the 1880s were to come back in later periods as the key problems of 
devolution.
These constitutionally insuperable deficiencies of any form of Irish “home rule” led some 
politicians to discover an easier model, which could reconcile the Irish wish for more 
autonomy and the requirements of sovereignty of parliament103. It was the proposal of a 
“federal solution”. However, the proposition was thereby not intended to divide powers and 
sovereignty constitutionally like the American Constitution does104. Here might have been the 
start of the continuing105 misleading understanding of federalism in the United Kingdom. In 
Britain, federalism is seen as a very centralist form of government. It has then been said, that 
“Federalism was a misnomer. But devolution has noisome associations. Home rule all around 
worse. Federalism has been a success everywhere and people will therefore not be inclined to 
fight shy of the word”106. In fact, the supporters of federalism meant a policy of general 
devolution or “Home- Rule- All- Round”107. Ireland, and Scotland, Wales and England should 
get some form of legislatures whilst retaining the Westminster sovereignty and solving the 
deficiencies of the Gladstonian “home rule” proposals by avoiding the problems of a lob­
sided constitution108. As a result of such a form of “federalism”, the different parts of the 
United Kingdom would be treated equally. On the one hand, “federalism” would therefore
97 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 29; Hadfield, Brigid, op cit, p 15
98 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 29
99 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 27
100 Hennessey, Thomas: A history of Northern Ireland. Macmillan, London 1997, pp 1
101 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 52
102 Hadfield, Brigid, op cit, pp 15
103 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 44
104 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 44
105 Burrows, Bernhard; Denton, Goeffrey: Devolution or Federalism. Macmillan, London 1980, p 5; Sturm, 
Roland: Kein totes Gleis britischer Politik, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 6 May 1999, p 14
106 Kerr, Philip, quoted in: Kendle, J.E.: The round table movement and „Home- Rule- All- Round", in:
Historical Journal. Vol 11, London 1968, p 338
107 Burrows/ Denton, op cit, p 7; Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 44
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safeguard the unity of the kingdom and protect against separatism. “Federalism” would, on 
the other hand, involve a massive constitutional upheaval. However, the federalist solution 
remained an almost unrealised idea. The most obvious objection to this constitutional system 
was that it gave to England a constitution that it did not want only to retain Ireland within the 
United Kingdom. Lord Curzon explained to the War Cabinet in July 1918 that “he was not 
prepared to pull up the British Constitution by the roots in order to get Ireland out of her 
difficulties”109. Apart from that, federalism was put forward in the context of constitutional 
arrangements for the Commonwealth as an imperial federation110.
Whilst Irish home rule failed before 1914, it was to re-emerge after the First World War. As 
the war drew to a close in 1918, the British government once more tried to settle the Irish 
question by legislating for “home rule” for the fourth time. Then, “devolution” was also seen 
in the context of an overloaded Westminster Parliament111, which sought to reduce its work 
schedule. The Government of Ireland Act 1914 was scheduled to be enacted automatically on 
the ratification of peace between the Great powers112. Albeit the Act was supposed to be 
politically impossible to amend, neither the nationalists nor the unionists found it now 
suitable. The government therefore set up a Committee under the leadership of Walter Long, 
the former leader of the Irish Unionist Party to elaborate a new scheme of self-government for 
the Isle. Long himself found that Ulster Unionists would accept “home rule” only if at least 
six of the nine Ulster counties remained outside the juridical responsibility of the Irish
i i q
“parliament” . Thus, the Committee conceived its proposals in the general context of 
devolution for the United Kingdom as a whole114. As the Bill passed the House of Commons, 
the position of the Nationalists was troubled by discussions between Sinn Fein and the Irish 
Party. These discussions were finished by a broad majority of Sinn Fein at the general 
election in 1918, but Sinn Fein’s MPs rejected their seats at Westminster115 and constituted 
themselves in Dublin as the Parliament of Ireland, Dail Eirann. There, it issued a declaration 
of independence, in which they announced an Irish Republic in January 1919116. 
Consequently, the Nationalists did not influence the elaboration of the “home rule” bill
109 Cited in Fair, John: British Interpartv Conferences. OUP, Oxford 1980, p 229
110 Wheare, K.C.: Federal Government, 4th edition, OUP, Oxford 1963, p 9
111 Bradbury, Jonathan: British Regionalism and Devolution, op cit, p 12; Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution. OUP, 
Oxford 1979, p 36
112 Hennessey, Thomas, op cit, p 4
113 Kendle, John: Ireland and the federal solution: The debate over the United Kingdom Constitution. Kingston 
1989, p 188
114 Hennessey, Thomas, op cit, p 5
115 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 64
116 Hennessey, Thomas, op cit, p 9
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(including the boundaries), that became the Government of Ireland Act 1920. It created two 
new jurisdictions with their own Parliaments117: one in Dublin and one in Belfast. Thus, the 
partition of the Isle was institutionalised118. The establishment of a separate Parliament for 
Northern Ireland was defended on the grounds that a later reunification of Ireland would be 
easier119.
The Government of Ireland Act was supposed to apply for Ireland as a whole. However, it
190came only into effect in the northern part of the Isle . In the Southern part, Sinn Fein did not 
claim “home rule” but independence121. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 finally assured the 
independence of the South. (Southern) Ireland was to become a self-governing dominion 
within the British Empire122, the so-called “Irish Free State”123. The Irish Free State Act 
amended the Act of Union by excluding the Southern counties from its jurisdiction124. 
Northern Ireland was given the choice to secede125 from the Free State, whilst retaining its
1 O ftown “home rule” scheme . The six northern counties naturally did not hesitate to accept this 
offer. Therefore, “home rule” for Northern Ireland remained the relic of a political failure: 
The solution of the Irish question. Consequently, the case study of Northern Ireland in relation 
of devolution is limited by two factors127. The underlying weakness of its exemplarity is at 
first, that its parliament was not established to meet a nationalist or separatist threat. However, 
this is in general the reason for devolved parliaments128. The new Ulster parliament at Belfast, 
called “Stormont”, was not demanded by the Unionist, but enforced by the British 
government to provide the end of direct rule from Westminster. The second argument for the 
unique character of the Northern Ireland example is that the situation in Ireland with its deep 
historical roots was (and is) exceptional. On the one hand the primarily protestant Unionists, 
who sought to remain entirely under central control, and on the other hand the catholic group 
of Nationalists, who wanted one Irish State129. Apart from that, the claim130 of the Irish Free 
State and the Irish Republic respectively on Northern Ireland justified the work of all
117 Hennessey, Thomas, op cit, p 9
118 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 64; Hadfield, Brigid, op cit, p 31
119 Kendle, John: Walter Long. Ireland and the Union. Queen’s University, Montreal 1992, p 183
120 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 66
121 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 66
122 Irish Free State (Agreement) Act 1922
123 Hennessey, Thomas, op cit, p 21
124 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 69
125 Article 12 of the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act 1922
126 Hadfield, Brigid, op cit, p 34
127 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 55
128 Barnett, Eric, op cit, p 59
129 Hadfield, Brigid, op cit, pp 5
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nationalist groups in Ulster. In this context, the North-South Council set up in the Act was 
never able to serve as a bridge for the later re-unification of Ireland and was destroyed by 
protestant opposition.
Despite these limitations, different lessons can be drawn from the Northern Ireland devolution 
scheme, which lasted for over fifty years. Northern Ireland had its status as part of the United 
Kingdom through the Act of Union 1800, but the Government of Ireland Act 1920 became
101
finally the Constitution of Northern Ireland . The Act divided legislative and financial 
powers132 between the two Parliaments and provided for machinery by which the Constitution 
could be safeguarded from any breach by the Northern Ireland Parliament. The 1920 Act
■I 0*3
established a bicameral Parliament and provided for reduced representation of Northern 
Ireland at Westminster. It was stipulated that there should be a Lower House134 (modelled 
alongside the House of Commons) and a Senate135 (The House of Lords). The Members of the 
Lower House should be elected by proportional representation in General Elections. The 26136 
Members of the Senate were to be elected by the Members of the Lower House according to a 
system of proportional representation137. The Act transferred138 to Belfast the general power 
to make laws for “the peace, order and good government” of the Province. This devolution of 
power was residual, as there were several enumerated restrictions139. At the outset, there was a 
realm of excepted matters, which remained within the exclusive competence of 
Westminster140. These matters dealt with national or imperial concerns, such as foreign affairs 
or defence. Secondly, the area of reserved matters was equated with the excepted matters and 
was to remain at Westminster. The reserved matters should originally be devolved to a Irish 
Parliament for the whole Isle141. They included a Supreme Court, certain taxes, postal services 
and savings banks. Following the general grant of power, the Stormont Parliament was 
responsible for all matters except the reserved and excepted ones (“transferred matters”). The 
Act provided142 also that the Belfast Parliament was prohibited from enacting laws interfering 
with religious equality and to take property without compensation.
131 Hadfield, Brigid, op cit, pp 45
132 Hadfield, Brigid, op cit, p 48-9
133 Section 14 (4)
134 Section 14
135 Section 13
136 Excluding the Mayors of Belfast and Londonderry
137 Hadfield, Brigid, op cit, p 55
138 Section 4(1)
139 Hadfield, Brigid, op cit, p 48
140 Section 4 (7)
141 Hadfield, Brigid, op cit, p 77
142 Section 5
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The Act stipulated that the validity of Northern Ireland’s legislation could be challenged and 
in doing so it enforced the sovereignty of Westminster143. It allowed for appeal to the 
Northern Irish Courts. Special provision was made for constitutional matters. They were to be 
raised at the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the House of Lords144. Consequently, 
statutes made by the Northern Ireland Parliament, albeit a subordinate parliament, could be 
declared void for being “ultra vires”145. Therefore, the courts were allowed to invalidate acts 
of parliament146. It is also noteworthy, that Northern Ireland was represented at Westminster, 
but in a reduced number of thirteen members147.
The Westminster Parliament maintained, in the Act, that its sovereignty remained unaffected 
and that the new Parliament at Belfast was sub-ordinate148. Therefore, it might have been 
possible that Westminster legislates even in areas of devolved matters. However, such 
attempts would have been “unconstitutional”149. In theory, however, the general diceyan150 
conception was followed by several sections151 of the Act 1920. In practice, on the contrary, 
the relationship between Stormont and Westminster became rather federal, as the province
I c j
enjoyed a rather large degree of autonomy . This was due to the fact that the provisions of 
the Act were unpractical and inconsistent with the general idea of devolution. Having 
legislated for this form of Northern Irish self-government, Westminster was never intended to 
enact interfering bills, i.e. to overrule Stormont. It could be argued that this was omitted by 
convention153 or as being unconstitutional154. Thus, Westminster did intervene by direct 
legislation on no occasion until 1969155. However, the provisions were unpractical, that means 
ineffective. This can be best showed by the way in which the United Kingdom could uphold 
the respect of the constitution, i.e. in constitutional practice of Northern Ireland. The 
Government of Ireland Act 1920 provided that the Belfast Parliament was prohibited from 
making laws interfering with religious equality156. However, Westminster had no right157 to
143 Section 49 and 50
144 Section 51
145 See further below
146 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 72
147 Hadfield, Brigid: The constitution of Northern Ireland, op cit, p 59
148 Section 75
149 Jennings, Ivor, op cit, p 157
150 See above
151 Section 6, 12 and 75
152 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 72
153 Hadfield, Brigid, op cit, p 80
154 See above
155 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 73
156 See above
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keep up equal treatment of the catholic population in Ulster. In practice, it became obvious 
that this was an Achilles’ heel, because the catholic minority has been consequently 
discriminated. First, it has been excluded from the nomination of judges158. Thus, “the only 
area of the United Kingdom where there were constitutionally entrenched safeguards against 
religious discrimination was also the only area in which discrimination was prevalent and 
unchecked”159. This led the protestant majority later to attempt that their political power was 
enforced: Stormont abolished the system of proportional representation in local government 
elections160. Westminster was aware of the problem, however, it hesitated to overrule the 
Stormont Parliament. The British government wanted to stop this measure as a breach of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 by withhold of the Royal assent. Belfast, in contrast, argued that 
the bill was clearly within its powers and was willing to resign, if Westminster overruled it. 
Thus, the British Government receded161. The consequence of this retreat was that Stormont 
went further and rearranged162 the boundaries in the interest of the Protestants. And finally, 
even the proportional representation for the elections of the Stormont Parliament were 
abolished in 1929. Under the previous system of proportional representation, the Catholic 
minority had a fair status in the province. With other discriminating measures added over the 
years, the situation exploded finally in violent protest in 1968163.
The Constitution of Northern Ireland did not provide for these acts, but Westminster was 
apparently unwilling to assert its sovereignty164. There was a lack of information. For 
example, the Parliament of the United Kingdom spent only two hours a year on average to 
Northern Irish questions between 1921 and 1968165. The inattention of Westminster was 
combined with a general ignorance166 in Britain. Thus, one part of the conflicting and violent 
development in the province was based on the failure of the British government to control 
effectively civil rights in Northern Ireland. Practically, however, the province enjoyed a quasi- 
federal status in this time.
157 Section 5(1) ,  8(6)
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In the early 1960s Northern Ireland’s new prime minister, Terence O ’Neill, offered a new and
1 68modernist image of Ulster Unionism . He intended to stress the economic problems of the 
province rather than the religious conflict and tried to integrate the catholic minority by this 
way. That “new spirit”169, however, could not prevent the minority pushing for more reforms. 
Like all his successors in reformist Unionism, O ’Neill was in a peculiar situation. On the one 
hand, Unionism was offered a new chance by his political overture but, on the other hand, it 
was increasingly difficult for the British government to depend upon O ’Neill. For the 
catholics, the pace of reforms was not fast enough. The British government, however, could 
force reforms on a Unionist prime minister, but only at the expense of compromising his 
position both in Ulster and within its own party170. The violent development in Ulster in 1968 
made it necessary that central government was involved in Northern Ireland’s politics 
directly. However, the “explication of British policy” to the Belfast government was belated 
and Westminster was gradually convinced that only a direct rule scheme could bring the 
control of the province171.
A new constitutional structure was covered by the Northern Ireland Act 1973, which 
contained like its predecessor of 1920 three categories of power, excepted, minimum reserved 
and transferred matters172. The Act provided for a power-sharing executive whose powers 
should be determined after its initial establishment. These questions were addressed in 
December 1973 at Sunningdale, where the British, Irish and Northern Irish governments met. 
At the conclusion of the conference agreement on the establishment of a “Council of Ireland” 
was reached, but that agreement could not be realised. The Unionists repudiated the 
agreement, leaving the power-sharing executive isolated173. The agreement was also 
challenged in the Irish Republic as a breach of the constitution”, because it claimed to accept 
the will of the Northern Irish population over their future. Even if the 1973 Act might have 
been a “bold and hopeful experiment”174, it once more gave the responsibility for the province 
to the Ulstermen themselves. The provisions lacked the necessary political and public support 
-  it was alleged that Whitehall had “betrayed Ulster”175 -  and the experiment was finished in 
1974.
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Following the break out of disorder in Ulster, there was no immediate attempt to look for a
1 a / r
new solution . Temporary arrangements for the province were sought for the orderly 
government of Northern Ireland177. Under the scheme of “direct rule”, the laws, which were 
made by primary legislation in other parts of the United Kingdom, were made largely by
17ROrders in Council for Northern Ireland . The province was constitutionally not re-integrated 
in the British State, but Westminster wanted to retain the control over the province applied by 
a Secretary of State179. Consequently, the parliamentary control over Ulster was less open
1 ROthan for the rest of the United Kingdom . The most serious defects of these systems were 
that they gave the political parties, which are completely different181 from the British parties, 
“all the advantages of political activity with none of the disadvantages of responsibility”182. 
There was thus a clear experience how devolution may not work successfully.
C. Nationalism and Devolution in Scotland, Wales and England
Even if the British state had a high degree of centralisation, the British government made 
special arrangements for the government in Scotland, Wales and England. From a general 
standpoint, it has been obvious that Scotland gained a lot from its membership in the United 
Kingdom since the beginning of the century, especially with respect to its ‘good deal’ in 
welfare. In the Acts of Union 1707 Scotland could preserve its own Church, special 
arrangements in education and its own legal system. It was also allowed to send a relative 
higher number of MPs to Westminster. In 1885 a Secretary of State for Scotland was re­
established and became Member of the Cabinet in 1892183. He presides over the Scottish 
Office, which has become central government’s executive arm in Scotland. Thus, Scotland 
has always been in a privileged position to demand more from the centre. Wales though being 
conquered at early times received similar treatment in 1960s. A Welsh Office was established
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in 1964 and like Scotland special arrangements were made in the House of Commons. 
England itself, however, always being dominant within the British state was only for 
administrative reasons split into eight regions (with Regional Economic Planning Councils) in 
1964. Later Government Offices have been established in these regions. These special 
treatments for the different territorial units have been described as “executive regionalism” 
within the British state184.
However, these arrangements proved unsatisfactory. New devolution debates arose in the 
1960s which were not due to the problems in Northern Ireland. Their main impulse came 
especially from Scotland and to a lesser extent from Wales185. The first modem political
1 R6movement leading Scottish nationalism had been founded in 1886 . The Scottish Home
Rule Association was set up in order to change the “legislative neglect of Scotland”187. A 
distinct political nationalist party was not created before 1934, when John MacCormick 
founded the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP). MacCormick himself has sought to fight for a 
Scottish “home rule” scheme, but he was rather quickly ousted from the leadership and the 
SNP became a explicitly separatist party188. Since the general elections hold in 1955 the SNP 
has been able to increase its support steadily189. In 1966, the SNP gained 5 per cent190 and 
won soon after a by-election in Hamilton -  a stronghold of the Labour Party191. After a time 
of economic growth, political participation became an increasingly important issue at this 
time. Apart from the Scot’s political participation, the SNP stressed the national character of 
the recently discovered oil resources in the North Sea. The slogan “It’s Scotland’s oil!” was 
put forward. In Wales, the nationalist party Plaid Cymru never reached the same role as the 
SNP, but it was also able to win its initial constituencies in the 1960s. The nationalist ascent 
has developed192 further and its threat enforced the political centre in London to react193. The 
then Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson proposed in 1968 a Royal Commission on the 
Constitution to investigate the situation. He remarked, however, that Royal Commissions 
“take minutes and spend years”194 implying that the Commission would “kill devolution”195
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when it was appointed in 1969. Officially, the Commission was charged to
“examine the present functions of the central legislature and government in relation to 
the several countries, nations and regions of the United Kingdom; to consider, having 
regard to developments in local government organisation and in the administrative and 
other relationships between the various parts of the United Kingdom, ... whether any 
changes are desirable in those functions or otherwise in present constitutional and 
economic relationship; to consider, also, whether any changes are desirable in the 
constitutional and economic relationship...”196.
Meanwhile, the general election of 1970 returned a new Conservative government with 
Edward Heath as Prime Minister. He was not insensitive to the argument for devolution to 
Scotland, as this would allow contrasting Conservative sensitivities with the centralising 
tendencies of the Labour Party197. Thus, the Conservatives became apparently the first of the 
two major parties to support devolution. In the “declaration of Perth198” in 1968, Heath 
favoured a directly elected Scottish assembly199. To prove his commitment to devolution, he 
established a Scottish Constitutional Committee200. In contrast to the Royal Commission, this 
Committee had to consider whether “it was possible to meet the desire of the majority of the 
people of Scotland to have a greater say in the conduct of their own affairs”201 -  quite an 
opportunistic instruction. The Committee reported in March 1970 by proposing Scottish 
assembly within the Westminster machinery202. This part of the proposal was evidently seen 
as weakness, but it had the advantage of being a “natural evolution ... of parliamentary 
practice203”. However, the Heath government made no move to establish that Assembly204. 
The reason for this hesitation205 might have been that the government did not want to 
anticipate the report of the Royal Commission of the Constitution206. Additionally, the Heath
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government proceeded with the local government reform207 in Scotland, which was 
incompatible with the establishment of an Scottish Assembly at the same time. However, this 
was the end of the Conservative move in favour of devolution, because in 1975 when the anti- 
devolutionist Margaret Thatcher became the successor to Edward Heath in the leadership of 
the party the proposals fell short208.
In October 1973 the report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution was finally 
published. Its members were united in the commitment that something had to change in the 
system of government, but they were divided on the kind of reforms that were desirable209. 
Moreover, their report was a rather unusual proposition210 of a Royal Constitution, because it 
contained a lot of individual opinions and different objections. Thus, the report was divided in 
two parts: the report of the majority and a memorandum of dissent211. Lord Crowther-Hunt 
and Professor Alan Peacock, who supported a scheme of federal212 devolution to Scotland, 
Wales, Northern Ireland and the English regions, issued the latter. The report of the majority 
proposed a form of devolution for Scotland and Wales, whilst beginning to distinguish 
thoroughly between separatism, federalism and devolution. This was made because the main 
line of division within the Commission was between a minority opting for a completely 
reformed federal state and a majority preferring only minor changes within the current
213system .
The majority rejected “federalism” as a solution for the United Kingdom in favour of 
devolution. First, questionably, they issued in their statement that “it is widely accepted that 
even at its best federalism is an awkward system to operate”214. Canadian federalism would 
have evidenced desirable change being avoided and proved as an inflexible system of 
government215. Secondly, for the majority of the Commission the application of federalism to 
the United Kingdom was seen as “particularly unsuitable”. That view was based, on the one 
hand, on the fact that no “unitary state comparable to the United Kingdom has ever changed 
to federalism, with the exception of Western Germany after the Second World War”. The 
circumstances of that case were, however, unique and, federalism was designed and is
207 Bradbury, Jonathan, in: British Regionalism, op cit, p 15
208 Bradbury, Jonathan, in: British Regionalism, op cit, p 16
209 Drucker/ Brown, op cit, p 59
210 Drucker/ Brown, op cit, p 59; Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 173
211 Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), Cmnd. 5460-1, op cit
212 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 172
213 Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), Cmnd. 5460-1, op cit, Parts IV-V
214 Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), Cmnd. 5460-1, op cit, para 520
25
appropriate for states coming together to form a single unit, and not far a state breaking up
91 f\into smaller units . Federalism was also rejected, because it would require a written 
constitution placing the elected bodies in a position subordinate to the judiciary. That 
situation, probably unavoidable in a federal system, is “foreign to our own tradition”217. 
Additionally, the majority of the Commission saw no solution to the dominant position of 
England in federation. Even if England was split up into several provinces, the south-east 
might dominate the federation according to its huge population218. Finally, the Commissioners 
feared the undermining tendency of federalism for the political and economic unity of the 
country219. Hence, the majority of the Commission favoured devolution, as they took into 
account the centralisation, the increasing weakening of democracy and the national feelings in 
Scotland and Wales220. Devolution, for them, thus “could go a great deal to cure the particular 
faults which we have been mainly concerned, those which are essentially regional in 
character221”.
Conversely, the Memorandum of dissent interpreted its task more widely and its authors 
thought, “only if we recommend the abolition of the Monarchy would we be in conflict with 
our terms of reference”222. Both interpreted the “terms of reference as meaning that we should 
consider what changes might be necessary in our system of government as a whole if it is not 
to meet the needs and aspirations of the people223. Our colleagues do not give an analytical 
assessment of the validity or otherwise of the particular complaints about our system of 
government [...] and summarise these complaints under such headings as “centralisation” and 
“the weakening of democracy”, but nowhere do they say whether [...] the complaints [...] are 
justified”224. Therefore, Crowther-Hunt and Peacock envisaged a reform of the entire system 
of government and recommended the adoption of a federal model like it is practised in 
Germany whilst including different adjustments referring to the British tradition and 
practice225. This comprised a devolution scheme for England, where five regional assemblies 
were to be established, and different models of devolution with legislative, executive, 
advisory powers and tax raising powers. This proposition had two weaknesses: First, it did
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devolve power to the English regions, albeit there was no popular demand for such bodies 
and, secondly, it made no special provision for the Scottish legal system, which was to remain
00 ftin the area of Westminster responsibility .
The majority’s report proposed227 in contrast a devolution scheme only for Scotland and 
Wales based on the argument that these two Nations wanted to have devolution according to 
opinion polls228. However, if there should be devolution to Scotland and Wales it should go 
along with the abolition of the Secretary of States and the equalisation of their Westminster 
representation. Apart from that, the whole Commission recommended that the new assemblies 
should enjoy the greatest financial scope consistent with the political and economic unity of 
the United Kingdom229. The question, what role would be attributed to Scottish and Welsh 
MPs after devolution did not raise any problem in the report230, although this problem worried 
Gladstone eighty years before231. The report’s legacy might be, however, that devolution to 
Scotland and Wales would not have an impact on England232 and that the recent Membership 
of the United Kingdom in the European Community would not affect devolution. The main 
report declared, that “momentous as entry to Europe is, it does not have any major specific 
consequences for the questions remitted to us. In particular, it does not rule out 
devolution”233. The contradictory parts of the report did not give a clear direction for possible
devolution debates and the report passed briefly the House of Commons. Apart from that, the
report of the Kilbrandon Commission represented the most comprehensive investigation of 
the constitutional issues of devolution in the United Kingdom.
Irrespective of the Kilbrandon report, however, devolution returned to the political agenda 
after the election of the Labour MP Harold Wilson as Prime Minister in 1974. Labour was 
under electoral pressure in Scotland confronted with the threat of the growing support for the 
SNP234. The Scottish Labour Party had rejected devolution in 1968 declaring “We think that 
legislative devolution would damage Scotland’s economic development”235. The Labour 
national election manifesto in March 1974 was silent about devolution, albeit the Welsh
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Labour group proposed a directly elected council for Wales236. However, for the general 
election of October 1974, Labour presented itself as committed to devolution237, and 
published for the first time a separate Scottish manifesto238. This was not really demanded 
from the Scottish Party239, but was introduced by the centre for tactical and strategic 
reasons240. Just before the election, Wilson presented in September 1974 a White Paper241 
laying down its “decisions of principles” for devolution. The White Paper broadly furthered 
the general ideas of the Kilbrandon Commission’s main report, but differed on certain points 
of principle242. The Labour government wanted to create directly elected assemblies in 
Scotland and Wales, whereby the Scottish one would have legislative powers, whilst it 
attributed to the Welsh only executive powers. There was no difference with the Kilbrandon 
proposals. In contrast to the Royal Commission, however, these bodies should be financed by 
block-grant allocated by Parliament and they would not have tax rising powers. Furthermore 
the White Paper saw no need to reduce the number of Scottish or Welsh MPs at Westminster. 
Nor were the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales to be abolished. In addition, the new 
bodies should be elected by the first-past-the-post system, whilst devolution in England would 
be postponed for further consideration.
However, these “principles” were formulated in the context of Labour’s electoral campaign 
and were dominated by fear of electoral gains of the SNP. They lacked “any particular 
conviction of the merits of devolution”243. This included an important opposition of some 
senior ministers of Wilson’s Cabinet244. In preparation of the Government of Scotland and 
Wales Act 1978 these “principles” were detailed more preciously in another White Paper245. 
'Iherein, the government endeavoured to show a minimalist approach to devolution. The new 
bodies should follow different types -  proposing an executive model for Wales and a 
legislative model for Scotland -  but they should be established by one act. The White Paper
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included restraints to prevent the assemblies from undermining the British government246. 
With these stipulations the Government of Scotland and Wales Bill was introduced in the 
Commons, whilst the new Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan declared that “a new 
settlement among the nations ...[of] the United Kingdom247” would be promoted with the Bill. 
However, the Bill encountered several difficulties. Initially, it was obvious that the
' J A Q
devolution- commitment of a wide range of Labour back-benchers was only lukewarm and 
that the Bill in its original form would have complications to get a majority in the 
Commons249. The cold reaction of some Labour MPs to devolution had historical reasons250, 
because the Party was opposed to devolution in Scotland until recently251. There were three 
different types of reasons. First, from an ideological standpoint, the Labour party still 
supported democratic socialism which has been seen as dependent on centralisation. 
Secondly, territorial aspects were put forward from Labour’s English MPs from the North- 
East, to whom devolution did not offer any advantage. Thirdly, another group of MPs stressed 
the constitutional problems of devolution252. The Callaghan government proposed therefore, 
that the Bill might be supplemented with a referendum clause253. Thus, the substantial popular 
support which had been put forward by the government could be tested. Another obstacle for 
the Bill was its apparent inadequacy254. Even passionate advocates of devolution wanted to 
repeal the bill, as it included “appalling difficulties” which could endanger the unity of the 
country”255. Therefore, a new attempt was undertaken in March after the parliamentary defeat 
of the first devolution bill in February256. Then, Labour agreed to a pact with the Liberals257 
who wanted to see the creation of a better legislation, but they failed to include in the 
agreement the aim of proportional representation and tax-raising powers for the devolved 
bodies. The new bill was now divided into one for Scotland and one for Wales -  including 
referendums. The majority of Labour and Liberals was large enough to secure its approval, 
although two major amendments were made at the end. The first one, the so-called “Ferrers
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amendment”, tabled in the House of Lords concerned a constitutionally and politically258 
important matter. It provided that if any vote in the House of Commons on a devolved matter 
of Scottish legislation was secured with the Scottish MPs, it could be demanded that this vote 
has to be repeated two weeks later. The concern of this amendment corresponded to one 
deficiency of Gladstone’s “home rule” proposals in 1886260. However, the possibility of a 
convention, which could answer the issue of equal representation, was raised. Then, Scottish 
MPs would not be able to vote on English-Welsh matters . The consequence of such a 
convention would be, of course, that a government relying on Scottish MPs, could lose its 
parliamentary majority for English-Welsh matters. The consequence of such a convention 
would have been that the parliamentary majority of the government was in question for 
devolved matters in relation to England and Wales. That would obviously have led to a
OfiO OfiX“bifurcated executive” . The second salient amendment was made by George 
Cunningham, therefore leading it to be called the “Cunningham Amendment”. It required that 
at least 40 per cent of the registered electorate had to be in favour of devolution in a 
referendum for to be enacted264. This allowed sceptical Labour MPs to vote for the Bills, as 
they were convinced that it would not achieve a 40 percent majority. However, the amended 
Act did not mention a definite percentage. It stipulated that “ having regard to the answers 
given in a referendum”, the Secretary of State may lay an Order for its repeal265. Thus, he was 
left with an extensive power of discretion for the interpretation of the results. Cunningham 
justified the amendment with the irreversible constitutional change that devolution was likely 
to introduce. In his view the constitutional change required to have the evidence of the people 
for the devolution legislation. However, the amendment opened the way to campaign against 
the legislation266.
The results of the Referendums held on 1 March 1979 were a clear defeat in Wales and a 
defeat in Scotland under the terms of the Act. In Scotland 51.6 per cent voted yes whilst
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48.4 voted No. The “yes-vote” thus represented only 32.8 per cent of the electorate. The 40 
per cent ruling thus defeated devolution in the Scottish vote. In Wales, only 20.2 per cent 
voted yes corresponding to a minority of some 15 per cent of the electorate268. During the 
long debates in the Commons the government stated repeatedly the considerable support for 
devolution whilst the outcome did not satisfy the expectations269. With respect to the 
Cunningham amendment, and the closeness of the popular vote it was impossible for the 
Callaghan government to implement the Acts270. The new government of Margaret Thatcher 
returned in 1979 put the issue of devolution off the constitutional agenda271.
It has been outlined that the constitutional background of the United Kingdom is principally 
based on the view that there is no other sovereign power than the central parliament at 
Westminster. However, even if the constitutional justification may have been difficult or 
lacking, devolution to Northern Ireland proved de facto to be a certain form of federalism. 
Also, even if the United Kingdom is from a constitutional viewpoint clearly a unitary state, 
the special treatment for Scotland and Wales proves that there remained some sort of pre­
union privileges for the historical nations. Thus, it became evident that the British traditions 
are not as strong as they might appear at first sight, but that they must be seen in their 
historical context. For these reasons, it has been said that the British Constitution is a 
“splendidly versatile and flexible instrument”272. Nevertheless, the flexibility has not been 
offered to the different parts of the country; the solutions proved to be non-concluding, as 
they were not strong enough to stop the nationalist parties. That flexibility was not used 
neither for a view on devolution beyond the traditional concept of a unitary state. Devolution 
followed the slogan that “power devolved is power retained”. This was also the case for 
Northern Ireland, even if there were other problems added. Thus, devolution failed in 
Northern Ireland because it could not secure a cross community majority, which would have 
been the key-stone for any solution. It failed in Scotland and Wales, as it could not be 
understood as a coherent, clear concept of how the nations should be related to the centre. 
What lessons from the past could thus be drawn? First, the Northern Irish problem needs to be 
based on an “all Isles” and inclusive approach. The open-up of the Irish question had been 
refused by the British government until the 1980s. This was an important condition for new
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and serious solutions. Devolution alone would not be a “new” idea. Secondly, the British state 
itself needed the reform of its territorial structure, which devolution could bring. However, 
devolution as a constitutional structure needed to be more coherent, as it does not represent 
just another concession to Scotland and Wales, but implies a fundamental change. Only if it 
entails legitimacy for the new institutions both within the nations and vis-a-vis the 
Westminster Parliament and, if it produces also gains of democracy, devolution could secure 
a parliamentary majority and popular support273.
273 See Bradbury, Jonathan: The Blair government’s White Papers on British devolution, in: Regional and 
Federal Studies. Vol 7 (3), pp 130; Bradley, Anthony: Constitutional Reform, the Sovereignty o f Parliament and 
devolution, op cit, p 35; Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 31
III. Devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
Devolution came back to the political agenda in the mid-1990s, when the Labour party 
showed its commitment to legislate for a Welsh assembly and a Scottish parliament and for 
regional chambers in England1, provided that the party should win a majority at the general 
elections. The Labour “Manifesto2” and the Labour leader, Tony Blair, argued that the abuse 
of central power would undermine democracy and governmental effectiveness and it would 
even lead to damage to the country’s economic interests. In contrast, devolution would 
preserve the British State from a break-up3. Devolution has also been advocated as a tool for a 
more effective government. The project of “bringing government closer to the people”4 was 
most of all about constitutional reform but also about creating a newly textured democratic 
culture5.
However, there are more reasons for democratically elected sub-national units and the Labour 
Party had further thoughts when it made these proposals. First, there was the need for new 
acceptance of the constitutional framework in the United Kingdom. This need was based on 
the fact that the expression of the politics of identity in Scotland and Wales have increased 
since the 1980s, when there was “a questionable mandate” for Conservative governments in 
areas where the Conservatives had little support6. Responsibility for a wide range of areas in 
Scotland and Wales had been transferred to non-accountable quangos or the Secretaries of 
State7 being judged as “excessive centralism”8. Secondly, the state reforms (as for example 
the Government’s Offices in the Regions9) of subsequent governments in the 1990s left a 
certain policy and planning vacuum10. Faced with a double challenge of a shortage of land for 
housing and the Conservative bias to avoid new constructions in their backyard, they 
supported local authority activity in the questions, albeit being generally hostile to their
1 Bradbury, Jonathan, Introduction, in: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, p 3
2 New Labour, Because Britain deserves better, London 1997, op cit, p 33 (see 
http://www.labour.org.uk/lp/new/labour/docs/MANlFESTO/97MANlbESTOPARTl.PDF)
3 Bradbury, Jonathan, in: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, p 4
4 New Labour, Because Britain deserves better, London 1997, op cit, p 33
5 Rawlings, Richard: The new model Wales, in: Journal of Law and Society. Vol 25 (4), Oxford, Blackwells 
December 1998, p 469
6 Bradbury/ Mawson: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, p 276
7 Brazier, Rodney: The Constitution o f the United Kingdom, in: C.L.J.. op cit, p 109
8 Olowofoyeku, Abimbola A: Decentralising the UK: The federal argument, in: Edinburgh Law Review. 
Edinburgh, January 1999, p 57 or already noted by the Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), op 
cit, part I, para 6
9 See below
10 Bradbury/ Mawson: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, p 278, see also further below
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influence11. Thirdly, there have been functional pressures for a more regional orientated 
governance due to the impact of state reform and European integration in the context of the 
political economy of regionalisation12. The democratic deficit in the United Kingdom with the 
lack of any representative or elected structure of regions made it difficult to access European 
Funds and to integrate in the European Union, who had the will to develop towards a special 
regional policy13. Furthermore, Britain‘s economic deficit relied upon the dependence of the 
regional level from the centre in a context of a more global economy and the Single European 
Market. Following these pressures, another support for devolution occurred, when the 
political elites in the periphery moved to champion devolution for positive regionalist, but not 
nationalist reasons14. Finally, as we have seen, it would not be the first time that devolution 
has been used for party political reasons15. This observation is surprising as the question of 
devolution is of central concern and has an important constitutional impact for the United 
Kingdom as a whole16. In respect of the devolution proposals in 1977 it was said that the fear 
of the SNP was more serious than “any particular conviction of the merits of devolution”17. 
Later, during the 1990s, Labour wanted to legislate for devolution to protect Scotland against 
right-wing London rule and to reorganise the “quangoland” in W ales18. The Labour party’s 
proposals were officially based on the idea of a more democratic and more accountable 
government, but behind this idea the issue was the party’s electoral future19. Since the arrival 
of John Smith and later of Tony Blair there has been a clear insight, that the Labour 
strongholds in Scotland and Wales would be at mid-term able to create a balance of power to 
the England dominated Conservative Party. Labour had constantly a majority of the electorate 
in these “Nations”, but this did not give any power to the party within the territorial 
administrations (“quangos”)20. Therefore, tactical and strategic reasons were most obvious. In 
the 1990s thus there was a remarkable growth in commitment to devolution within the Party. 
First, “New Labour” sought to distance from “Old Labour” as a party of state intervention21.
11 Bradbury/ Mawson: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, p 278
12 See Murphy, Phil; Cabom, Richard: Regional government -  an economic imperative, in: Tindale, Stephen: 
The state and the nations, op cit, p 184
13 Roberts, Peter: Whitehall et la desert anglais: Managing and representing the UK Regions in Europe, in: 
Bradbury/ Mawson: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, p 256
14 Mitchell, James: The Evolution o f Devolution: Labour’s Home Rule Strategy in Opposition, in: Government 
and Opposition. Vol 33(4), London 1998, pp 479
15 See above
16 See further below
17 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 178
18 Mitchell, James, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 653
19 Bradbury/ Mawson: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, p 275
20 Morgan, Kevin; Roberts, Ellis: The democratic deficit. A Guide to Quangoland. University Papers in Planning 
Research N° 144, Cardiff 1993
21 Bradbury/Mawson: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, p 297
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New Labour, in seeking to find an ideological identity which was anti-statist but also one 
which was not identified with the market individualism of the Conservative Party, tried to 
stress its role as the party of the community22. In the view of the leaders, social and economic 
problems could thus be best addressed by devolving power not to the individuals but to a unit 
of the community: the nations. However, such a regional reform was also seen as positive in 
terms of management of the party and its approach to the state . As parts of traditional 
Labour were worried about the anti-statist approach, devolution could create a new party 
“occupation” and so maintain the unity of the party. The Labour Party has furthermore always 
been more pro-European than the Conservatives. Hence, devolution was likely to establish 
closer links with its European Socialist parties and would so add influence to the British 
Labour party in Europe. Apart from the Party’s strategic reasons, there was, however, in 1997 
a shift from electoral expediency to more instrumental policy-making and an increasing 
commitment24. What Labour proposed in 1978 was so limited that it would have created an 
Assembly without meaningful devolution. According to Mitchell, that has been a direct 
consequence of legislating without conviction25. In 1997, however, Labour developed a more 
innovative policy for Scotland. This can be best shown by the nature of the scheme, which 
was proposed. In many respects, the 1998 legislation can be seen as a more professionally 
designed version of the 1978 Act26. When the devolution legislation was successfully put in 
the statutes, the new Prime Minister put forward a more “global” view of devolution as 
follows:
“The demand for more democratic self-govemance is fed by better educated citizens 
and the free-flow of information provided by new technology and media. We must 
meet this demand by devolving power and making government more open and 
responsive. Devolution and local governance are not just important in themselves: 
open, vibrant, diverse democratic debate is a laboratory for ideas about how we should 
meet social needs. We must equip government with new capacity and skills”27.
Devolution as a constitutional expression has quite a vague meaning, because it only needs 
the transfer of certain powers. However, which powers it precisely encompasses is not
22 Bradbury/Mawson: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, p 297
23 Bradbury/Mawson: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, p 298
24 Bradbury/Mawson: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, p 296
25 Mitchell, James, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 663
26 Mitchell, James, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 663
27 Blair, Tony: The third way. New politics for the new century, in: Fabian Society, Pamphlet N° 588, London
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provided with this definition. Hence, it is important to analyse in detail the different 
devolution schemes which have been implemented since 1998 in Britain. Thus, first it is the 
Scottish model, which is to be scrutinised as it represents the clearest example of devolved 
powers. The policy of devolution to Scotland was based on an already existent “asymmetry” 
in different parts of the political life: the administration, but most of all the church and the 
legal system. The devolved territorial structure of the United Kingdom does not follow a strict 
model rather than create a special devolution scheme for each part of the country. Scotland 
has got responsibility for a much larger part of powers compared with the other nations of 
Wales and Northern Ireland. Thus, there are important differences between the implemented 
devolution models, which are to be scrutinised.
A. Legislative devolution for Scotland
One year after the referendum of 1979, an all-party Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA)
9 o
has been established which, however, did not launch its first declaration before 1988. In 
“The Claim of Right for Scotland29” the CSA expressed its conviction that sovereignty rests 
with the Scottish people and claimed that Scotland should be accountable to its people30. In 
the event, the sense that the Conservative governments were ruling Scotland against the 
wishes of a majority of its people was common ground31. This impression had been enforced 
by a special political measure of the Thatcher government in 1988. Although the 
Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher were opposed to any distinctive treatment of Scotland 
and Wales, the “poll tax” was launched in Scotland one year earlier than in the residual part of 
the country. That tax was strongly criticised and the Scots felt like the guinea pigs for the 
unpopular tax.32
This popular backdrop to “the Claim of Right” led the CSA to set up a Scottish Constitutional 
Convention (SCC), which met first in 1989 under the joint chairmanship of a Labour and a 
Liberal MP and comprised a large slice of Scottish opinion, that means apart from Labour
September 1998
28 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 196
29 Edwards, O.: A Claim of Rights for Scotland. Edinburgh 1989
30 Millar, David: Scottish Home Rule: Entering the Second Century, in: The Edinburgh Law Review. Vol 1, 
Edinburgh 1997, p 264
31 Mitchell, James, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 655
32 Kellas, James: The Scottish political system revisited, in: Taylor, Bridget; Thomson, Katarina: Scotland and 
Wales, Nations again?, op cit, p 223
33 Millar, David, in: The Edinburgh Law Review, op cit, p 264
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and Liberals there were the trade unions, the church and others34. The majority of the SNP 
preferred to campaign35 for “independence in Europe” and did not participate. The 
Conservatives were opposed to a Scottish Parliament in any form36. The Constitutional 
Convention adopted in its inaugural meeting a declaration which started with the following 
phrase: “We, gathered as the Scottish Constitutional Convention, do hereby acknowledge the 
sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine the form of Government best suited to 
their needs, and do hereby declare and pledge that in all our actions and deliberations their 
interest shall be paramount....”37. The Constitutional Convention went on to publish several 
proposals for devolution, becoming ever more detailed and complete . The first document 
“Towards Scotland’s Parliament ”, published in 1990, set out the principal elements for a 
devolution scheme in accordance with Scottish needs40. In the aftermath of the 1992 election 
with a returning Conservative majority, more substantive agreements could be reached about 
the electoral system. After the European Council meeting in Edinburgh in 1992 faced with 
30000 demonstrating Scots further breath was given to the work of the SCC41. This resulted 
finally in the declaration “Scotland’s Parliament. Scotland’s Right”42 published on St. 
Andrew’s Day 1995. In contrast to the 1978 Bill43, the Convention’s proposals included a 
single-chamber Scottish Parliament without any legislative role for the House of Lords44. The 
most important feature was the recommendation of the election of the future Members of the 
Scottish Parliament (MSPs) by proportional representation45. On the whole, the Convention 
concentrated on a limited range of issues leaving crucial questions apart like the future 
relation between Edinburgh and Westminster and Whitehall respectively46.
In the lead up to the 1997 general British election, Labour stuck to its devolution pledge. 
Nonetheless, the Party decided suddenly that a referendum about the future role of the
34 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 197
35 Brand/ Mitchell, in: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, p 45
36 Millar, David, in: The Edinburgh Law Review, op cit, p 264
37 Mitchell, James, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 657
38 Millar, David, in: The Edinburgh Law Review, op cit, p 265
39 Scottish Constitutional Association, Towards Scotland’s Parliament. Edinburgh 1990
40 Initially, the Rights of a Scottish Parliament should be entrenched formally, see: McFadden, Jean; Bain, 
William: Strategies fo r  the Future: A lasting parliament for Scotland?, in: Bates, T. St. J.: Devolution to 
Scotland. T&T Clark, Edinburgh 1997, pp 10
41 Brown, Alice; McCrone, David; Paterson, Lindsay: Politics and Society in Scotland. 2nd edition, Macmillan, 
London 1998, p 24
42 Scottish Constitutional Convention, Scotland’s Parliament. Scotland’s Right. Scottish Constitutional 
Association, Edinburgh 1995
43 The Bill proposed an „Assembly“, see Brand/ Mitchell, in: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, p 47
44 Millar, David, in: The Edinburgh Law Review, op cit, p 265
45 Brand/ Mitchell, in: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, pp 47-8
46 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 200
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Parliament should be held before its creation. However, neither the SCC nor the Labour party 
were ever in favour of a referendum, as it existed a widespread fear that a referendum could 
endanger devolution a second time47. This change of view was due to the context of the
48campaign . The decision to hold a referendum with two questions concerning the 
establishment of the parliament and its tax raising powers was a bid to take a thorny issue off 
the campaign. Then, the general elections returned Labour successfully, as all Scottish M P’s 
were Labour. Thus, the realisation of devolution was possible. In July 1997, a White Paper49 
outlining New Labour government’s proposals was issued. Important settings were made 
comprising some details, which differed from the 1978 Bill and the Convention proposals. 
Scotland should “no longer be the only democratic country with its own legal system but no 
legislature of its own”50. The legislation would define matters to retain at Westminster rather 
than devolved powers51 and a reduction of Scottish M P’s at Westminster was to “be 
reviewed”52. The Scotland Act 1998, which was based on the White Paper, passed the House 
of Commons without any problem as the Conservatives were in a weak position having not 
one Scottish MP53. The contrast with the 1978 Bill was most apparent. The Act, however, did 
not resolve all questions, which were raised by the White Paper. The precise operation of the 
devolved bodies, the resolution of conflicts between London and Edinburgh, its financial 
responsibility etc. were left to be clarified in the implementation of devolution54.
The Referendums Scotland and Wales Bill 1997 was the first Bills introduced in the House of 
Commons after the general elections. As the Labour Party itself pledged to devolution in its 
manifesto, the Bill passed the Parliament rapidly. The decision to hold the referendums was 
made, not in government, but in opposition. On the one hand, there was the concern that the 
devolution legislation might have a difficult passage through the Houses of Parliaments55. On 
the other hand, New Labour wanted to leave the “tax and spend” image56. The government 
had not forgotten the situation of 1978, when the referendum took place after the legislation 
and was finally rejected by the people57. Another remarkable change occurred in comparison
47 Mitchell, James, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 661
48 Brown/ McCrone/ Paterson, op cit, p 25
49 Scotland’s Parliament. HMSO, London, Cmnd. 3658, July 1997
50 Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p vii
51 Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, para 2.4, p 3
52 Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, para 4.5, p 13
53 Brown/ McCrone/ Paterson, op cit, p 25
54 Mitchell, James, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, pp 662
55 Taylor, Bridget; Curtice, John; Thomson, Katarina, in: Scotland and Wales: Nations again?. University of 
Wales Press, Cardiff 1999, p xxv
56 See above
57 Munro, Colin: Power to the people, in: Public Law. Sweet & Maxwell, London, Winter 1997, p 581
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to 1979. The preparation of the referendum was organised in one single campaigning strategy, 
led jointly by Labour, Liberals and the SNP58, even if the latter wanted an independent 
Scotland in the mid term. Therefore, the campaign against was difficult to carry out59. In the 
referendum60 held on 11 September 1997 two questions were asked on separate ballot 
papers61. One concerned the creation of a Scottish Parliament, another the tax varying powers 
of the Parliament. The result was an overwhelming majority in favour of the establishment of 
a parliament with 74.3 per cent (1979: 51.2) on a turnout of 60.2 per cent (1979: 62.9). The 
victory was completed by a Yes-vote of 63.5 per cent for its tax varying powers62. The 
“Cunningham Amendment ”, however, applying in 1978 would have permitted merely a 
non-revenue raising Parliament, as only 38.1 per cent of the Scottish electorate were in favour 
of this competence64.
A referendum may raise the question of its constitutional context65. Devolution has a very 
deep impact on the constitutional settlement in the United Kingdom66. In several states
f k l  (COconstitutional change requires mandatory or advisory referendums. In the United 
Kingdom, however, with its doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty there is no need for 
referendums69. Prior to the Referendum (Scotland and Wales) Act 1997 there were two 
referendums held: one on EC membership in 1975 and the other one on devolution in 197970. 
The arguments put forward for and against referendums are well known71, raising the question 
as to whether they are furthermore necessary for constitutional changes. The constitutional 
practice of the United Kingdom has been described as “elastic”72, as there is neither any legal 
provision nor any agreed criteria as to when referendums should be called. This has been
58 Brown/ McCrone/ Paterson, op cit, p 25
59 Brown/ McCrone/ Paterson, op cit, p 25: “amateurish”
60 Referendum (Scotland and Wales) Act 1997
61 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 199
62 Brown/ McCrone/ Paterson, op cit, p 25
63 See above
64 Munro, Colin, op cit, p 581
65 See Heath, Anthony; Taylor, Bridget: Were the Scottish and Welsh referendums second-order elections?, in: 
Taylor, Bridget; Thomson, Katarina: Scotland and Wales: Nations again?. University of Wales Press, Cardiff 
1999, pp 149
66 See above
67 E.g. the German Constitution provides for a mandatory consultation of the people as far as they are concerned 
by a change of boundaries of the Lander, but only for that question (Art. 29 GG)
68 E.g. the French Constitution attributes to the President of the Republic the power to hold a referendum, which 
has an advisory function, article 11 French Constitution
69 Munro, Colin, op cit, p 579
70 Donnelly, Kathy; Smith, Nicole: Implementing Constitutional Reform, in: Blackburn/ Plant: Constitutional 
Reform, op cit, pp 216; see also Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament. London 1996, p 51-2
71 Donnelly/ Smith, in: Blackburn, Plant: Constitutional Reform, op cit, pp 216
72 Bogdanor, Vernon: Western Europe, in: Butler, David; Ranney, Austin: Referendums around the world. 1994, 
p 46
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proved with the Referendums Act 1997, as notably a “yes” vote was not a guarantee of the 
establishment of the body73. However, there are certain questions about the increasing use of 
referendums. It has been argued that once the genie is out of the bottle74, it is not difficult to 
imagine that there will be demands for the voice of the people in other areas like capital 
punishment. The problem has been shown75 at the example of the Scottish vote in 1997. In 
that referendum there was a obvious logic for the vote. The outcome of the referendum,
H(\however, did not correspond to this logic .
The Scottish model of devolution has been described with the term of “legislative 
devolution”. The Kilbrandon Commission issued the opinion that in a scheme of legislative 
devolution, “powers would be transferred to the regions to determine policy on a selected 
range of subjects, to enact legislation to give effect to that policy and to provide the 
administrative machinery for its execution, while reserving to Parliament the ultimate power 
to legislate on all matters”77. Whether this definition in theory is supposed to reflect the 
devolution process at work is to be seen78. However, the Scotland Act 199879 establishes a 
Scottish Parliament80, which has been based in Edinburgh. The first general election to the 
Parliament took place on 6 May 1999. This date was set by the Secretary of State for 
Scotland81. Voters left Labour 9 seats short of an overall majority, with 56 MSPs 
corresponding to 43.4%. The SNP added one constituency to the six it holds at Westminster 
and emerged with a total of 35 MSPs. The Conservatives secured 18 seats, all from the 
regional lists, while the Liberal Democrats finished with 17 members. The Scottish Socialist 
and Green parties are represented in a British Parliament for the first time ever82. For the 
election of the First Minister at 13 May 1999, Labour reached an agreement with the Liberals 
and a coalition government was set up with the former Labour Secretary of State, Donald 
Dewar, as First Minister83. The new Parliament assumed its full powers on 1 July 199984,
73 Tierney, Stephen: Constitutional Reform under the new Labour Government, in: European Public Law. Vol 3 
(4), Kluwer, London 1997, p 468
74 Munro, Colin, op cit, p 580
75 Heald, David; Geaughan, Neal; Robb, Colin: Financial Arrangements fo r UK devolution, in: Keating, Michael 
(ed.): Remaking the Union. London, Cass 1998, p 26
76 Heald/ Geaughan/ Robb, op cit, p 26
77 Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), op cit, para 734
78 See below
79 London, HMSO 1998 (http://www.hmso.gov.uk/scotland/)
80 Scotland Act 1998, section 1 (1)
81 Scotland Act 1998, section 2 (1 )
82 The turnout was 58%; for results see Appendix 1
83 Dewar wins his place in history, in: Daily Telegraph, 14 May 1999, p 1
84 Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution in 1998-99, in: Parliamentary Affairs. Vol 53 (2), London, 
Hansard 2000, p 245
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when the Queen came to Edinburgh for the Official opening85. A Liberal Peer, Sir David 
Steel, was elected Presiding Officer. The Scotland Act 1998 stipulates that the elections must
o r
be held by an additional-member system which is a special form of proportional 
representation and is quite similar to the system used in Germany87. The electoral law for 
Scotland, however, will remain in the remit of Westminster88. This perhaps reflects the 
lessons of the history in Northern Ireland89. The main advantage of this form of vote90 is a 
more proportional representation and it is likely to increase the number of female MPs91. The 
proportion of women elected to the Parliament was unprecedentedly high at 37 per cent. The 
major reason for that was the “twinning” policy of the Labour party to achieve gender 
equality.
The Scottish Parliament is -unlike Westminster -  unicameral and its term of office has been 
fixed for four years . Subsequently, ordinary general elections in Scotland will be held on the 
first Thursday in May in the fourth year after that in which the last ordinary general election 
was held. It is, however, possible for an ordinary general election to be held no more than one 
month earlier or later than the first Thursday in May93. It is possible that the Scottish 
Parliament is dissolved before the four years are expired. This may happen if at least two- 
thirds of the MSPs vote for the dissolution94 or if the Parliament fails to agree on the 
appointment of a First Minister95. In this case an extraordinary election must be held. The 
Presiding Officer who corresponds to the Leader in the House of Commons proposes to the 
Queen a day for the holding of the extraordinary general election and her Majesty dissolves 
the Parliament96. However, if the date proposed is within six month of the regular date for the 
ordinary elections, the latter will not be held97. This does not affect the date of the next
85 Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution in 1998-99, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 246
86 section 7, 8
87 Gay, Oonagh: British Elections -  additional members and the „Neill" effect, in: Public Law. London, Sweet & 
Maxwell 1999, p 187
88 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 5 (g), see further below
on
Haggerty, Charles: Scotland’s Parliament -  The devolution white paper, in: SCOLAG. Scottish Legal Action 
Group, Edinburgh August 1997, p 130
90 Seyd, Ben; Michell, Jeremy: Fragmentation in the Party and Political System, in: Hazell, Robert: 
Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 99
91 Plant, Raymond: Proportional Representation, in: Blackburn/ Plant: Constitutional Reform, op cit., p 66; see 
also: Report of the Independent Commission on the Voting System. (Jenkins Commission) London, HMSO 1998
92 Scotland Act 1998, section 2 (2)
93 Scotland Act 1998, section 2 (5)
94 Scotland Act 1998, section 3 (l,a)
95 Scotland Act 1998, section 3 (l,b)
96 Scotland Act 1998, section 3
97 Scotland Act 1998, section 3 (3)
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subsequent ordinary election98. Therefore, the Scottish Parliament is in contrast to the 
Westminster Parliament not a maximum-term parliament but a fixed-term parliament99. The 
proceedings in the Scottish Parliament are in some ways different with respect to the latter: in 
Scotland, members of the Parliament are called by their name, parliamentary questions are 
possible throughout the summer recess and, there is no annuality for the legislative 
programme
For the election to the Scottish Parliament, Scotland has been divided into 73 constituencies. 
This division differs from the Westminster constituency system as Orkney and Shetland have 
been given two MSPs101. For these two islands special provision was made, as they are not 
permitted to be combined or associated at the next general review of the boundary 
commission either for general elections for Westminster or the Scottish Parliament102. The 
other 56 MSPs, which are regional members, are returned from the eight regions used for 
elections to the European parliament103. Every region104 returns seven additional members to 
Edinburgh. The number of MSPs, however, is likely to change because the boundary 
commission for Scotland will take place between 2002 and 2006105. The number of 
constituency-elected MSPs could therefore be approximately 57 after their decision106. As the 
relation between the constituency-elected Members and the regional Members of the Scottish 
Parliament must be respected, this will probably decrease the regional-based Members to five 
or six per region107. The right to vote for the Scottish Parliament is different to the 
Westminster Parliament because of the inclusion of European Union nationals and Peers who 
are resident in Scotland108.
98 Scotland Act 1998, section 3 (4)
99 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 216
100 Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution in 1998-99, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 247; for the 
procedure at Westminster see Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, pp 515
01 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 1, para 1
102 Scotland Act 1998, section 86 (3,4)
103 SI 1996/1926
104 European Parliamentary Constituencies (Scotland) Order 1996, SI 1996/1926
105 McFadden, Jean: Elections to the Scottish Parliament: A guide to the law, in: Scottish Law & Practice 
Quarterly. Vol 4 (2), Edinburgh 1999, p 125
106 O’Leary, Brendan; Hazell, Robert: A Rolling Programme o f devolution, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional 
Futures, op cit, p 22
107 The number of 129 MSPs are likely to remain, even if the Boundary Commission may recommend a 
reduction of Scottish Westminster constituencies, on which the current division is mostly based. See Hadfield, 
Brigid: The nature o f devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland: Key Issues o f Responsibility and control, in: 
Edinburgh Law Review. Vol 3, Edinburgh, January 1999, p 8
108 Scotland Act 1998, section 11 (1)
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1. The Scottish Parliament
The Scottish Parliament is a real “parliament”109, albeit not being sovereign. It is responsible 
for drawing up and adopting its Standing Orders110. Schedule 3 of the Scotland Act 1998 
provides a detailed module in which the statutorily required part of the Standing Orders is 
prearranged. In the White Paper the government intended that the Standing Orders were 
designed to ensure openness, responsiveness and accountability111. An all party-Consultative 
Steering Group (CSG) on the Scottish Parliament was established by the Secretary of State for 
Scotland to take forward consideration of how the Scottish Parliament might operate. The 
CSG issued a report112, which drew up “proposals on how the Scottish Parliament should 
operate”113. The detailed decisions on how the Scottish Parliament works were left to the 
Parliament itself. Therefore, the Standing Orders were made by resolution of the Parliament 
on 9 December 1999 and came into force on 17 December 1999114. Therein the proceedings 
for the different sections of the Scotland Act 1998 are described. The Scotland Act 1998 does 
not mention any scrutiny of the Executive other than provision in section 91 requiring an 
Ombudsman-style procedure for complaints of maladministration against a Scottish Minister 
or any other official in the Scottish Executive115. Besides, the Parliament is empowered to call 
for witnesses and documents concerning the devolved matters116. Furthermore, the Act 
provides for a motion of no confidence to be moved in the Scottish Executive as a body117. At 
the beginning, it was thought that this would not be possible for one minister individually118. 
However, the Standing Orders provided later for “a motion that the Scottish Executive or a 
member of the Scottish Executive or a junior Scottish Minister no longer enjoys the 
confidence of the Parliament119.
To the Scottish Parliament is given the power to approve the appointment of the whole 
Executive120 including the Law Officers121. The Parliament has to vote on (junior) Minister
109 Scotland Act 1998, section 1(1)
110 Scotland Act 1998, section 22 (1); Constitution Unit, Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 148
111 Government’s White Paper, Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 30
112 Report of the Consultative Steering Group “Shaping the Scottish Parliament”, Scottish Office, Edinburgh 
1998 (see: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/librarv/documents-w5/recsg-00.htm)
113 McLeish, Henry, Foreword, in: Report of the Consultative Steering Group, op cit, p 1
114 From the official Website of the Scottish Parliament (http://www.scotland.parliament.gov.uk/)
115 Hadfield, Brigid, in: Edinburgh Law Review. Vol 3, January 1999, op cit, p 11
116 Scotland Act 1998, sections 23
117 Scotland Act 1998, section 45 (2), 47 (3,c), 48 (2), 49 (4,c)
118 Brazier, Rodney: The Scottish Government, in: Public Law. Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998, p 213
119 Standing Orders, Rule 8.12 (1)
120 Scotland Act 1998, section 47 (2), 49 (3)
121 Scotland Act 1998, section 48 (1)
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nominations before the names are submitted to the Queen122. The requirement for
parliamentary approbation is a novel check and an extension of parliamentary rights, which
1have never existed at Westminster . The White Paper stated that the relationship between 
the Scottish Parliament and the Executive would be similar to the relationship between 
Westminster and Whitehall124. This is only true for the drawing of the Executive from the 
Parliament and for its general parliamentary responsibility. However, there are several 
differences. Due to its fixed four-year term and the application of proportional representation, 
it is likely that there are less clear cut political alignments than in the Westminster
1 J C
parliament . In further contrast to London, there are statutory rules for the choice of the First 
Minister126. As no party is likely to enjoy a majority in the Scottish Parliament127, the decision 
about an appropriate candidate for the office of the First Minister is to be provided by the 
parliamentary groups. Therefore, the appointment of the First Minister by the Queen is only
1 0 0  _  i  i n
formal . The Presiding Officer has to transmit to her the parliament’s recommendation . 
There is a clear statutory framework which -unlike Westminster -  places the responsibility of 
a viable First Minister nomination on the Scottish Parliament131. So, it is very unlikely that the 
Queen would do other than comply with the Officers transmission132. However, the fact that 
the Queen is given a role to nominate the First Minister proves that the devolved power is 
vested in his or her office.
This is also shown by the procedures of nomination for the judiciary. The Scottish judiciary 
continues to be responsible for adjudicating on reserved matters and on devolved matters, and 
in disputes between institutions of the United Kingdom and Scottish institutions133. Also, the 
judges of the supreme Scottish courts are one component of the common base from which 
appointments are made to the House of Lords and the Privy Council. Generally, the 
responsibility for judicial appointments in Scotland has been devolved to the Scottish
122 Brazier, Rodney: The Scottish Government, in: Public Law, op cit, p 214
123 Brazier, Rodney: The Scottish Government, in: Public Law, op cit, p 214
124 Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 7
125 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 216
126 Scotland Act 1998, section 46
127 See e.g. Hassan, Gerry: The new Scotland. Fabian Society Pamphlets, N° 586, London, May 1998, pp 13; 
(The last majority for Westminster was wont by the Conservatives in 1955)
128 Scotland Act 1998, section 45 (1)
129 Himsworth/ Munro: The Scotland Act 1998. op cit, p 60; Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 
216
130 Scotland Act 1998, section 46 (4) and Rule 4.1 of the Standing Orders
131 Scotland Act 1998, section 46
132 Brazier, Rodney: The Scottish Government, op cit, p 216; Hadfield, Brigid, in: Edinburgh Law Review, op 
cit, Vol. 3, January 1999, p 10
133 Reed, Robert: Devolution and the judiciary, in: Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom, op cit, p 28
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Parliament134. This was criticised when the Bill passed the House of Lords135 because the 
Scottish Parliament is not bound by the many unwritten arrangements and conventions that 
operate in Westminster for these offices at present . This concerns most of all the 
independence of the Lord Advocate’s office137. Under the blurred heading138 “Miscellaneous 
and General” section 95139 provides that “a judge of the Court of Session and the Chairman of 
the Scottish Land Court may be removed from office only by Her Majesty; and any 
recommendation to Her Majesty for such removal shall be made by the Scottish First 
Minister”. Additionally, the appointment of the Lord President and the Lord Justice Clerk will 
be made by Her Majesty on the advice of the Prime Minister140. However, the Prime Minister 
will be unable to recommend the appointment of any person who has not been nominated by 
the First Minister141. This reflects clearly the duality of devolved decision-making alongside 
the symbolic retention of roles for central government with respect to the Scottish Law 
Officers142. Other appointments to the Court of Session or the Sheriff Court are to be made by 
the Queen on the recommendation of the First Minister143. Therefore, all juridical 
appointments in Scotland need the consent of the First Minister144. The Scottish Parliament 
can only be involved if a motion is made by the First Minister resolving that the Parliament 
should make a recommendation145. There have been criticisms that arguments in favour of 
more important role of the Parliament have not been respected146. This would have supported 
a more open and independent system of the judiciary’s high offices. However, it will depend 
upon the Scottish Executive to determine the selection procedures147. It is thus up to the First 
Minister to act and up to the Scottish Parliament to scrutinise the Executive’s work. The 
Scottish devolution model clearly divides between a managing First Minister and controlling 
Parliament. This view is supported by the organisation of the Parliament itself. The Scottish
134 Scotland Act 1998, section 95
135 Lord Roger of Earlsferry, in: House of Lords Debates, Vol 582, col 197, 30 July 1997
136 Himsworth, Chris: Securing the tenure o f Scottish Judges, in: Public Law. Spring 1999, pp 15
137 Reed, Robert: Devolution and the judiciary, op cit, p 29
138 Brazier, Rodney: The Scotland Bill as Constitutional Legislation, in: Statute Law Review, Vol 19 (1), p 13
139 Scotland Act 1998, section 95 (6) and Rule 4.4 of the Standing Orders
140 Scotland Act 1998, section 95 (1)
141 This has been a change to the initial version of the Bill. Himsworth/ Munro: The Scotland Act 1998. op cit, p
120; Reed, Robert: Devolution and the judiciary, op cit, p 29
142 Himsworth/ Munro: The Scotland Act 1998, op cit, p 120
143 Scotland Act 1998, section 95 (4) see also for further procedures
144 Reed, Robert: Devolution and the judiciary, op cit, p 29
145 Scotland Act 1998, section 95 (7)
146 Bradley, Anthony: Constitutional Reform, the sovereignty o f Parliament and devolution, in: Constitutional 
Reform in the UK. op cit, p 37; for the “legislative story” see Himsworth, Chris: Securing the tenure o f Scottish 
Judges, in: Public Law, Spring 1999, p 15
147 See further below
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Parliament’s Committees were established by way of its Standing Orders148. There is a 
Procedures Committee; a Standards Committee; a Finance Committee; an Audit Committee; a 
European Committee; an Equal Opportunities Committee; a Public Petitions Committee and a 
Subordinate Legislation Committee. Generally, these Committees have been drawn alongside 
the lines of the Executive’s departments. Hence, they are expected to assume the role of 
scrutiny committees and they do not have, as at Westminster, an advisory role in the form of 
Standing Committees. Generally, the shape of the Scottish Parliament’s Committees provides 
thus for holding the Scottish Ministers into account149. The Parliament’s main office is the 
position of the Presiding Officer, which is of significant constitutional importance as it is 
supposed to be the main channel of communication between the Scottish Parliament and the 
Queen150
The Scottish Parliament is given the power to make primary laws, which are to be known as
Acts of the Scottish Parliament151. However, the power of Westminster to legislate for
Scotland is not affected by Scotland’s power to make laws152. Following Section 29 of the
Act, the competence of the Scottish Parliament is bound153. Before a Bill is introduced into
the Scottish Parliament, it must be stated that it is within the Parliament’s competence154.
Furthermore, if the Secretary of State has ’’reasonable grounds” to believe that a Bill is
incompatible with international obligations or the interests of defence or national security or
modifying the reserved matters, he or she can make an order prohibiting the Presiding Officer
to submit a Bill for Royal assent155. The Act156 does not list the devolved, but only the
reserved matters. That is in sharp contrast to the Scotland Act 1978, which specified in detail
1
the legislative competences devolved from Westminster . This system of enumerated 
competences for the devolved parliament was too detailed, and the schedules were open to 
different interpretation. Judicial challenges would then have been a very probable 
consequence158. Therefore, the Scotland Act 1998 provides thus a more comprehensible 
document. Westminster is responsible for the reserved matters159, whilst the Scottish
148 Rule 6.1.5 of the Standing Orders
149 Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 7
150 Brazier, Rodney: The Scottish Government, op cit, pp 216
151 Scotland Act 1998, section 28
152 Scotland Act 1998, section 28 (7)
153 See further below
154 Scotland Act 1998, section 31 (land 2)
155 Scotland Act 1998, section 35, see also further below
156 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 5
157 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 35
158 For further detail see, Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, pp 35
159 See further below
46
Parliament has responsibility for all matters, which are not in the realm of the Westminster 
Parliament. These include160 a large range of Scottish domestic affairs like health, school 
education, further and higher education, science and research funding, training policy and 
lifelong learning, vocational qualifications, careers and advice guidance, local government, 
social work, voluntary sector issues, housing, area regeneration, land-use planning and 
building control, economic development, financial assistance to industry, inward investment, 
trade and export promotion, tourism, passenger and road transport, air and sea transport, 
inland waterways, criminal law, criminal justice and prosecution, civil law, civil and criminal 
courts, local government elections, judicial appointments, tribunals, legal aid, parole, prisons, 
police and fire services, civil defence and emergency planning, international legal agreements, 
liquor licensing, protection of animals, environment, natural heritage, built heritage, flood 
prevention, coast protection and reservoir safety, for the European linked matters as 
agriculture, fisheries, forestry, food standards, and sport, the arts, statistics, public registers 
and records161.
The Scottish Parliament’s powers include a large responsibility over other public bodies. 
First, this concerns the Parliament’s devolved power over local government. While little in 
practical terms is to change at the beginning, it has been hold the opinion that the creation of 
the new parliament “represents a unique opportunity to redefine the nature of central-local 
government relation” : the new powers should not be centralised at the parliament solely, 
but its division should be organised following the principle of subsidiarity . Local 
government is currently highly dependent on the total expenditure, which is part of the 
Scottish block distributed at the Scottish Parliament164. Therefore, the Scottish Parliament has 
a considerable influence over local government policy. Also, its powers over other public 
bodies such as health authorities and quangos are inherited from the Scottish Office165. The 
most important functions in this context are the appointment of Executives, the scrutiny and 
accountability of the Scottish and cross-border bodies and their funding166. However, these 
functions have been transferred from the Parliament to the Scottish Ministers. It remains to be
160 Government’s White Paper, Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 3
161 Government’s White Paper, Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, pp 4; also Gay, Oonagh: Devolution and 
Concordats. House of Commons Research Paper 99/84, London, October 1999, p 8
162 McAteer, Mark; Bennett, Michael: The role o f local government, in: Hassan, Gerry: A guide to the Scottish 
parliament, op cit, p 110
63 McAteer, Mark; Bennett, Michael: The role of local government, op cit, p 110; Constitution Unit: Scotland’s 
Parliament, op cit, p 126
164 This encompasses nearly 40 per cent of the global expenditure of the parliament
165 Hogwood, Brian: Relations with other public bodies, in: Hassan, Gerry: A guide to the Scottish parliament. 
op cit, p 103
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seen in which way the Parliament will be involved in vetting individual appointments. There 
are no legal requirements for it. Thus, the function of the Parliament in exercising its 
responsibilities over these bodies, is probably also a scrutinising one. Apart form that, it is 
noteworthy that new matters may arise which fall directly into the realm of Holyrood. On all 
these non-reserved matters, the Scottish Parliament is allowed to legislate.
Another important task concerns the subordinate legislation of the Scottish Parliament. 
Section 117 of the Scotland Act 1998 provides that any pre-commencement enactment or 
prerogative instrument, and any other instrument or document for the exercise of a function 
by a member of the Scottish Executive within devolved competence is to be read as 
including references to the Scottish Ministers168. In the continuity of the British practice169 the 
Scotland Act provides also for extensive powers to make subordinate legislation. Initially, 
functions that includes subordinate legislation, which were heretofore exercised by a Minister 
of the Crown, can now be transferred to Scottish Ministers170. After the official Opening of 
the Parliament, most of the responsibilities and functions formerly effected by the Secretary
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of State were thus transferred . Additionally, Sections 104 and 105 provide for subordinate 
legislation for two concerns: On the one hand, subordinate legislation can make such 
provision as the person making considers it necessary or expedient in consequence of a 
provision made by or under any act of the Scottish parliament172. On the other hand,
1 7^subordinate legislation can modify any pre-commencement enactment , prerogative 
instrument as appears necessary or expedient to the person making the legislation in 
consequence of the Scotland Act174. This includes a “Henry VIII” clause allowing earlier 
primary legislation to be modified by subordinate legislation being with the devolved area175. 
A similar power contains section 107 providing for subordinate legislation to cure defects in 
an act of the Scottish parliament or exercise of power by the Scottish Executive being “ultra 
vires”. That type of secondary legislation is, however, subject to scrutiny by Parliament176. 
Following Section 112, the Scottish Ministers, provided that Scottish Ministers are regarded
166 See Hog wood, Brian: Relations with other public bodies, op cit, p 103
167 Scotland Act 1998, section 118
168 Craig, Paul: Administrative Law. 4th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1999, p 206
169 See Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 549
170 Scotland Act 1998, sections 52-54
171 Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution in 1998-99, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 245
172 Scotland Act 1998, section 104 (1,2)
173 For the unclear meaning of “pre-commencement enactment4* in the different meanings for Scottish and 
Westminster legislation, see: Craig, Paul: Administrative Law, op cit, p 207, fn 70
174 Scotland Act 1998, section 105
175 For more detail, see further below
176 See Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 7
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as Ministers of the Crown177, have the power to exercise that power by Her Majesty by Order 
in Council or by a Minister of the Crown by order. The mode of approving such secondary 
legislation being transferred to a Scottish Minister is, principally, moved to the Scottish 
parliament178. Secondary legislation allowed by the Scotland Act itself is to follow detailed 
rules stipulated in Schedule 7179. The Scotland Act 1998 thus gives to the Scottish Parliament 
a wide scope of legislative responsibility, primary and secondary.
2. The Scottish Executive
The Scotland Act 1998 provides for a Scottish Executive180, which is composed of the First 
Minister, such further Ministers as the First Minister appoints, and the Lord Advocate and the 
Solicitor General for Scotland181. Only Members of the Scottish Parliament can be appointed 
(junior) Scottish Ministers182. It is not possible to hold ministerial office at Westminster and 
to be member of the Scottish Executive183 at the same time. However, membership of both 
Westminster and the Scottish Parliament is possible, a MSP can therefore be a Member of the 
Westminster or European Parliament or a local council184. The number of Scottish Ministers 
or their portfolios are not provided by statute. Therefore, the First Minister could theoretically 
appoint as many Ministers as he wishes from the 129 MSPs185. The present portfolios of the 
Ministers have been allocated as follows: Justice, Enterprise and life-long learning, Children 
and Education, Finance, Health and Community Care, Rural Affairs, Communities, Transport 
and Environment and Parliament. The requirement of being a Member of the Scottish 
Parliament is not imposed for the Scottish Law Officers, but being appointed they have the 
right to attend or speak in the Parliament186. Hence, the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor 
General for Scotland are part of the Executive187. Until recently, they have been part of the 
British government. As they exercise quasi-judicial functions188, they have to take decisions
177 Craig, Paul: Administrative Law, op cit, p 208, see below
178 Scotland Act 1998, section 118 (2)
179 For more detail see: Craig, Paul: Administrative Law, op cit, p 209
180 Scotland Act 1998, section 44
181 Scotland Act 1998, section 45
182 Scotland Act 1998, sections 46, 47 ,49
183 Scotland Act 1998, section 44 (3)
184 Brazier, Rodney: The Scottish Government, op cit, p 213
185 Brazier, Rodney: The Scottish Government, op cit, p 213
186 Scotland Act 1998, section 27 (1)
187 Scotland Act 1998, section 44 (l,c)
188 Brazier, Rodney: The Scottish Government, op cit, p 213
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independently of any other person189. In order to continue to grant British access to legal 
advice and information about Scotland, an Advocate General for Scotland can be appointed 
by the Prime Minister190.The First Minister leads the Executive191 even if this is not set by the 
Scotland Act 1998. It is inferred, however, because he or she can recommend the appointment
1 09
of all other members of the Executive . Provision is also made for Junior Scottish 
Ministers193, but they are not members of the Executive194. The First Minister is the keeper of 
the Scottish Seal195 and its delivery by the Queen (and the surrender back) marks the legal 
taking up of the office196. Its first delivery was at Edinburgh on 17 May 1999, when the First 
Minister was sworn in by the Queen who subsequently granted him an audience197. Audiences 
are normally held at Buckingham Palace, but this one took place at Holyrood and the Queen 
was making a special visit to Edinburgh for the occasion198. The Scotland Act 1998 
stipulates199 that each MSP and each (junior) Minister has to take the oath of allegiance. 
Section 80 (7) provides that this is the oath as provided for by the 1868 Act as follows: “I do 
swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, her 
heirs and successors, according to law. So help me God.”200 In addition, Scottish Ministers
9 0 1take the official oath on appointment. There is an apparent difference to the oath procedure 
at Westminster. British junior Ministers are not supposed to take the oath on appointment: 
they assume their office as a matter of law as soon as the Queen has approved their names202. 
The very fact that all Members of the Scottish Executive have to take the oath of allegiance 
underlines that their duty is not only owed to the Scottish Parliament, but to the United 
Kingdom with the Queen as head of state203. Thus, the procedure of oath underlines that 
devolution “enhances the Union”204 and it is “symbolic” of the relationship between the new 
Scottish institutions and the Queen205. Therefore, the Scottish Ministers hold office “at Her
189 Scotland Act 1998, section 48 (5)
190 Scotland Act 1998, section 87
191 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 203
192 Scotland Act 1998, section 44; see also above
193 Scotland Act 1998, section 49
194 Hadfield, Brigid, in: Edinburgh Law Review, op cit, p 9; Brazier, Rodney: The Scottish Government, op cit, p 
212
195 Scotland Act 1998, section 45 (7)
196 Brazier, Rodney: The Scottish Government, op cit, p 214
197 Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution in 1998-99, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 246
198 Historic day as the Queen arrives in Scotland for first audience, in: Daily Telegraph, 16 May 1999, p 2
199 Scotland Act 1998, section 84
200 Cited in Hadfield, Brigid, in: Edinburgh Law Review, op cit, p 9
201 Scotland Act 1998, section 84 (4,a)
202 Brazier, Rodney: Ministers of the Crown. Clarendon, Oxford 1996, p 86
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204 Government’s White Paper: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 10
205 Scotland Bill, House of Commons Bill 104 (1997-98), clause 79 (notes)
50
Majesty’s Pleasure” , but the oath is taken at the Scottish Parliament. This may make it 
easier for the First Minister to carry out reshuffles207, as the Ministers are not directly 
responsible to the Parliament itself. Also, the Scottish First Minister became a Member of the 
Privy Council. Consequently, the Scottish Executive is, generally spoken, in a similar 
situation to Westminster as far as devolved competences are concerned. Specific statutory 
functions can be conferred on the Scottish Ministers by name through enactment208. Section 
53 of the Act makes also a general transfer to the Scottish Ministers of functions which were 
hitherto exercised by a Minister of the Crown, i.e. of central government209.
The Scotland Act 1998 stipulates that the Union with Scotland Act 1706 and the Union with 
England Act 1707 have effect subject to this Act210. By introducing the Act into the House of 
Commons the government was “firmly committed to strengthening the Union”211. Scotland 
will continue to form an integral part of the United Kingdom as the devolution proposals, by 
meeting the aspirations [of the people], will not only safeguard but also enhance the Union”. 
Both the Scottish Parliament and the English Parliament passed the Scottish Acts of Union in 
1707. The power of both bodies was transferred to Westminster except some reservations 
concerning the Scottish legal system and the position of the Church in the North. The Scottish 
view of these reservations was explained in the famous case of MacCormick v Lord 
Advocate as follows: “The principle of the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a 
distinctively English principle which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law”. The 
then Lord President told having “difficulty in seeing why it should have been supposed that 
the new Parliament of Great Britain must inherit all the peculiar characteristics of the English 
Parliament, but none of the Scottish Parliament, as if at all that happened in 1707 was that 
Scottish representatives were admitted to the Parliament of England. That is not what was 
done ”. The Scots saw the guarantees firmly entrenched and any attempt of Westminster to 
pass legislation, which infringed them, would be invalid214. The Scotland Act 1998 might be a 
new foundation of these rights, even if they have not been entrenched at all215. Devolution to 
Scotland could release political forces, which have been suppressed in the former system of
206 Scotland Act 1998, section 45 (1), 47 (3)
207 Hadfield, Brigid, in: Edinburgh Law Review, op cit, p 10
208 Scotland Act 1998, sections 52 (1,7)
209 See above
210 Scotland Act 1998, section 37
211 Scotland Bill, House of Commons Bill 104 (1997-98), clauses 5
212 [1953] SC 296 concerning the legitimacy of the numeral “Elisabth II.“
213 [1953] SC 296, at p 411
214 Boyle, Kevin; Hadden, Tom: Northern Ireland, in: Blackburn/ Plant: Constitutional Reform, op cit, p 304
215 See proposals of the SCC, Further Steps towards a scheme for Scotland’s Parliament, Edinburgh 1994, pp 29
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centralisation. However, these forces must not be centripetal216 as far as a spirit of trust and 
generosity accompanies the new constitutional settlement217. Nevertheless, as it was put by 
John Major in a White Paper218 of the Conservative government in 1993, “no nation could be 
held irrevocably in a Union against its will”. Expectations of the break-up of Britain are 
stronger than before, as nationalist attitudes and support for independence have spread
91Qthroughout the population, and across all parties in recent decades . Hence, much depends 
on how devolution works in Scotland.
B. Administrative devolution for Wales
Wales has always been different from the Scottish case. In the twelfth century, England began 
to acquire parts of the Welsh territory and in the Treaty of Aberconway 1277, Wales lost its 
independence220. In 1536 and 1543, two acts221 were passed by the Westminster Parliament 
declaring that Wales was a part of England. English became the official language, but in 1563 
Elizabeth I ordered the translation of the Bible and Prayer Book into Welsh to secure Welsh 
allegiance to the Protestant religion222. Thus, the roots of Welsh nationalism rested not on 
institutions but on language, non-conformism and culture223. The effects of Irish home rule or 
Scottish nationalism were never able to create a strong national Welsh movement. 
Nationalism in Wales has always been divisive and much less integrative than it was in 
Scotland224. The Welsh nationalist Party “Plaid Cymru” was established in 1925 and began as 
a movement to preserve the Welsh language. Its electoral success has always been less 
notable. The Labour party has traditionally dominated the party scene in Wales and it was the 
party which supported devolution at the end225. The issue was how united the party would be 
in recommending it, and as to whether the Labour voters would support it. Labour, therefore, 
did not renew its proposals for devolution until the late 1980s . Plaid Cymru, similarly to the
SNP in Scotland, followed a commitment to a policy of “Wales in Europe”. Following the
216 Naim, Tom, op cit, pp 22
217 O’Leary/ Hazell: A Rolling Programme o f devolution, op cit, p 45; see further below
218 White Paper, Scotland and the Union. A Partnership for Good. HMSO, Edinburgh 1993, Cmnd. 2225
219 Kellas, James: The Scottish political system revisited, in: Taylor/ Thomson: Scotland and Wales. Nations 
again?, op cit, p 232
220 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 6
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222 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 7
223 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 144
224 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 148
225 McAllister, Laura: The Road to Cardiff Bay: The process o f Establishing the National Assembly fo r Wales, in: 
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Conservative victory in 1987, an official “Campaign for a Welsh Assembly” was set up. The 
movement that was led by representatives of the main opposition parties changed its name to 
“Parliament for Wales campaign” in 1993227. In the same time, an independent report about 
the Conservative’s way of carrying out the governance of Wales was published228. It outlined 
the undemocratic character of the administration in the Principality229. However, the 
Campaign did not have the same public and party support as in Scotland230. The reasons were 
twofold. On the one hand, Labour had problems to convince its own members of the political 
need of devolution231 and, on the other hand, the relationship between Liberals, Plaid Cymru 
and Labour was less perfect. Lastly, there was no broad popular demand for devolution within 
the Welsh opinion as, for example, the poll tax did not have the same impact as in Scotland. 
This might be one argument for the fact that the National Assembly for Wales has been only 
granted executive powers232. There was no strong political logic for the creation of a body 
without legislative powers . Also, the announcement of the referendum has been seen as an 
attempt to convince the public opinion of the need for devolution in Wales, even if there were 
fears in 1997 that a referendum may defeat devolution Thus, the Wales devolution model is 
partly based on political compromises complying with the majority of the Welsh electorate.
After the success of Labour in Wales at the general election, the new government did not 
hesitate to publish a White Paper234. On 22 July 1997 it proposed in a bilingual235 publication 
that an elected Assembly would “assume responsibility for policies and public services 
currently exercised by the Secretary of State for Wales” . It outlined that there is a need for 
an Assembly to take over responsibility for the services run directly by the Secretary of 
State237 because the Secretary’s power over their “spendings and settings” represented a 
“democratic deficit”238. In contrast to the proposals for Scotland, the module for Welsh 
devolution did not differ from the general settings made in the devolution Bill 1978. It has
226 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 196
227 McAllister, Laura, op cit, p 638
228 Morgan, Kevin; Roberts, Ellis, op cit
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been argued that the 1978 devolution model had established a principle of a Welsh Assembly
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having only executive powers . In contrast to this view, however, even the Kilbrandon 
Commission had favoured legislative devolution for Wales240.
In the lead up to the referendum, the government launched a “Yes for Wales” campaign and 
sought to create a larger consensus for devolution in the proposed frame. However, Wales 
lacked something like the Scottish Constitutional Convention where the basis of a consensus 
in the leadership of Welsh opinion could have developed241. That deficit was also significant 
for the “Yes” campaign, because the support of Parties like Plaid Cymru and the Liberals was 
not enthusiastic242, as they sought a “better” model of Welsh devolution. In consequence, the 
referendum, which took place on 18 September 1997, brought a very narrow result, although 
the Scottish result was intended to boost the Welsh public opinion. Only 50.3 per cent of the 
electorate voted “Yes” with a low turnout of 50.1 percent. The majority for devolution was 
secured by less than 7000 votes243. That outcome was due to the “No” coming from Cardiff 
and the Southeast, well industrialised areas where people speak mainly English. Conversely, 
the Welsh speaking North and the former Welsh coalfields in the Southwest voted “Yes”. 
Thus, the opposition to devolution is easier to locate in Wales than in Scotland even if the 
Welsh identity might have been less divisive than it was in 1979244. Apart from the 
geographic and social class divisions, the analysis of the referendum stresses the generational 
difference: younger people were more favourably disposed to devolution245.
1. The National Assembly
The National Assembly for Wales with its specific characteristics is a unique institution in 
Europe246. Devolution to Wales must be seen in a context of an asymmetrical redistribution of 
powers247. Compared with the French Regions, it has a considerable power in secondary 
legislation whilst the Spanish Communidades autonomidas enjoy a stronger position as they
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have a constitutional entrenched status248. In contrast to the Scottish Parliament, the National 
Assembly for Wales does not have legislative powers. The scheme for the Assembly can be 
defined as administrative or executive devolution249. The Kilbrandon Commission yielded the 
latter expression. Its report outlined, “that [the Westminster] Parliament and the central 
government would be responsible for the framework of legislation and major policy on all 
matters but would, wherever possible, transfer to directly elected regional assemblies the 
responsibility within that framework for division specific policies and for general 
administration”250. The Welsh model does not really differ from the 1976 one, which had 
been described as “a sort of Glamorgan County Council on stilts”251. The whole devolution 
scheme is more tightly controlled by central government. Thus, it reflects Labour’s long 
standing ambivalence about Welsh devolution252. In 1997 however, the Secretary of State for 
Wales, Ron Davies, believed that the Government of Wales Act 1998253 “is immeasurably 
stronger than [he] dared hope”254. This implied a certain unawareness of the public about the 
political power of the new body when the first elections to the National Assembly for Wales 
took place on 6 May 1999. The elections gave Labour 28 seats -  three short of an overall 
majority. Plaid Cymru won 17 seats, the Tories nine and the Liberal Democrats six. Alun 
Michael, the succeeding Labour Secretary of State won the battle for the Labour leadership in 
the Assembly. Unlike Scotland, he decided to form a minority government rather than to 
attempt a coalition255. This did not mean, however, that deals did not have to be done. For 
example, the Presiding Officer of the new Assembly was a Nationalist, Lord Dafydd Elis 
Thomas.
The Government of Wales Act 1998 provides for a National Assembly for Wales256. The act 
is longer than its Scottish counterpart but despite its 159 sections it is not overly 
prescriptive . The emphasis on “national” was chosen by the Secretary of State for Wales 
because of the divisive character of the former title of a “Welsh Assembly”. That Assembly is 
composed of sixty258 Members of the Assembly (AM). The AMs are to be elected by an
248 See above, also Wiedmann, Thomas, op cit, pp 156
249 Constitution Unit: An Assembly for Wales. London 1996, pp 50
250 Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon^ op cit, para 827
251 Thorpe, Jeremy, MP, in: House of Commons Debates, Vol 254, col 903, 13 January 1976
252 Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution in 1998-99, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 247
253 London, HMSO 1998 (http://www.hmso.gov.uk/)
254 Davies, Ron, op cit, p 4
Blair faces coalition dealing in both Scotland and Wales, in: Daily Telegraph, 8 May 1999
256 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 1
257 McAllister, Laura, op cit, p 640
258 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 2 and Schedule 1
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additional member system, the same system of proportional representation as in Scotland. 
In forty constituencies260 in Wales representatives are elected under the “first- past- the- post” 
system. The remaining 20 AMs are additional members. They are to be elected from the party 
lists in the five regions of Wales based on the European parliamentary constituencies261. This
9/^9figure signalled a reduction from the first proposal of eighty members . The ratio between 
different types of members differs from Scotland as it is in Wales 2:1 between constituency 
and additional members. This reduces considerably the proportionality of the vote in Wales. 
As in Scotland, however, the Members of the Assembly are elected for a fixed four-year
9term . As the first election took place in May 1999, the next election is supposed to take 
place on the first Thursday in May of 2003. The Act does not provide for any possibility of 
the Assembly’s earlier dissolution264. This may be a handicap for the Executive Committee 
and may prove difficult for strong leadership of the Assembly . This was to be seen when 
the new First Secretary, Mr Alun Michael, had to resign after less than one year of office 
because of “his failure to deliver a secure promise of matched funding for ‘Objective One’ 
spending”266. The main problem was, however, that he did not have a party majority or a 
stable coalition in the Assembly267. He resigned finally according to the Standing Orders268. It 
is therefore to be seen if the blend of cabinet and local government system is a workable
Of\Qsolution for the Assembly . In Wales, there was a similar attempt of Labour as in Scotland 
to increase the female representation within its group of the Assembly through “twinning- 
lists”. At the first elections, the proportion was at 37 per cent of female AMs. Also, the 
Assembly has installed a Committee on equal opportunities270.
The Government of Wales Act 1998 provided for the preparation of the Assembly’s Standing
9 7 1Orders . However, Wales lacked on the one hand the preparatory work that was done in
259 See above
260 Government of Wales Act 1998, Schedule 1
261 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 2 (2), 6,7 and Schedule 1
262 McAllister, Laura, op cit, p 641
263 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 3 (2) with exceptions of section 3 (3)
264 Rawlings, Richard, The new Model Wales, op cit, p 478; Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 
218
265 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 219
266 Michael’s Day o f Destiny, in: Western Mail, 10 February 2000
267 Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution in 1998-99, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 248
268 Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales. Cardiff, Welsh Office 1999, (or 
http://www.assemblv.wales.gov.uk/works/standingorders/standingorders e.htm), para 2.9
269 See below
270 Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales, op cit, para 14
271 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 50
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Scotland at the SCC and on the other hand the act itself was not over-prescriptive either272. 
Therefore the Assembly’s Standing Orders were to be geared up by the Secretary of State273 
before the Assembly would begin to function. The Secretary of State transferred this task to 
an all-party commission274, which was charged to draft a report on the precise procedures for 
; the Assembly275. That Commission proposed a scheme embodying the principle of open,
ii
accountable government, thus allowing the Assembly flexibility enough to decide the 
| procedural details. These new Standing Order claim to offer a “contemporary interpretation of
j  democratic governance within the context of accountability and inclusivity” and were
adopted at the first meeting of the new Assembly at the end of May 1999. The Standing 
Orders can only be changed with a majority of two-thirds within the Assembly. Moreover, 
they include a rigorous Code of Standards for Members and require the Assembly’s members 
to act at all time exclusively in terms of the public interest277. Generally, AMs can also be 
MPs. The Labour party thought, however, that double membership should be avoided. 
Currently, about five AMs are Members of both bodies.
The National Assembly for Wales elects its First Secretary278. He or she is, however, not 
appointed by the Queen. The First Secretary appoints the Executive Committee composed of 
Assembly Secretaries with specific policy portfolios279. This corresponds in practice to a 
Cabinet-type system280. The Standing Orders allow the Assembly to delegate functions to the 
Executive Committee281. Generally, however, power over devolved areas is transferred to the 
Assembly as a whole, to whom powers are devolved282. The Assembly is a body corporate 
which may exercise both executive and legislative functions. That is a salient difference to the 
Scottish Parliament. The Assembly is empowered to delegate its functions to its committees 
or to the First Secretary. The Assembly elects the committee chairs, which have the duty to 
oversee the policy remit of each subject committee283. The statutory Committees are the “sub-
272 See above
273 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 50 (1)
274 National Assembly Advisory Group set up in 1997 and later the Standing Orders Commission
275 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 50 (2)
276 Michael, Alun: Foreword, in: Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales, op cit, p 1; see also 
Davies, Ron, in: House of Commons Debates, Vol. 298, col. 757,22 July 1997
277 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 72 see also Standing Orders
278 Government o f Wales Act 1998, section 53 (1)
279 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 56
280 See Standing Orders, op cit, definitions, before para 1; also Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit,
P 211
81 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 62
282 Gay, Oonagh: Devolution and Concordats, op cit, p 15
283 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 57 (5). Their chairpersons proved as potential power-breakers with 
Labour providing only two due to the lack of coalition. See Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution 
1998-99, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 248
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ordinate legislation Committee”284, and “Audit Committee”285, “Regional Committees286” for 
North Wales, Mid Wales, South West Wales and South East Wales287. Beside these statutory 
settings the Standing Orders established a “Business Committee”288, a “Standard of conduct 
Committee”289, a “Committee on European Affairs”290 and a “Committee on equal 
opportunities”291. Apart from that there are the subject Committees, which are established
9Q9with reference to the Assembly Secretaries . The “sub-ordinate legislation Committee” has a 
special position as it considers subordinate legislation for Acts passed by the Westminster 
Parliament293. It co-operates with the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, which has 
much experience with the delegation by statute. This implies a limited power to legislate that 
is regularly handed to the Executive294. Besides that, the subject committees’ role extends 
well beyond the scrutiny of the executive on the Scottish scheme295. They assume a double or 
hybrid task as they do not only combine the roles of standing and select committees but also 
in the way in which they enable the minority parties to play a distinctive and influential role. 
Proceedings of the Assembly must be held in public; a Welsh Administration Ombudsman 
investigates complaints296.
9Q7
All Committees must reflect the party balance in the Assembly . These Committees are at 
least composed of seven and not more than eleven members. Therefore, questions arose 
concerning the management of Committees. As the Assembly has only sixty Members it is
9QQ
difficult to staff and organise these structures with reference to its range of responsibilities . 
The Presiding Officer299 of the National Assembly for Wales has not the same weight as in 
the Scottish Parliament. Its responsibility lies only in its political position to control the 
proceedings of the Assembly300. He or she is not supposed to be an information channel to the 
crown as Whitehall manages all contacts between London and Cardiff. The First Secretary is
284 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 58, 59; Standing Orders, op cit, para 11
285 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 60; Standing Orders, op cit, para 12
286 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 61; Standing Orders, op cit, para 10
287 An attempt to unite the historically diverse country; see McAllister, Laura, op cit, p 642
288 Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales, op cit, para 13
289 Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales, op cit, para 16
290 Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales, op cit, para 15
291 Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales, op cit, para 14
292 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 57 (4)
293 Jones, Barry: The Committees, in: Osmond, John: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 60
294 See further below
295 Rawlings, Richard, The new model Wales, op cit, p 481
296 Government o f Wales Act 1998, section 70
297 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 54 (2)
298 Jones, Barry: The Committees, op cit, p 61; also Institute of Welsh Affairs Working Party: Making the 
Assembly work. Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff 1997
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not to be nominated by the Queen neither.
Unlike Scotland, Wales has its own language which might be used as “the badge of the 
distinctive Welsh identity”301. The Welsh Language Act 1993 stipulates that Welsh and the 
English language are to be treated on a basis of equality in the conduct of public business and 
in the administration of justice in Wales. In keeping with the terms of that Act, the 
Government of Wales Act 1998 requires that the new body carries out its work in both 
languages “so far as it is both appropriate in the circumstances and reasonably practicable”302. 
All papers are available in both languages and the sessions of the Assembly are staffed with a
A A 1
simultaneous translation . Particularly, Welsh as a language of law is to be “re-invented” . 
Section 122 of the act attributes to the Assembly even a “dictionary power” as it can describe 
Welsh equivalents to established legal terminology.
The Government of Wales Act 1998 confers executive but not primary legislative functions 
on the Assembly. This means that the Assembly will have the powers transferred from 
Whitehall departments and especially the Secretary of State for Wales to make subordinate 
legislation in areas within its competence. This construction implies inevitably a legal and 
administrative complexity where a “horizontal division” of law-making functions is 
concerned but also a “vertical division” of primary law-making powers305. In contrast to the 
Scotland Act, the Government of Wales Act 1998306 requires functions to be transferred to the 
Assembly and charges the Secretary of State to consider as to whether further parts of 
functions are to be “devolved”307. The strategy of the Government of Wales Act is to assign 
the Assembly competence field by field308. These areas are specified in Schedule 2 of the 
act309 and include agriculture, forestry, fisheries and food, ancient monuments and historic 
buildings, culture (including museums, galleries and libraries), economic development, 
education and training, environment, health and health services, highways, housing, industry,
300 Standing Orders, para 1.9- 1.12
301 J.R. Jones quoted in: Williams, Colin: Operating through two languages, in: The National Assembly Agenda, 
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London, Kluwer 1999, p 44
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local government, social services, sport and recreation, tourism, town and country planning, 
transport, water and flood defence and the welsh language. The Assembly has also the power 
to transfer to itself the functions of other public authorities such as health310 authorities or 
quangos311. This includes a large responsibility for the funding of the Welsh public bodies.
1^9Also, the National Assembly has to distribute the central government grants to local 
government. This revenue constitutes the dominant proportion of local government finance . 
The Assembly is required to set out a scheme to promote a sustainable relationship with local 
government314. In this context, a “Partnership Council” has been established which should 
enhance the consultation between both bodies.
The National Assembly for Wales (Transfer of Functions) Order315 has defined the scope of 
the Assembly’s work, which is, in principle, to take over the functions previously exercised 
by the Secretary of State . The Transfer Order describe precisely each act or statutory 
instrument for which the responsibility is to be taken further by the Assembly (Schedule 1) 
and it (Schedule 2) enumerates the enactments subject to constraint on ministerial exercise. 
However, there is nothing to prevent future Acts of Parliament to transfer more powers . 
The Assembly also takes over the former budget of the Welsh Office, which corresponded in 
1999 to approximately £7bn318. Moreover, the Act provides for regulatory appraisal of 
subordinate legislation319. A draft lay before the Assembly needs generally to be analysed for 
cost-benefits320. This can be seen in the context of a consultative style of government as the 
National Assembly has also to establish a scheme for the promotion of the voluntary sector321, 
its consultation with business322 and a scheme for sustainable development323.
Despite the fact that the Assembly has not got primary legislative power, it will exercise a
3,0 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 27
311 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 28
312 See further below
313 McAllister, Laura, op cit, p 647
314 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 113
315 National Assembly of Wales (Transfer of Functions) Order, SI 1999/672 changed by SI 2000/253
316 Corresponding to 150 Statutory Instruments made independently and around 400 with other Ministers, see: 
Rawlings, Richard: The new model Wales, op cit, p 488
317 Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, in: Osmond, John: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 71
318 A Voice for Wales, op cit, para 1.3
319 Craig, Paul; Walters, Mark: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 276
320 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 65
321 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 114
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considerable degree of power in view of “secondary” or more precisely “sub-ordinate324” 
legislation and scrutiny of primary legislation. This is only to understand in the context of the 
British system of legislation. Albeit the Parliament makes the law in Britain, it has delegated 
legislative powers to other institutions especially to Ministers, local authorities or other public 
bodies from the nineteenth century325. These “orders”, “regulations” or “rules” are legally 
provided by the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, which stipulates the procedures and 
formalities of this type of legislation. The main political decisions are generally made by 
primary legislation. Ministers for example can only be empowered to make secondary
99  f \legislation because of an act of primary legislation . Nevertheless, secondary legislation can 
have the same effects. In Britain, unlike other European states as for example Germany, 
prison sentences can be based on breaches of secondary legislation327. The volume of 
delegated legislation reveals its importance, as in recent years a growing number of laws have 
been sub-ordinate legislation328. Statutory instruments govern largely the daily life in
9 9 0Wales . However, these have not been all made by the Secretary of State for Wales, most of 
these instruments have been made by other Ministers330. Some of them are made 
concurrently, others jointly. In the first case, the instrument falls within the responsibility of 
the Secretary of State for Wales that for reasons of administrative convenience only one 
instrument is made. The second case may happen if the act confers powers to a group of 
Ministers. The jointly made statutory instruments are furthermore to be made between the 
Assembly and the appropriate Whitehall Ministers whilst the Assembly is solely responsible 
for the concurrent scheme even if it might be inclined to follow the Westminster made 
instruments331. In addition, the Assembly has the power to make sub-ordinate legislation 
where none has been made yet. In this the Assembly is supposed to be able to revoke or 
amend existing secondary legislation as it has the power to make sub-ordinate legislation in
9 9 9the devolved areas following the Interpretation Act 1978 . However, there is one special
class of powers to make secondary legislation that is called “Henry VIII clauses”. Their name 
is due to a King who was given sweeping powers under Statute of Proclamations 1539 to 
legislate without reference to parliament333. These clauses allow a Minister to amend or repeal
324 Interpretation Act 1978, section 21
325 Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, in: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 68
326 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, pp 549
327 Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, in: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 69
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329 Rawlings, Richard: The new model Wales, op cit
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333 Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, in: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 73
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primary legislation by secondary legislation. The width of their power has been described as 
“breath-taking”334. This has been the case concerning the School Standards and Framework 
Act335 for example, which allows statutory instruments to make fundamental changes to major 
provisions of the Act concerning appeals against school exclusions or admissions . This Act 
is included in the Government of Wales Act (Transfer of Functions) Order 1999337. Sub­
section338 2(g) allows for regulations making “provision for amending, repealing or revoking 
any statutory provision passed or made before the appointed day, for applying any such 
provision and for making savings or additional savings from the effect of any amendment or 
repeal made by this Act”. Section 5 stipulates furthermore that the “amendments that may be 
made under the previous subsection shall be in addition (and without prejudice) to those made 
by any other provision of this Act”339. Also Section 27 (5) and 28 (7) of the Government of 
Wales Act 1998 contain such clauses340. Ordinary “Welsh clauses341” in recent acts are more 
clear and understandable and do not give such autonomy to the Assembly. As an example 
could be taken the Local Government Act 1999 which stipulates in section 29342 that the Act 
“in its application to Wales shall have effect with modifications”. This means that “for each 
reference to the Secretary of State there shall be substituted a reference to the National 
Assembly for Wales”. Some sections of the Act are omitted or excluded whilst the Secretary 
of State is in other cases prohibited to make any provision which has effect in relation to 
Wales unless he has consulted the National Assembly for Wales or to amend the application 
of legislation made by the National Assembly for Wales, unless the Assembly consents.
2. The Welsh Executive
The particularity of the Welsh devolution model can be best identified with its organisation of 
the political Executive. Originally it was intended that the Assembly is organised like a local 
government council carrying out the work in subject committees343. However, in order to 
enable the Executive to have a more effective leadership it was finally regulated a mixture
334 Bradley, Anthony: Constitutional Reform, the sovereignty o f Parliament and devolution, in: Cambridge 
Centre for Public Law: Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom, op cit, p 39
335 Other examples are the Jobseekers Act 1995, Human Rights Act 1998 or the Deregulation and Contracting 
Out Act 1994 see Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, in: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 73
336 Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, in: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 71
337 SI 1999/253
338 School Standards and Framework Act 1998, section 144
339 School Standards and Framework Act 1998, section 144 (5)
340 Craig, Paul; Walters, Mark: The courts, devolution and judicial review, in: Public Law, op cit, p 277
341 Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, in: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 77
342 Local Government Act 1999, section 29 “Modification for Wales“
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between the Westminster cabinet-model344 and also that the subject committees should come 
in operation345. Thus, the Assembly is organised on a hybrid system, but the definition of the 
business of the Assembly follows a top-down logic. The First Secretary has therefore the task 
to create its own cabinet with Minister’s portfolios of its choice. Thus, the following 
Assembly’s Secretaries were established in 1999: Finance, Business, Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Health and Social Services, Environment and Local Government, Economic 
development, Education and children, Education and Training346. Indeed, this partition was 
the base for the correspondent subject committees of the Assembly. In the event, the National 
Assembly Advisory Group347 had precisely recommended such an Assembly Cabinet to 
ensure efficient decision-making but with considerable involvement for subject committees to 
provide scrutiny348 of the Cabinet349. This differs with the Scottish model. It can be argued 
that the position of the First Secretary is rather strong as far as the Executive is concerned. 
Nevertheless, he has a different position compared with the Scottish First Minister. Therefore, 
it was presumable that he was not granted an audience with the Queen following his 
election350. However, he also has been given the status of Member of the Privy Council.
C. The Northern Ireland Assembly
It has been pointed out that the Northern Irish case differs considerably from the Scottish and 
Welsh ones. Since 1920 Northern Ireland has been treated differently from Great Britain. 
Also, the issues in Northern Ireland have never been separatist, but “unionist” or “nationalist” 
and “protestant” or “catholic”351. The constitutional background and the context of 
“devolution” in Northern Ireland differ thus generally from Scotland and Wales. Hence, it is 
necessary to explain why a comparative approach is suitable352. First, the understanding of the 
devolved institutions in Northern Ireland is significantly enhanced in the context of
344 Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales, para 2.4 “Assembly Cabinet”
345 McAllister, Laura, op cit, p 642
346 See Official Website of the National Assembly for Wales (http://www.assemblv.wales.gov.uk/)
347 see above
348 Concerning the role of the courts, see further below
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350 Historic day as the Queen arrives in Scotland for first audience, in: Daily Telegraph, 16 May 1999, p 2
351 See above; for the religious implications in Scotland see: Walker, Graham: Scotland and Northern Ireland: 
Constitutional Questions, Connections and Possibilities, in: Government and Opposition. Vol 33 (1), London 
1998, pp 21
352 Also Hadfield, Brigid, The nature o f devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 5 stating “a risk of 
a certain amount of distortion”. Meehan, Elizabeth: The Belfast Agreement -  Its distinctiveness and point of  
cross-fertilization, in: Parliamentary Affairs. Vol 52 (1), London 1999, pp 19 holds that Northern Ireland is 
central to this question.
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devolution to Scotland and Wales. Special problems of Ulster are then easier to identify. 
Second, the constitutional questions of devolution in Northern Ireland are similar to those in 
Scotland and Wales and for a general overview of the devolution model it is important to see 
which powers are devolved to Northern Ireland. Thirdly, devolution to Northern Ireland 
affects also the residual part of the United Kingdom . It introduces an inter-national aspect 
in the constitutional settlement of devolution of the United Kingdom354.
As shown above, there was since the 1980s a common attempt of the British and Irish 
government to seize the problem. The British- Irish inter-governmental approach culminated 
1985 in the Anglo-Irish Agreement355. This international treaty established a base for the both 
governments in the leading-up to the 1998 peace-talks356. It included four principal elements. 
On the one hand, it stipulated that “any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only 
come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland”. On the other 
hand, it established an inter-governmental conference, chaired by both British and Irish 
Ministers assisted by a permanent secretariat at Belfast. The general viewpoint of the 
agreement was that power should be devolved to a Northern Irish administration maintained 
by cross-community co-operation. The agreement was a sign to a real “open-up” of the Irish 
issue to the international public, whilst the British government had always taken the view that 
the Irish question is exclusively of national concern357. The whole agreement was embedded 
in the context of deeper cross-border co-operation between Ireland and the United Kingdom 
in security and socio-economic matters358. These principles established a common ground for 
further co-operation. For the first time, the Anglo-Irish Agreement gave a special role to the 
Republic of Ireland, which has been consequently able to moderate the nationalist option. The 
Downing Street Declaration in 1990, where the Irish Republic announced the abandon of its 
constitutional claim over Northern Ireland, was conversely able to appease the Unionist 
position. The logic which followed was that the British government has attempted to force the 
Unionists into a power-sharing co-operation, whilst the Irish government coerced the 
nationalists all conditioned that Northern Ireland is to remain a part of the United Kingdom as 
long as the majority does not express another will. However, the capability of the British 
government for an effective coercion was suspended when the Major government lost its
353 O’Leary, Brendan, The British-Irish Agreement. London, Constitution Unit 1998, p 8
354 See further below
355 See Hadfield, Brigid: The Constitution of Northern Ireland, op cit, Appendix 8
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358 Boyle, Kevin; Hadden, Tom: The Anglo-Irish Agreement. Sweet & Maxwell, London 1989, and in:
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majority in the Commons and relied increasingly on the vote of the Northern Irish Unionists. 
The final breakthrough in the province of the United Kingdom was, indeed, not only due to 
the endeavour of the new Labour government, because the peace process started under the 
former governments However, an important difference was marked by the change of the new 
British government concerning the integration of the Northern Irish problem in a more
- ic q
substantial concept of devolution thereby avoiding any isolation of the Northern Irish case .
In 1994 the announcement of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to hold a cease-fire boosted 
the all-party approach of the Anglo-Irish Agreement as it allowed its political wing Sinn Fein 
to take part in these talks360. In February 1995, the joint ministerial conference issued its Joint 
Framework documents. These documents361 outlined in detail the possible status for Northern 
Ireland and were in the end followed by a final agreement . That agreement has been 
prepared363 since 1996 through multi-party talks under the chairmanship of the former United 
States Senator George Mitchell. A further Westminster Act provided364 then for the elections 
of a “forum for political dialogue”. This Forum had the task to discuss “issues relevant to 
promoting dialogue and understanding with Northern Ireland”. Thus, its functions were 
deliberative only365. The talks within the forum led finally to the Good-Friday Agreement of 
1998 , which created a new political and constitutional construction for the province. The
agreement, however, was discussed and developed by the representatives of the Northern Irish 
parties. It later became the basis for the Northern Ireland Act 1998 that enshrined the 
agreement in the form of legislation.
The agreement itself provides under Strand One for a cross-community Assembly to be 
elected by the single transferable vote system for a four-year term. The Assembly should 
“exercise full legislative and executive authority in respect of those matters currently within 
the responsibility of the six Northern Ireland Government Departments (Agriculture, 
Economic, Development, Education, Environment, Finance and Personnel, Health and Social 
Services), with the possibility of taking on responsibility for other matters as detailed
Constitutional Reform, op cit, p 295
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elsewhere in [the] agreement”367. Further powers could also be devolved in due course. The 
Assembly would enjoy an “aliud” status between the Scottish Parliament with tax-raising 
powers and the Welsh Assembly with a restricted realm of competence. Apart from the cross­
community institution, Stand Two of the Agreement provides for a North-South Ministerial 
Council, whilst Strand Three establishes the British-Irish Council368.
The Good Friday Agreement369 regulated that each government organises a referendum on 22 
May 1998. Subject to Parliamentary approval, a consultative referendum in Northern 
Ireland370 and the Irish Republic, should address the question: "Do you support the agreement 
reached in the multi-party talks on Northern Ireland ...?". Also, the Irish government was to 
introduce in the Irish Parliament a Bill to change the Irish Constitution by amending Articles 
2, 3, and 29 to permit its government to ratify the new British-Irish Agreement371. As the 
public in the Irish Republic and all parties in Northern Ireland were broadly involved in the 
agreement, a “Yes” campaign for these referendums was not set up. The agreement was lastly 
approved on 22 may 1998 when, on a turnout of 81.1 per cent, 71.1 per cent of the Northern 
Irish electorate voted in favour372. The large majority of „yes“ votes proved that the 
agreement enjoyed a majority support in both communities in Northern Ireland, the unionist 
and the nationalist. The referendum held in the Republic was endorsed by 94 per cent of the 
electorate on a turnout of 56 per cent.
1. The Northern-lreland Assembly
Following the agreement and its approval by the population, general elections for the new 
Northern Ireland Assembly were held in June 1998. This was provided by the Northern 
Ireland (Elections) Act 1998. However, these general elections took place before a Northern 
Ireland Bill had been published373. This implied that Scotland and Wales had much more time 
to prepare the individual devolution scheme and a consultative committee of preparation was 
installed. In Northern Ireland, on the contrary, the Agreement provided for a complete
367 The Good-Friday-Agreement, London, HMSO 1998,Cmnd. 3883, strand one, 3 (See also 
http://www.niassemblv.gov.ukl
368 See further below
369 Good-Friday-Agreement, para 11 (2)
370 Organised under the terms of the Northern Ireland (Entry to Negotiations, etc.) Act 1996
371 Para 2 of the section “Constitutional Issues”, in Annex B, see also O’Donnell, Donal: Constitutional 
Background to and aspects o f the Good Friday Agreement -  A Republic o f Ireland perspective, in: Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly. Vol 50 (1), Belfast, SLS Spring 1999, pp 76
372 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 108
373 Hadfield, Brigid, in: The nature o f devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 12
66
“devolution” project. The electorate had therefore to vote without detailed legislation 
proposals concerning the future tasks of the Assembly374. The general elections for the new 
Assembly in Belfast were held in June 1998 and returned a majority of 28 seats for the 
protestant UUP, 24 seats for the catholic SDLP, 20 seats for the protestant Democratic 
Unionist Party, whilst Sinn Fein won 18 seats. Other parties including parties for cross­
community support got 18 seats. The new Assembly met for the first time on 1 July 1998 in 
Castle Buildings and since then has met in Parliament Buildings. The AMs elected David 
Trimble as (shadow) First Minister and Seamus Mallon as (shadow) Deputy First Minister375. 
Lord Alderdice was appointed by the then Secretary of State as initial Presiding Officer of the 
New Northern Ireland Assembly. The timetable, which was imposed by the Agreement, 
provided that the First Minister and its colleagues had to take office by the 31 October 1999. 
After hectic activity to establish the devolution scheme for Northern Ireland, the devolution 
process became delayed first by the refusal on the Unionist side to enter a power sharing 
executive until there was evidence about the disarmament of the IRA. The unionist problem 
was to sit with Sinn Fein in Cabinet without being assured about disarmament. In 1999, 
Senator Mitchell came a second time to Belfast, and after some delicate negotiations the IRA 
agreed to appoint an interlocutor for decommissioning. The Unionist leader, David Trimble, 
then got a small 58 per cent majority of his party to establish the power-sharing executive 
provided that the IRA started decommissioning until February 2000. The UUP, although 
having two ministers, refused to sit in Cabinet with Sinn Fein. The decommissioning of IRA 
weapons became the deadlock during the initial months of the new Northern Ireland 
Assembly. The taking of office in October/November 1999 was already difficult, as the 
unionist did not see a progress in decommission of IRA. Whilst a real break-through was not 
possible at the beginning of 2000, the Northern Irish First Minister announced to resign if the 
decommissioning did not progress. Nevertheless, the general context of co-operation 
advanced as the Secretary of State announced in January 2000 the scrapping of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary’s name and the force‘s dismemberment, in what Unionists perceived to 
be an appeasement of the republicans. However, the British government feared finally the 
resignation of the Unionist leader. His withdrawal from the Executive could have lead to a 
new deadlock on the unionist side, it was thought. Therefore, Westminster overruled the new 
body on 11 February 2000376. The Northern Ireland Act 2000 provides for the complete
374 Hadfield, Brigid, in: The nature o f devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 12
375 Results from http://www.niassemblv.gov.uk
376 See Mandelson imposes direct rule, in: Daily Telegraph, 12 February 2000
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suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly and of all other related institutions377. In May 
2000, however, the British and Irish government could break the deadlock on 
decommissioning . The IRA made an official statement being ready to put its weapons
070
“beyond use”. Thus, the power-sharing body could be reinstated at the end of May . All 
theoretical questions about the future of parliamentary sovereignty are at present resolved at 
least in relation to Northern Ireland, where it was stipulated “that Northern Ireland in its 
entirety remains part of the United Kingdom”379. The future of the peace process remains, 
however, unclear.
The Northern Ireland Act has been adopted at Westminster in November 1998 and repealed 
the Northern Ireland Elections Act 1998. It is not evident which devolution scheme was 
followed in Northern Ireland. The Kilbrandon Commission’s definition380 of legislative 
devolution would be able to describe the present system. However, this system is supposed to 
be changed381 in Northern Ireland and might end in a later unification of the Isle. Thus, the 
system has been described as “power-sharing plus”382. Bogdanor383 avoids classifying the 
Northern Irish model of devolution. It is true, that the original Gladstonian conception of 
Home Rule has been followed. Thus, the devolution model of Northern Ireland may be a 
limited legislative devolution opened to an independent status at the end. An important feature 
are the “confederal” arrangements384 both within the Irish Isle and between Britain and the 
Irish Republic. The confederal nature of the arrangements are shown by the different cross 
border bodies385.
00/ '
The Northern Ireland Act 1998 provides for a 108-member unicameral -in  contrast to the 
bicameral system of 192 1387 -  Northern Ireland Assembly. The Assembly is elected for a 
fixed term of four years, although the Act388 schedules the next elections not before 1 May 
2003. That has been stipulated due to the lack of competences of the Assembly in the first
377 Northern Ireland Act 2000, section 1
378 By way of a restauration order under Section 3 (1). See SI 1445/2000 and 1446/2000 of 27th May 2000
379 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 1(1)
380 See above
381 Section 3 and 1 (2) respectively
382 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement, op cit, p 1
383 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 109
384 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement, op cit, p 6
385 See below
386 Section 33 (1) and Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, Schedule 2 also Good Friday Agreement 1998, 
Cmnd. 3883, para 5 (2)
387 See above
388 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 31 (2)
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nine month of its existence . However, the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly 
makes it unforeseeable as to whether this date will be maintained. Clause 24 of the Northern 
Ireland Bill391 empowered originally the Queen i.e. the Secretary of State to dissolve the 
Assembly if the First Minister or other Ministers were not able to hold office or, if they 
should resign, that those who might succeed them should also be unable to do so or, lastly, if 
the public interest might be that the Assembly should be dissolved. Thus, the dissolution of 
the Assembly could have produced an earlier general election. However, this clause of the 
Bill was changed at the Lord’s Committee stage. It was argued that the weight of criticism of 
such emergency power was considerable. Therefore, it was argued that these regulations “are
' I Q '}
planning for failure and as a result make failure more likely” . Thus, section 32 is now
'JQ 'l
equal to the regulations of the Scotland Act 1998 and any prorogation power was deleted.
Each of the 18 Northern Irish Westminster constituencies returns six Members to the 
assembly394. The figure of 108 Members of the Assembly (AMs) is proportionally higher than 
that for Scotland and Wales. However, that number has been enshrined in the Good Friday 
Agreement395 as it states that a “108-member Assembly will be elected by proportional 
representation from the existing Westminster constituencies” thus reflecting the 
understanding of six AMs per constituency . Nevertheless, this provision faced unionist
amendments when it was inserted in the Northern Ireland Act397. The then responsible
Minister justified the proposal because of the agreement’s regulation, which should provide
' lQ O
for “greater inclusivity” . Therefore, the boundary commission has to respect the 
agreement’s provisions399. This does not include the current representation at Westminster, 
which is, however, likely to remain400. This “inclusivity” means in fact a high degree of 
proportionality that is more than in Scotland and Wales. The political reason for the 
proportionality of the agreement’s provisions is that every part of the Northern Irish 
community is ensured of its representation according to its population. This is to provide for 
confidence in the newly established institutions from both sides, nationalist and unionist.
389 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 18
390 Northern Ireland Act 2000, section 1
391 Sub-section 4, see Website of the Assembly http://www.niassemblv.gov.uk
392 Lord Dubs in: House of Lords Debates, Vol 593, col 1442, 21 October 1998
393 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 18
394 Section 33 (2) and Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986
395 Para 5 (2)
396 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 18
397 Sections 31-5
398 Murphy, Paul, in: House of Commons Debates, Vol 310, col 892, 22 April 1998
399 The UK government remains legally responsible for the elections to the Assembly
400 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 17
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The elections were held under a system of proportional representation, the so-called “single 
transferable vote”. The single transferable vote offers both proportionality between votes and 
seats and a constituency based, but multi-member, system of election401. The calculation is 
based on a quota of the votes cast that is reached either by first preference voting producing 
the required quota or the redistribution of votes cast for losing candidates. It requires that the 
total number of votes be divided by one more than the number of vacant seats, plus one402. In 
contrast to the systems of additional member lists like in Scotland and Wales, this system 
offers a greater proportionality and a better choice for the voter. However, it implies a greater 
influence of the parties too, even though more parties are represented at the Assembly403. 
Given the experiences of the Northern Ireland Parliament404, the electoral system cannot be 
changed by the Assembly405. Apart from that, a higher female representation was not an issue 
in the Northern Ireland elections.
The Northern Ireland Act 1998 provides for the establishment of the Assembly’s own 
Standing Orders406. It requires the creation and the repeal of the Standing Orders only by 
cross-community support407. The Standing Orders were prepared by the Committee on 
Standing Orders which was established by the Assembly at its first meeting on 1 July 1998 to 
assist it in its consideration of Standing Orders408. They were finally approved by the 
Assembly on 9 March 1999. According to section 31, the Standing Orders of the Assembly 
stipulate that the Presiding Officer is in Northern Ireland called the “Speaker”409. The 
Assembly has to elect the leaders of the Executive and to take key-decisions by way of a 
novel cross-community voting mechanism410. That means those elected must first secure a 
majority of members voting in the election. Secondly, however, they need also a majority of 
the designated nationalists and a majority of the designated unionists voting in the election411. 
Thus, it is ensured that both parts of the community support the candidates. However, for the 
very important decisions, like the Assembly’s leaders a third provision is made. It requires
401 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 508
402 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 508; Mitchell/ Seyd, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 99
403 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 15
404 See above
405 As it is included in the Good-Friday Agreement and as it would fall in the reserved competence of 
Westminster, see below
406 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 41
407 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 41 (2)
408 See http://www.niassemblv.gov.uk
409 Standing Orders of the Northern Ireland Assembly, para I, see http://www.niassemblv. gov.uk/
410 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement, op cit, p 6, 13
411 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 4 (3)
70
that the office can only be held by two persons of the different communities, but both must 
secure a majority within their own community and also within the other part of the 
community412. At the first meeting of the Assembly, all members were required to register a 
declaration of identity413. It is possible to be “unionist”, “nationalist” or “other”. This created, 
of course, some difficulty for the “others”, as their votes are not counted414 if cross­
community support procedures take place. A party is not likely to lose seats, as vacancies are 
to be replaced by substitutes rather than through by-elections. The number of seats can only 
be changed by defections415. Conversely, the Assembly with majority vote can pass “normal 
laws”, although a minority of 30 Members can claim special procedures416. Key-decisions417, 
however, are the adoption of controversial laws like the budget or questions of equality are to 
be voted by cross-community support418.
The Act requires that the Standing orders make provision for establishing committees of 
members of the Assembly (“statutory committees”) to advise and assist each Northern Ireland 
Minister in the formulation of policy with respect to matters within his responsibilities as a 
Minister419. Therefore the following committees are provided420: Committee on Procedures, 
Business Committee, Special Committee on conformity with Equality Requirements, Public 
Accounts Committee, Committee on Standards and Privileges, Audit Committee and a 
Committee of the Centre. These committees have to scrutinise the work of the Executive 
Committee421, which is established, following section 20 of the Act. The distribution of 
committee chairs follows the d’Hondt formula422 that means a proportional scheme. 
Moreover, section 29 of the Act requires for the Committee chairs that the nominating party 
has to prefer a committee in which there is no “party interest” . Party interests in a committee 
arise when the committee is established to advise or assist a Minister who is member of that 
party423.
412 See further below
413 Standing Orders, para 3 (7)
414 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 106
415 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 19
416 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement, op cit, p 13
417 Good Friday Agreement, Strand 1 (5)
418 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 63 (3); Standing Orders, paras 33, 54
419 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 29 (1)
420 Good Friday Agreement, paras 52-8
421 See above
422 The formula applies as follows: S/l+M , where S is equal the number of seats of the party in the Assembly, 
which were held by members of the party on the day on which the Assembly first met following its election; M 
has to be equal with the number of Ministerial offices (if any), which are held by members of the party.
423 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 29 (6)
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The Northern Ireland Act 1998 provides for full legislative and executive authority in respect 
of the matters currently devolved administratively to the Northern Irish government 
departments. The power of the Northern Ireland’s Assembly is thus closer to the role given to 
the Scottish Parliament than to that of the Assembly in Wales424. The Act classifies three 
different categories of legislative powers to the Assembly, which are described in section 2 as 
follows: transferred, reserved and excepted matters. However, the term “reserved” has a 
different meaning with reference to the Scotland Act 1998 where “reserved” matters are those 
“excepted” in Northern Ireland Act425. Following the Northern Ireland Act 1998426 excepted 
matters remain in the realm of the Westminster Parliament as far as they are not ancillary to 
other provisions dealing with a reserved or transferred matter427. Excepted are the Crown, the 
Parliament and the elections, international relations except some areas of cross-border co­
operation, defence, national security and weapons control, political parties and the
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appointment of judges and others . The substance of that schedule is similar but not 
identical with the Scottish one, albeit the Northern Ireland Act makes no provision for moving 
a matter out of the excepted category429. In contrast to the excepted matters, reserved matters 
can be legislated by the Assembly but only with the consent of the Secretary of State430. 
Under section 15431 parliamentary approval is needed unless the matter is ancillary only. 
Reserved matters are, as stipulated in Schedule 3, navigation, civil aviation, domicile, post 
office, public order, policing and the criminal law (including abortion432) and others433. 
Section 4434 provides for reserved matters to become transferred matters and the other way 
round, but any further transfer needs a cross-community vote and the approval by the 
Westminster parliament. However, though these matters could be transferred to the Assembly 
in due course435, not all are judged as being suitable for transfer436. Conversely, all other 
matters are, as in the Scottish case, transferred to the Assembly. The assembly enjoys, for 
example, powers devolved to finance, personnel, agriculture, education, health, social 
services, economic development and environment. The general structure of the devolved
424 Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution 1998-99, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 249
425 Hadfield, Brigid, The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 16
426 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 4 and Schedule 2
427 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 6 (2b)
428 See Northern Ireland Act 1998, Schedule 2
429 Hadfield, Brigid, The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 16
430 Northern Ireland Act 1998, sections 4 and 7
431 Northern Ireland Act 1998, sections 8 (5), 15 (2)
432 See Hadfield, Brigid, The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 17, fn 63
433 See Northern Ireland Act 1998, Schedule 3
434 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 4 (2,3)
435 See Good Friday Agreement
436 Lord Dubs, in: House of Lords Debates, Vol 593, cols 1195,19 October 1998
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matters is thus similar as in Scotland, even though the Northern Irish realm is less extensive, 
as it enjoys for example no tax raising powers.
2. The Northern Irish Executive
The Northern Ireland Act 1998 provides for a very special executive model, whose crucial 
feature is the idea of real power-sharing between the two communities in Northern Ireland437. 
The Assembly has to vote through cross-community majority for the First and Deputy First 
Minister438. Initially, section 16 (2) of the Act requires that a First Minister and a Deputy First 
Minister candidate jointly for both offices, because of the fact that if one ceases to hold office 
the other office falls also vacant439. All other ministerial offices are distributed following a 
scheme determined in accordance with the d’Hondt formula440. By contrast with 1973, the 
appointment of the executive is no longer to be made by the Secretary of State. Nor is the 
devolution model dependent on a 70 per cent vote in the Assembly as it was in 1982441. Both 
leaders of the Executive can only take office442 after affirmation of the pledge of office443 
which reflects the same pledge that is included in the Good Friday Agreement. Both First 
Ministers -  they enjoy actually equal status444 -  submit to the Assembly for its approval on a 
cross-community vote their determination as to the number of (junior445) Ministers and their 
portfolios. The number of executive offices was set up at ten ministers446 and a number of 
junior ministers447. They form together the Executive Committee, which is similar to the 
Welsh model448. Each (junior) Ministers shall not take office until he or she has affirmed the 
pledge of office449. However, the oath of allegiance to the Queen is not required with contrast 
to Scotland and Wales. The Standing Orders provide450 that a Minister cannot chair a 
statutory committee. This is not the only reason, for which it is likely that the opposition to
437 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement, op cit, pp 1
438 See above
439 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 16 (7)
440 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 18 (5)
441 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 106
442 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 16 (4)
443 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Schedule 4
444 Both offices have to co-operate following the Act (see e.g. section 16 (7)) and the agreement
445 The Bill did not provide for junior Ministers. The Bill was there changed at the stage in the House of Lords. 
The d’Hondt formula does not apply for the Junior Ministers. See Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to 
Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 20
446 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 17 (4)
447 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 19
448 See above
449 Northern Ireland Act 1998, sections 18 (8), 19 (3)
450 Good Friday Agreement, para 45 (3), and Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 29 (5a)
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individual ministers comes from the shadow committees451, which have the task of scrutiny of 
the Executive. In contrast to Scotland, no Minister holds office at Her Majesty’s pleasure and 
the Executive is therefore not dismissable by the Queen452. Another similarity in Northern 
Ireland occurs from a comparative standpoint as the initial First Minster, David Trimble, is a 
Member of the Privy Council. However, he was nominated before the time of his office. The 
question is therefore, as to whether all Northern Irish First Ministers are given a Membership 
in the Privy Council453.
The Northern Ireland Act 1998 attributes454 to the Executive Committee the task of agreeing 
and reviewing the Northern Ireland budget. The budget is linked to cross-community policies 
and programmes as included in the Good Friday Agreement. The agreement455 stipulates that 
ministers “have full executive authority in their respective areas of responsibility, within any 
broad programme agreed by the Executive Committee and endorsed by the Assembly as a 
whole”. In the context of the pledge of office, these regulations should ensure some 
collectivity within the Executive and avoid a fragmented decision-making456. Nevertheless, 
the agreement provides457 for the removal of individual ministers too. Therefore, a minister 
may be “removed from office following a decision of the Assembly taken on a cross­
community basis, if he or she loses the confidence of the Assembly”. Before the suspension 
of the Northern Ireland Assembly the following ministerial offices were established: 
Agriculture and Rural Development, Culture, Arts and Leisure, Education, Enterprise, Trade 
and Investment, Environment, Finance and Personnel, Health, Social Services and Public 
Safety, Higher and Further Education, Training and Employment, Regional Development and
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Social Development . For the support of the Executive, Section 68 provides for a Human 
Rights Commission. It has the task to “keep under review the adequacy and effectiveness in 
Northern Ireland of law and practice relating to the protection of human rights”459. The 
commissions members are nominated by the Secretary of State ensuring that the Commission 
as a group is representative for the province460. The Commission advises the Secretary of
451 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 21
452 See above
453 See also Brazier, Rodney: The Scottish Government, op cit, p 215; for the historical background of Privy 
Councillors in Northern Ireland, see: Hadfield, Brigid: Devolution: Some key issues and a Northern Ireland 
searchlight, in: Cambridge Centre for Public Law: Constitutional Reform. Practice and Principles, op cit, p 51
454 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 20 (3), based on the Good Friday Agreement, paras 19, 20, and section 64
455 Para 24
456 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Wales, op cit, p 20
457 Para 25
458 See http://www.niassemblv.gov.uk
459 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 69 (1)
460 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 68 (3)
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State and the Executive Committee of the Assembly of legislative and other measures, which 
ought to be taken to protect human rights in Northern Ireland.
3. The trans-national Councils
According to the Good Friday Agreement, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 stipulates461 that the 
North-South Ministerial Council462 (NSMC) brings together representatives of the Irish 
government and the Executive of Northern Ireland thus providing for a “con-federal” 
relationship between both parts of the Isle463. Visibly, that new body was not called “Council 
of Ireland464”. This was the term of the 1920 Council, which has “unfortunate overtones” for 
unionists465. The NSMC is to be “established to bring together those with executive 
responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop consultation, co­
operation and action within the island of Ireland - including through implementation on an all­
island and cross-border basis - on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the 
administrations, North and South“466. However, it is to be established after the Assembly has 
come into being and completed a work programme to establish this body467. The Assembly 
and the Council are therefore interdependent468. All Council decisions are to be agreed 
between the two sides. The Members of that body are the First Minister, Deputy First 
Minister and any relevant Ministers of the Northern Ireland government, and the Irish 
Government represented by the Taoiseach and relevant Ministers. All of its Members have to 
operate in accordance with the rules for democratic authority and accountability in force in 
the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas respectively469. Participation in the Council 
should become one of the “essential responsibilities470” attaching to relevant posts in both 
administrations. It is, however, up to the leaders of the Executives to “make alternative 
arrangements”, if a holder of a relevant post will not participate normally in the Council471. 
Firstly, the Council can meet in different formats that means in plenary format twice a year,
461 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 52
462 Good Friday Agreement, Strand Two. Established through the Agreement between the government o f the UK 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government o f Ireland establishing a North/South ministerial 
Council, Dublin 8 March 1999, see http://www.nioffice.gov.uk
463 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement: Power-sharing plus, op cit, p 6
464 See above
465 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 108
466 Good Friday Agreement, op cit, Strand Two, para 1
467 Good Friday Agreement, op cit, Strand Two, para 8
468 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement: Power-sharing plus, op cit, p 6. Also p 7: “Unionists cannot 
destroy the Council while retaining the Assembly, and nationalists cannot destroy the Assembly while retaining 
the Council”.
469 Good Friday Agreement, op cit, Strand Two, para 2
470 Thus, neither Unionist nor Nationalist Ministers can oppose this body
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with Northern Ireland representation led by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister and 
the Irish Government led by the Taoiseach472. Secondly, specific sectoral formats are possible 
“on a regular and frequent basis with each side represented by the appropriate persons”. 
Lastly, the NSMC can establish an appropriate format of Members to consider institutional or 
cross-sectoral matters (including in relation to the EU) and to resolve disagreement. However, 
by agreement between the two sides, experts from outside can be appointed to consider a 
particular matter and report473. Therefore, the NSMC will function much like the Council of 
Ministers model in the European Union474. The agendas for all meetings are to be settled by 
prior agreement between the two sides, but it will be open either to propose any matter for 
consideration or action475. The British-Irish Agreement states as its main functions to 
“exchange information, discuss and consult with a view to co-operating on matters of mutual 
interest within the competence of both Administrations, North and South. The NSMC has to 
use best endeavours to reach agreement on the adoption of common policies, in areas where 
there is a mutual cross-border and all-island benefit, and which are within the competence of 
both Administrations, North and South, making determined efforts to overcome any 
disagreements4*476. Moreover, the Council considers the European Union dimension of 
relevant matters, including the implementation of EU policies and programmes and proposals 
under consideration in the EU framework. Arrangements are to be made to ensure that the 
views of the Council are taken into account and represented appropriately at relevant EU 
meetings. Generally, decisions are taken by agreement on policies for implementation 
separately in each jurisdiction, in relevant meaningful areas within the competence of both 
Administrations. Consistent with the Good Friday Agreement, the Irish Parliament has 
changed the Constitution of the Republic to ensure that the NSMC is able to exercise island- 
wide jurisdiction in those functional activities where co-operation is possible477. The Council 
can take decisions by agreement on at least six policy areas and action at an all-island and 
cross-border level to be implemented by the cross-border bodies479. These are, however, 
executive bodies480. Apart from the EU-subjects, the matters for that co-operation are not 
specified, but it is likely that the following matters are included: agriculture, transport,
471 Good Friday Agreement, op cit, Strand Two, para 2
472 Good Friday Agreement, op cit, Strand Two, para 3
473 Good Friday Agreement, op cit, Strand Two, para 14
474 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement: Power-sharing plus, op cit, p 7
475 Good Friday Agreement, op cit, Strand Two, para 4
476 Good Friday Agreement, op cit, Strand Two, para 5
477 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement: Power-sharing plus, op cit, p 7
478 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement: Power-sharing plus, op cit, p 8
479 See above
480 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement: Power-sharing plus, op cit, p 7
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tourism, and education481. Each side has to be in a position to take decisions in the Council 
within the defined authority of those attending, through the arrangements in place for co­
ordination of executive functions within each jurisdiction482. Both sides remain, however, 
accountable to their respective parliamentary institutions, whose approval, through the 
arrangements in place on either side, is required for decisions beyond the defined authority of 
those attending. As far as disagreements within the Council occur483, they are to be addressed 
in the plenary format or in the Council where the appropriate persons represent each side484. 
The NSMC is funded by the two Administrations supported by a standing joint Secretariat, 
staffed by members of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Irish Civil Service485.
On 13 December 1999, all 15 members of the Irish Cabinet met 10 of the new Northern 
Ireland executive486. That was the first time that ministers from Dublin and Belfast had sat 
down for formal discussions. The gathering in the historic setting of Armagh City marked the 
inaugural meeting of the NSMC. The Irish team was led by the Prime Minister and the Ulster 
contingent by the First Minister. Both parties agreed to set up six cross-border implementation
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bodies to work together for the benefit of north and south . These include waterways, food 
safety, special European Union programmes, language, lighthouses and trade and business. 
The headquarters of three will be north of the border and three in the Republic. The 
ministerial council also agreed that “matters for co-operation4* should include transport, 
agriculture, education, health, environment and tourism488. However, the meeting was 
boycotted by two extreme unionist members of the executive cabinet (both of the Democratic 
Unionist Party), but their refusal of co-operation concerns the members of Sinn Fein and not 
the Members of the Irish Republic. The First Minister of Northern Ireland stated that “this 
council will allow north/south co-operation to be co-ordinated and managed in a way that 
threatens no one and benefits everyone. Central to its operation is the principle of consent. 
This interlocking principle binds the future of all sides to the implementation of the Belfast 
Agreement. It is the bedrock of justice and fairness in this process and it is the reason the 
Agreement will work”489. Paragraph 13 of this Agreement, however, outlines that it is 
understood that the North/South Ministerial Council and the Northern Ireland Assembly are
481 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement: Power-sharing plus, op cit, p 8
482 Good Friday Agreement, op cit, Strand Two, para 6
483 Good Friday Agreement, op cit, Strand Two, para 14
484 See above
485 Good Friday Agreement, op cit, Strand Two, paras 15, 16
486 Trimble hails first formal links across the border, in: Daily Telegraph, 14 December 1999
487 As provided by the Good Friday Agreement, see above
488 See: Trimble hails first formal links across the border, in: Daily Telegraph, 14 December 1999
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mutually inter-dependent, and that one cannot successfully function without the other. Thus, 
the entire system has been interrupted by the suspension of the Northern Irish Assembly 
through the Northern Ireland Act 2000490. Section 1 (5) of that Act provides that the functions 
conferred by section 52 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 referring to the Council are not to be 
exercised any more. Therefore, it remains to be seen as to whether the NSMC can re-take 
office.
Strand three of the Good Friday Agreement provides491 for the establishment of a British-Irish 
Council492 (BIC). Both governments agreed493 on 8 March 1999 at Dublin about the 
establishment of that Council. It will bring together representatives of the British and Irish 
governments, and of the devolved bodies of Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, the Isle of 
Man and the Channel Isles (whilst England could follow suit494) to discuss matters of 
common interest495. Apart from its function for devolution as a whole, this council puts the 
Northern Irish conflict in a general context of self-government. This may facilitate the 
development in Northern Ireland in the future. Moreover, it may encourage further links 
between the devolved institutions and the both countries496 as an “overarching tier”497. 
Furthermore, a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference was established, bringing together 
the British and Irish governments, to promote bilateral co-operation at all levels498. According 
to the Good Friday Agreement499, an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was established500 
on the same day. The agreement provided for a standing conference, which subsumes both the 
Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council and the Intergovernmental Conference established 
under the 1985 Agreement. The new Conference brings together the British and Irish 
Governments to promote bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of mutual interest 
within the competence of both governments. It can meet as required at Summit level (British
489 Cited in: Trimble hails first formal links across the border, in: Daily Telegraph, 14 December 1999
490 See above
491 Good Friday Agreement, Strand Three (5,1)
492 See further below
493 Agreement between the government o f the UK o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government o f  
Ireland establishing a British-Irish Council, 8 March 1999, see Official Website of the Northern Ireland Office 
http://www.nioffice.gov.uk
494 See further below
495 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 108
496 Good Friday Agreement, paras 14, 15
497 Thus: Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 30
498 See also: Qvortrup, Mads; Hazell, Robert: The British-Irish Council: Nordic Lessons for the Council o f the 
Isles. London, Constitution Unit 1998, p 17
499 Annex B (5)
500 Agreement between the government o f the UK o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government o f  
Ireland establishing a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, Dublin 8 March 1999, see 
http://www.nioffice.gov.uk
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Prime Minister and Taoiseach) or governments are represented by appropriate Ministers like 
at EU-level. Apart from these high-level institutions, the agreement provided for other cross- 
border implementation bodies. These bodies may take an important role for a general 
exchange between the North and the South of the Irish public, as their functions are rather 
non-political. An agreement501 between the Irish and British governments adjusts the detailed 
mission of the bodies. They are responsible for the implementation of inland waterways 
(“Waterways Ireland44), for the implementation of food safety (“The Food Safety Promotion 
Board”), for trade and business development (“The Trade and Business Development Body”) 
for the implementation of special EU programmes (“The Special EU Programmes Body”), for 
the language (“The North/South Language Body” or “An Foras Teanga or in Ullans as Tha 
Boord o Leid”), and for the implementation of aquaculture and marine matters (“The Foyle, 
Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission”). Lastly, both leaders of the Executive acting 
jointly have install a “Civic Forum” which corresponds to the consultative Civic Forum 
established in pursuance of paragraph 34 of Strand One of the Belfast Agreement.
The Good Friday Agreement and its following agreements establishing different new bodies 
and institutions, are a very subtle construction503. It is in fact an inter-ethnic accord, which has 
been made by parties, which are not directly involved. Such inter-ethnic accords are, however, 
normally established within one state and they are not made under such cross-border 
conditions504. It has been shown that such accords mostly improve the position of only one 
part of the community505. However, the case of Northern Ireland is different. On the one hand, 
the agreement was not based on one single state, and it offers a unique model of power- 
sharing which might be able to triumph over the deep-seated conflict506. The agreement might 
therefore really not represent a “victory” for the unionists or of the nationalists507. O’Leary508 
argues that “no paramilitaries that abide by the Agreement have to engage in formal surrender 
to those they opposed in war”. Unfortunately, this proved as untrue in the view of the extreme 
republicans. The extremists are, however, in a increasing minority position509.
501 Agreement between the government o f the UK o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government o f  
Ireland establishing implementation bodies, Dublin 8 March 1999, see http://www.nioffice.gov.uk. The 
agreement refers to Article 2 of the Good Friday Agreement.
502 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 56
503 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement, op cit, p 11
504 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement, op cit, p 11
505 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement, op cit, p 11
506 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 109
507 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement, op cit, p 11
508 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement, op cit, p 11
79
What can we now conclude about the models of devolution in Scotland, Wales and, Northern 
Ireland? Firstly, it is obvious that there is no common model for these nations within the 
framework of the British Constitution. Each nation has special powers: Wales got only a 
“basic” model, which allows the Assembly to make the decisions formerly being made by the 
Secretary of State. Even if this seems to be minimalist, it must be seen as a large gain of 
democracy. “Quangoland” is therefore an expression of the past. However, the limited powers 
of the Assembly in Cardiff are difficult to handle and to adapt in a country which has been 
dominated for centuries by an omnipotent Parliament. The question “Just Who Is Running 
This Country?510*4 is currently not only unclear within the Assembly in Cardiff itself, but also 
in the eyes of the Welsh Public. Thus, it may take some time for the AMs to understand how 
to work within a confined scope. Conversely, the Scottish Parliament got a strong devolved 
powers. Initially, these powers were even so large that the Scottish parliament allowed 
Westminster to legislate on a devolved matter511. This is however, likely to change in the 
future when the experience of the MSPs has grown. From a European standpoint, however, 
the Scottish Parliament is becoming a “normal” regional institution, which will be able to 
overtake the bulk of devolved matters. Also the adopted form of government, a coalition 
enjoying a broad parliamentary majority, proved very stable, although the Scottish First 
Minister being leader of the main party within the coalition had to undertake medical 
treatment for several weeks. Northern Ireland, in contrast, the situation witnessed all the 
problems one had to expect. Therefore, devolution in this part may start with interruptions and 
work in another background than in Scotland and Wales. At the end of the day, however, 
Northern Ireland may have even more power than Scotland, because the transfer of powers is 
likely to increase. This sort of devolution has been described as '‘asymmetrical”. That means 
nothing more than a completely different devolution for each nation. As to whether this 
asymmetry will prove to be stable and create strong institutions remains to be seen .
Secondly, the inside construction of the devolved bodies witnesses the same differences. The 
relationship between the First Minister or First Secretary and the Assembly is one pivotal 
point in this construction. In Scotland, it has been outlined that the Parliament has to 
concentrate on its functions of scrutiny. The devolved powers are vested in the Scottish First
509 See above
510 See Western Mail. 12/05/00
511 See Constitution Unit: Monitor. March 2000, p 3
512 See further below
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Minister. This is emphasised by the fact that he is sworn in by the Queen and holds office at 
Her Majesty’s pleasure. The Scottish Executive functions thus on the same idea as Whitehall: 
a strong government, which is made accountable to the Parliament. In Wales, in contrast, the 
devolved powers are directly placed under the corporate body of the National Assembly. 
Hence, the office of the First Secretary and his or her Executive Committee are theoretically 
completely different: the Assembly follows the general idea of a County Council where all 
Members are able to make their contributions. The functions of the Assembly should 
therefore be hybrid: scrutiny and advisory work. However, in practice the Assembly decided 
quite soon for reasons of efficiency to transfer a large part of its power to the Executive 
Committee thus evolving to a real “government”. In Northern Ireland efficiency reasoning is 
not possible. The main purpose of the Assembly in Belfast is to ensure that all decisions enjoy 
cross-community support. This takes more time, but if it appeases the political climate in 
Northern Ireland it may be the best solution for constructive politics. Also, the Committees in 
Northern Ireland work differently. They are not established to make decisions following the 
majority will, but to ensure consocial decision making. This implies the control of Ministers 
of “extreme” political parties. The Northern Irish Committee on Education thus is keen on 
overseeing all details of the Minister’s work: Martin McGuiness, former member of the IRA. 
A handicap of Northern Ireland’s devolution has been seen in the fast legal implementation. 
Only weeks were between the Agreement, the Northern Ireland Act, the Referendum and the 
establishment of the Assembly. However, the legislation for Northern Ireland was flexible and 
strict, when this was necessary. This was obviously due to the co-operation of the British and 
Irish governments. Thus, the life of the Northern Ireland’s Assembly is likely to be a moved 
one followed by sudden “stops” and quick “go”. The three devolved institutions have really 
equal powers as far as their control over local government and other public bodies is 
concerned. There are small differences, but generally, all devolved bodies have overtaken the 
former functions of the Secretary of State. Given the power over secondary legislation, the 
new institutions have an important constitutional but also political task.
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IV. Devolution: The English question and Intergovernmental Relations
As a consequence of Scottish and Welsh devolution, two other issues have to be addressed: 
England and the intergovernmental relations. Devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland does not include England, although it is the main part of the United Kingdom both 
economically and demographically. The developments in the “Celtic fringe” have significant 
implications on England. However, there are several solutions as to how England can be 
integrated in these arrangements. Hence, the implications of devolution for the United 
Kingdom as a whole are to be examined. From an internal viewpoint, there are currently no 
attempts to devolve power to “England”, but maybe to the regions within England. 
Considered externally, on the contrary, devolution established a new form of co-ordination 
within the British government: the co-operation and exchange between central government 
and the devolved institutions. Such inter-governmental relations are “new” within the United 
Kingdom, but the country is already used to work under similar conditions in the context of 
the European Union councils. The British inter-governmental institutions have, of course, 
some different features compared with the European Union. Whilst the European co-operation 
is based on co-ordinated members, devolution in the United Kingdom is based on the 
principle of sub-ordination. Both issues, the English dimension and the inter-governmental 
structures, are thus part of the country-wide implications of devolution. Therefore, this 
chapter analyses the position of England after devolution and stresses the problems, which are 
due to the fact that there is no move towards regionalism in England. Also, the future co­
operation of the devolved bodies is outlined.
A. England
England is, it has been argued, a “constitutional fiction”1. The English part of the United 
Kingdom has never been organised following a territorial model, but always administered by 
Westminster. Therefore, it might be thought that England is not concerned by devolution at 
all. However, England is, in many aspects, the key to the success of devolution2. This is 
because of the need for a large acceptance of the devolution settlement not just to the Scots 
and the Welsh but also to the English, who represent 85 per cent of the population in the
1 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution: Decentralisation or Desintegration, in: Political Quarterly, Vol 70 (2), Oxford, 
Blackwells 1999, p 191
2 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 264
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United Kingdom. England has not yet “spoken” as it does not exist as a constitutional term3. 
Since 1563 there has been no English Parliament and there was never an “English Office” in 
London4. Thus, it has been argued that England is rather a parliamentary Nation than a 
democracy5. However, debates about devolution and regionalism in England were present in 
the latter decades of the nineteenth century and in the time up to the First World War6. Later, 
the Kilbrandon Commission proved that England as a whole constitutes a complicated part in 
a devolved United Kingdom. Eight Members of the Commission favoured regional co­
ordination and advisory councils, partly indirectly elected and partly nominated. One Member 
of the Commission advocated co-ordinating committees of local authorities. The 
Memorandum of dissent7 promoted a detailed scheme for a regional level in England. These 
regional institutions were to have similar executive powers to those exercised by the Scottish 
and Welsh Office. This rather federalist scheme needed also elected regional assemblies with 
their own sources of taxation8. The report noted furthermore, that there was a general demand 
from people in England, “to win power back from London”9. A second point to be made is 
that England in relation to its size is unusual amongst European democracies, as it does not 
have a system of regional government10. However, England is divided into different regions 
for administrative purposes11, but these regions follow a variety of boundaries and regional 
distinctions, which are quite artificial. Additionally, these boundaries have often been 
changed and there is no clear responsibility for the general “governmental” structure of 
England12. Therefore, England lacks a juridical concept of divided competences13.
The requirement for a regional structure of government occurred at the beginning of the last 
century and culminated during the First World War in the creation of regional offices of 
government departments. These offices were to be in charge of food distribution and labour 
organisation14. Later, the discussion about a regional tier of administration focused on the
3 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution: Decentralisation or Desintegration, op cit, p 191
4 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution: Decentralisation or Desintegration, op cit, p 191
5 Osmond, John: Reforming the House of Lords and changing Britain. Fabian Society Pamphlet 587, London 
1998, p 8
6 Mawson, John: English Regionalism and New Labour, in: Keating, Michael; Elcock, Howard: Remaking the 
Union. Devolution and British Politics in the 1990s. London, Frank Cass 1998, p 158
7 Issued by Lord Crowther-Hunt and Professor Alan Peacock, see above
8 Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), Cmnd. 5460-1, op cit
9 Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), Cmnd. 5460-1, paras 1-7
10 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England. Constitution Unit, London 1996, p 16
11 Hogwood, Brian: Mapping the Regions, Policy Press, Bristol 1996, p 10
12 Wiedmann, Thomas, op cit, pp 74
13 Wiedmann, Thomas, op cit, p 74
14 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 16
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need of local government to be organised more effectively15. The time of the Second World 
War was marked by the creation of ten civil defence regions. In the context with the economic 
crisis after the war, the Treasury established nine standard regions in 194616. In the 1960s, the 
conviction emerged that a number of governmental tasks are best be carried out at a regional
17level . The Labour government returned after the 1964 elections set up a framework for
economic development thereby establishing eight “Regional Economic Planning Councils”
18(REPC) . These councils were basically established on the French model of Economic 
planning being made by central government and implemented by regional bodies. Following 
the local government reorganisation in England in the mid-1970s, several of these regions 
were newly shaped19. Whilst many of these “Standard regions” were used by several 
departments, it has been shown that the pattern remained one of substantial variation in
0C\boundaries and regional administrative centres . The Conservative government returned in 
1979 abolished the REPCs and later the GLC, as it was hostile to every form of economic 
planning. It is the Department of Environment (DoE) that occupies a very important position 
in this context, as it is responsible for a wide range of issues including urban planning, 
housing, environment and so on21. However, even the DoE, which had inherited the regional 
co-ordinating role, used a scheme that was not adapted to the respective boundaries22. A 
recent research study identified nearly hundred regional structures of administration23.
However, the regional agenda in England was inspired from the political developments in 
Scotland and Wales at the end of the 1970s and from the European trend of regionalisation24. 
Also rational arguments for reform like strategic planning and co-ordination were put 
forward . Thus the Conservative government of John Major although being hostile to any 
form of constitutional change , announced in 1993 the creation of new Government Offices
15 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 16
16 Hogwood, Brian, op c it , pp 10
17 Keating, Michael; Rhodes, Malcolm: The status o f regional government, in: Hogwood, Brian; Keating, 
Michael: Regional government in England. OUP, Oxford 1982, p 51
18 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 17
19 Hogwood, Brian: Mapping the regions, op c it , pp 11
20 Hogwood, Brian; Lindely, P.: Variations in regional boundaries, in: Hogwood/ Keating: Regional government 
in England, op cit, pp 21
21 Wiedmann, Thomas, op cit, p 75
22 Hogwood, Brian: Mapping the regions, op cit, p 13
23 Hogwood, Brian: Mapping the regions, op cit, p 25
24 Mawson, John; Spencer, Ken: The Origins and Operations of the Government Offices fo r the English Regions, 
in: Bradbury/ Mawson: British Regionalism and Devolution, op cit, p 161
25 See Constitution Unit: Regional government in England, op cit, p 28
26 Bradbury, Jonathan: Introduction, in: British Regionalism and Devolution, op cit, pp 9
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27for the Regions (GoRs) . The new network of ten integrated regional offices in the English
9 o
regions was finally launched in 1994 . Under leadership of the DoE various departments 
integrated their regional work and made their civil servants accountable to one Senior 
Regional Director (SRD)29. Each SRD had to report to the different Secretary of States. The 
main idea of these structures has been to create a more adapted governance in England. On 
the one hand, business leaders became increasingly concerned about the weakness of business 
support structure as the economic impact on the regions had obviously been neglected30. On 
the other hand, the Conservative government sought to enhance its presence and thereby to 
forestall pressures for an elected regional level. Various national local authority and business 
representative bodies appreciated that system of governmental Offices31. However, the 
representatives were disappointed, as the GORs did not open up to a more active involvement 
of local institutions in their work . The ten Government Offices are regional arms of central 
government and therefore democratically not accountable. The political responsibility 
remained centralised in the Whitehall Ministries33. The heads of the GORs had approximately 
the same position as the French Prefets before the re-organisation of the French regions by the 
Deferre Acts 198234. The Prefets were the symbols of centralism in France. Their functions
9 C
have been finally overtaken by the new Conseils Regionaux . In the aftermath of the GORs 
development, local government discovered that one central office in their “region” was taking 
the decisions which have been largely scattered before36. Thus, subsequent regional 
associations have been created since the late 1980s. Their aim has been to face the main 
structural questions and the European Funding of the region. These regional associations, 
which focussed ironically on the GORs, initiated thus a certain pressure for regional 
governance in England. These offices underlined the democratic deficit in the English regions 
relative to Scotland and Wales37. In England, however, apart from the GORs, the overall 
dominance of quangos has also been criticised . The quangos impose here the same problem
27 Mawson, John: The English Regional Debate, in: Bradbury/ Mawson: British Regionalism and Devolution, op 
cit, p 185
•jo
Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 40
29 Mawson, John; Spencer, Ken: The Origins and Operations o f the Government Offices op cit, p 163
30 Mawson, John; Spencer, Ken: The Origins and Operations o f the Government Offices, op cit, p 163
31 Mawson, John; Spencer, Ken: The Origins and Operations o f the Government Offices, op cit, p 175
32 Economic Development Committee: Integrated Regional Offices. London, Association of District Councils, 5 
May 1995
33 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 47
34 Also: Osmond, John: Reforming the House of Lords and changing Britain, op cit, p 11
35 Wiedmann, Thomas, op cit, p 118
36 For the regional structure of the GORs, see Appendix 2
37 Bradbury, Jonathan; Mawson, John: Devolution: I t’s England’s turn, in: New Statesman, 19 September 1997
38 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 50
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as in Wales : they perform functions, which impact considerably on the community, they are 
funded with public money, but people who are neither elected nor appropriately accountable 
run them. The appointments to quangos are dominated by patronage and are generally made 
in secrecy40. That system of quangos represents therefore a further lack of democratic 
accountability.
It is to note, however, that the analysis of the administrative division of the English territory is 
independent of any political tier in England. “Wessex”, “Mercia” and “Northumbria” may 
have a romantic appeal41, but they are not associated with regional units. There have never 
been “nationalist” parties and the people do not feel “South Western”. They may feel at least 
Cornish, but Cornwall is not a regional unit of England. “England”, it has been said, “is a 
state of mind, not a consciously organised political institution”42. The essential difficulty of 
English regions is that there is not enough demand for it43. Some opinion polls have shown 
scores between 40 and 60 per cent against the increase of regional power in England44. These 
findings are difficult to interpret as far as there is no exact definition as to what a region is45. 
Regional levels need a certain sense of regional public awareness. However, at the moment 
English regions have been simply ghosts46. This may change due to the increase of the various 
regional movements.
Devolution, however, accentuates an imbalance in favour of Scotland and Wales, which exists 
already47. The fundamental impact of devolution upon England results, of course, not from 
the constitutional situation. Scotland and Wales had both their own Secretary of State and 
they have been over-represented in the Westminster Parliament. Now, they have their own 
elected bodies too. These are the constitutional imbalances between England and the Celtic 
fringe. However, the most important pressure for change is economic in nature. Scotland and 
Wales have been favoured in public spending48 in recent years. Hence, the English regions
39 See above
40 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 50
41 Tindale, Stephen: Devolution on demand: options fo r the English Regions and London, in: Tindale, Stephen: 
The state and the nations, op cit, p 48
42 Rose, Richard: Understanding the United Kingdom. Longman, London 1982, p 29
43 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 271
44 MORI/Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, State of the Nation Survey. London 1995; see also: Tindale, Stephen: 
Devolution on demand: options for the English Regions and London, in: Tindale, Stephen: The state and the 
nations, op cit, p 48
45 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 26
46 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 271
47 Bogdanor, Vernon: Decentralisation or Desintegration, op cit, p 190
48 See further below
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benefit less from public spending, although their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per head is 
considerably higher49. Due to the flexibility of the devolved governments, it is not unlikely 
that the they are able to attract more easily investment to Scotland and Wales. This would 
increase their own economic power. Moreover, the devolved control over local government 
spending and services could contribute to a more focussed planning of economic 
investment50. The devolved institutions may also profit of their “direct access” to the British 
government and the European Union51. Hence, especially the people in those English regions, 
which are economically disfavoured, are likely to feel handicapped as they are not represented 
in the Cabinet and do not have their own assembly . Therefore, devolution increases, on the 
one hand, the constitutional imbalance but, on the other hand, the economic disfavour of 
England in the Union is likely to grow.
1. Regional Chambers and Assemblies
When the Labour Party came into government, it had already developed a distinct model 
attempting to counter this unfavourable imbalance to England. The election manifesto 
proposed a two-stage approach53 to developing a regional tier. At the beginning, indirectly 
elected Regional Chambers of local authority representatives should be established. These 
could later move on to directly elected Regional Assemblies54. This idea corresponded to a 
policy of “devolution on demand”, developed by the present Labour Home Secretary Jack 
Straw55. It was based on the idea of indirectly elected regional chambers being voluntary 
groupings of local authorities. This policy should imply, however, the approval of their move 
towards a Regional Assembly by a referendum56. Regional development Agencies (RDAs), 
which had been established in Scotland and Wales already in the 1970s, were to be 
established and run by central government. Contrary to this model, the Secretary for 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, John Prescott, had proposed to move on by regional 
structures which are based on economic development. He argued that England has no
49 See Heald, David: Territorial Expenditure in the UK, in: Public Administration. Vol 72, Blackwells, Summer 
1994, pp 147; Hazell, Robert; Comes, Richard: Financing Devolution: the Centre retains control, in: Hazell, 
Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 202 (Fig. 11.2); Bogdanor, Vemon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 265
50 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 265
51 See further below
52 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 265
53 Hazell, Robert: Three policies in search o f a strategy, in: Wright, Tony: The English Question, op cit, p 32
54 Labour Party: A choice for England. London, July 1995
55 Hazell, Robert: Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State survive?, op cit, p 91
56 Labour Party: A choice for England, London, July 1995; and A new Voice for England’s Regions, London, 
September 1996
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democratic deficit if it is compared with Scotland and Wales He has rather taken the opinion
r o
that it lacks powerful development agencies of the kind of these nations . His approach was 
to move to English RDAs, which should be made accountable to statutorily created and 
initially indirectly elected Regional Chambers. Both positions, however, were included in the 
Labour manifesto at different chapters and it was therefore not clear, which turn the new 
government would take59.
Since the election, the government has appeared to backtrack60. After the Scottish and Welsh 
Referendums, the new government moved on to consider the future of the English regions61.
f i  9A White Paper was published in December 1997 which explained the decision to legislate 
first for a RDA model. However, the government’s “proposals also build on the arrangements 
for Regional Chambers which are established by the regions themselves on a voluntary 
basis” . Regional Chambers were not written out of the proposal and Regional Assemblies 
should remain possible. The White Paper notified in its introduction that the government is 
“committed to move to directly elected regional government in England, where there is 
demand for it, alongside devolution in Scotland and Wales and the creation of the Greater 
London Authority”64. The government, however, did not see the “business of imposing it”. 
They believe that a lot can be done “within the present democratic structure to build up the 
voice of the regions”65. The Secretary of State put the English case in a context with Scotland 
and Wales: “Where there is popular demand, we are committed to further consultation on 
directly elected regional assemblies. This may take time, just as the developments in Scotland 
and Wales have come over time and with the growing support of the population”66. As noted 
in the White Paper the RDAs were to be nominated by Ministers and accountable through 
Ministers to Parliament what means that they should be new “quangos” . However, the 
Members of the RDAs were supposed to be chosen from the Regions. Also, Regional 
Chambers were establised, but as non-statutory bodies and the accountability of the RDAs to
57 In contrast, especially from a European perspective: Roberts, Peter: Whitehall et la desert anglais: Managing 
and representing the UK Regions in Europe, in: Bradbury/ Mawson: British Regionalism and devolution, op cit, 
p 255, 269
58 Regional Policy Commission: Renewing the Regions. Sheffield Hallam University, June 1996
59 Hazell, Robert: Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State survive?, op cit, p 90
60 Bradbury, Jonathan; Mawson, John: Devolution: i t ’s England’s turn, in: New Statesman. 19 September 1997
61 Hazell/O’Leary: A rolling programme o f  devolution, op cit, p 37
62 Building Partnerships for prosperity -  Sustainable Growth. Competitiveness, and Employment in the English 
Regions. HMSO, London 1997, Cmnd. 3814
63 Building Partnerships for prosperity ... op cit, para 1.3
64 Building Partnerships for prosperity.... Introduction
65 Building Partnerships for prosperity.... Introduction
66 Building Partnerships for prosperity.... Introduction
67 Hazell, Robert: Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State survive?, op cit, p 91
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the Regional Chambers is secondary. Therefore, the Regional Chamber is one of a number of 
regional “stakeholders”, but is not the body to which the RDAs are made accountable68. This 
means that the Regional Chambers have no statutory status.
In November 1998 the legislation was finished and adopted at Westminster. The Regional 
Developments Agencies Act 1998 followed consequently the proposals of the White Paper. It 
stipulates69 that England is divided into nine regions (East Midlands, Eastern, London, North 
East, North West, South East, South West, West Midlands, Yorkshire and the Humber). All 
these regions have to have a corporate body, which is called by the name of the region with 
the addition of the words “Development Agency”70. The regions do, in fact, vary from the 
former Standard Planning Regions as for example, London represents furthermore an
71additional region . However, they do not correspond to a previous scheme, but they are a 
“mix” of the GoRs and the former Standard Regions as it was favoured by a recent research
7 9study . Thus, the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998 establishes a new scheme of 
territorial organisation, which might be confusing at the beginning both for the civil service 
and for the public in those areas being part of a “new” region. This might be the case in the 
South East especially73. It might be that a change of the region’s name74 is able to contribute 
to a regional understanding. However, the boundaries of the regions are anew not really 
legally entrenched as the Secretary of State is still allowed to change them75.
7 fkThe RDAs are composed of thirteen members who are nominated by the Secretary of State . 
However, Section 277 attempts to introduce a general model of Membership, the Secretary of 
State has a large discretion in the nomination of these Members. This raises the question of 
“representation” in these bodies. It would have been favourable to stipulate statutorily that 
each part of the region is to be represented in the RDA78. At present, half of the members are
7Qfrom business and a third from local authorities . Nevertheless, concerning the composition
68 Hazell, Robert: Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State survive?, op cit, p 91
69 Regional Developments Agencies Act, section 1(1) and Schedule 1
70 Regional Developments Agencies Act, section 1(2)
71 See Hogwood, Brian: Mapping the regions, op cit, p 13 and Schedule 1 of the Act
72 Hogwood, Brian: Mapping the regions, op cit, pp 56; see also Constitution Unit: Regional Government in 
England, op cit, p 84
73 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, pp 94
74 Section 26
75 Section 25
76 Section 2(1)
77 Subsection 2, 3
78 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 86 (concerning the Chambers)
79 Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution 1998-99, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 250
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and proceedings of the Agencies the Act has a similar structure as the devolution Acts80. The 
chairman of the RDA is not elected, but the Agency can regulate its own procedures81 and 
Schedule 3 allows the delegation of ministerial functions to the RDA. This is most apparent in 
Section 6, which provides for the delegation of any eligible function from the Secretary of 
State to a regional development agency. However, only such powers are allowed to delegate 
which do not consist of a power to make regulations or other instruments of a legislative 
character or a power to fix fees or charges . Nonetheless, this does not mean that the RDAs 
are disallowed every financial activity. With reference to Section 9 the RDA has a general 
financial duty which is determined by the Secretary of State. Apart from its grant of central 
government the Agency is entitled to borrow according to its duties83 and the Treasury can 
guarantee these borrowings84. The main activities of the RDAs as outlined in section 4 of the 
Act correspond exactly to the need of these bodies in the context of devolution. They have to 
promote the economic interests of the regions85.
The powers of the RDAs are therefore very restricted as they can only give financial 
assistance, dispose of land and form or acquire a body corporate86. They have not got the 
powers of the GORs. Thus, public expenditure and inward investment remain with central 
government. Conversely, in the lead up to the Act it had been proposed that a regional 
agencies should have the functions of strategic land-use planning, transport, economic 
development including inward investment, the co-ordination of regional relations with the EU 
and its regions, including bids for funding and implementation and providing a “voice” for the 
region87. The Act itself does not provide for all these powers. This scattering of competences 
between the GORs, the RDAs and the Regional Chambers is not able to create a strong 
regional individuality. However, a further delegation of powers may increase the role of the 
RDAs. Thus, it is hard to judge as to whether the RDAs are able to “bring government closer 
to the people”. The Act makes clear that the RDAs do not carry out functions on behalf of the 
Crown88. This follows from their status as agencies of central government89. Lastly, a very
80 Schedule 2
81 Schedule 2, Para 6
82 Section 6 (2)
83 Section 10, 11
84 Section 12
85 Section 4(1 )
86 Section 5 (2)
87 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 76
88 Section 3
89 Sections 16, 17
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important feature90 of the Act is that the Secretary of State can designate as far as there is a 
suitable body representative of those in a regional development agency’s area with an interest 
in its work such a body as the regional chamber for the agency. The RDA would then be 
required “to have regard, in the exercise of its functions to any views expressed by the 
chamber” and to consult the latter in relation to the exercise of its functions. This provision of 
the Act may create a “devolution on demand”, although it is likely that the local authorities 
need a certain time to find solutions and political compromises, which are necessary for the 
development of such bodies. Therefore, it has already been argued that the RDAs may prove 
as a disappointment, because of the lack of own budget and powers like the Welsh or Scottish 
Development Agencies91. The Agencies do not have a “clear and significant core group of 
function”92. As to whether the public and senior political figures may be attracted by the 
present scheme of RDAs remains to be seen. However, given the premise that England never 
had a clear territorial structure, these Agencies could be expected to create some sort of 
regional “identity” as far as their boundaries remained clear and durable. However, the tri­
partite model is likely to blur regional power and thus discourage the regional movements. As 
to whether they are a first step93 towards a regional structure in England remains to be seen.
The government’s proposals for directly elected Regional Chambers are not closed, although 
there has not been any real attempt to provide for further legislation. Currently, they are 
voluntary, non-statutory bodies which, if designated by central government, are to be 
consulted by the RDA in the formulation of regional plans94. In 1999, for each RDA a 
Regional Chamber was designated by the Secretary of State. They vary from 40 to 100 
members and not more than seventy per cent can be chosen from local government. Thus, the 
Chambers are not the political masters of the RDAs, but “mere appendages”95. However, 
several regions are more ambitious. In the aftermath of the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention’s “Claim of Right”96, the campaign for a Northern Assembly issued a declaration 
advocating for a “directly elected Assembly representing the people of the North”97. Later, a 
Regional Assembly for Yorkshire and Humberside was formally established98. The North-
90 Sections 8, also 18, 27
91 Hazell, Robert: Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State survive?, op cit, p 91
92 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 76
93 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 269
94 Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution 1998-99, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 251
95 Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution 1998-99, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 251
96 See above
97 Hazell/O’Leary: A Rolling programme o f devolution, in: Hazell: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 38
98 It corresponds to the former Regional Planning Forum in that region, see: Hazell, Robert: Reinventing the 
Constitution: Can the State survive?, op cit, p 91
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East is most likely to move fastest as it enjoys the strongest support for an elected 
Assembly". The English Regional Association, which is composed of all these regional 
groupings100 issued a first collective declaration in 1999. There, they affirm their commitment 
to the “development of democratically elected regional government in England”101. They 
were disappointed by the very weak Labour proposals for the English regions.
On the one hand, there are some arguments that the Regional Chambers will develop. They 
may gradually play an increasing part as partners in the business of regional development102. 
This is due to the fact that the RDAs do not have real power103 and consequently, their role 
depends on the expansion of Regional Chambers104. Moreover, it is likely that devolution 
increases the political pressure for regional institutions in England. Therefore, they may even 
become statutorily entrenched with respective powers in the mid-term105 that means after the 
next general elections106. Thus, the ERA proposed to make the RDAs rapidly accountable to 
Regional Chambers that are legally entrenched. Furthermore, the ERA requests the devolution 
to the regions of those functions of central government, which are more appropriately dealt 
with at a regional rather than a national level107. This is an apparent borrowing on the 
principle of subsidiarity108. The Association advocates furthermore to having similar 
competencies as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This can, however, only be achieved 
through the establishment of accountable regional institutions109. That proposal is likely to be 
supported by those Local Government Associations, which want to proceed towards directly 
elected assemblies110. However, the Labour party remains committed to hold referendums in 
the regions before Regional Assemblies are introduced. One might see therein a lack of 
political leadership or a constitutional insurance for the new bodies, but the referendums 
create an immense political challenge as the English public does not (yet) see the need for the
99 Following a MORI poll, cited in: Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution 1998-99, in: Parliamentary 
Affairs, op cit, p 251
100 Osmond, John: Reforming the Lords and changing Britain, op cit, p 14
101 English Regional Association: Regional Working in England: Policy Statement and Survey of the English 
Regional Associations. English Regional Association, London June 1999
102 Hazell/O’Leary: A Rolling programme o f devolution, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 39
103 See above
104 Hazell/O’Leary: A Rolling programme o f devolution, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 39
105 Hazell/O’Leary: A Rolling programme o f devolution, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 39
106 Cabom, Richard, in: Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee, Regional Development 
Agencies, House of Commons Debates, Vol 415, qu 561, 1997-98
107 English Regional Association: Regional Working in England, op cit
108 See above
109 English Regional Association: Regional Working in England, op cit
110 Hazell/O’Leary: A Rolling programme o f devolution, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 39
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Assemblies111.
On the other hand, a further development of English regions involves “almost certainly” the 
reorganisation of local government112. Apart from that, Labour’s policy of “devolution on 
demand” requires difficult conditions113 for directly elected Assemblies. They underlie a 
“triple lock”. First, a single tier structure of local government must be introduced. This means 
that the shire and district counties are to be merged, because there should not be a extension 
of administrative tiers114. In 1979, the “no” campaigners in the devolution referendums raised 
this issue as it would be a waste of money to have two local governmental and a regional tier. 
However, this merger would impose the need for the abolition of one local government tier. 
This is a considerable obstacle, as local government has “no appetite” for a further round of 
reorganisation115. Also, all local authorities in the chamber need to agree to this process. 
Moreover, some Regional Chambers might be not willing to cede their power to an elected 
body, which is likely to be more difficult to control. Second, their establishment must be 
approved both by Parliament and -thirdly- in a region- wide referendum and they must have 
the auditor’s confirmation that no additional public expenditure overall is involved116. These 
provisions appear as an attempt to block any regionalisation of England. Initially, however, a 
further threat to the regionalisation came from the directly elected Mayors117. The office of 
directly elected Mayors represent a threat because they might become political rivals to the 
Chambers within the regions. The big town’s Mayors except from London might feel as the
110
representative of the whole region and dislike a powerful Assembly . Therefore, it would be 
necessary to begin with the establishment of Regional Assemblies and to hold the elections of 
the Mayors later119. However, the government decided not to wait with the introduction of 
directly elected Mayors. The re-introduction of a London Mayor was legislated120 in 1999 and
111 Hazell, Robert: Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State survive?, op cit, p 91
112 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 270; Hazell/O’Leary: A Rolling programme o f devolution, 
in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 38; Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op 
cit, p 109
113 See for example Uncertainties cast a cloud over future, in: Financial Times. 11 May 2000
114 Tindale, Stephen: Devolution on demand, in: Tindale, Stephen: The state and the nations, op cit, p 61; also 
Elcock, Howard: Territorial debate about Local Government: Or don’t reorganise -  don’t, don’t, don’t, in: 
Elcock/Keating: Remaking the Union, op cit, pp 174
115 Hazell/O’Leary: A Rolling programme o f devolution, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 38; 
also Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 270
116 Quoted in: Hazell/O’Leary: A Rolling programme o f devolution, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op 
cit, p 38
117 Hazell, Robert: Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State survive?, op cit, p 91
118 Hazell, Robert: Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State survive?, op cit, p 91
119 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 275; Hazell, Robert: Reinventing the Constitution: Can 
the State survive?, op cit, p 92
120 Greater London Authority Act 1999; see below
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the Mayors of Birmingham and other major towns are likely to be elected in the period after 
1212002 . The political atmosphere of the campaign at London since mid 1999 has shown all
the difficulties, which may occur in the regions122. As to whether that could be the hope for 
the English regions remains to be seen. One could argue that the Labour government will try 
to avoid further experiences like the London Mayor election123.
2. London: Local government reform
London is the first English “region” where the RDA is accountable to a directly elected 
Regional Assembly. By way of the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998124 London 
became a “region” and the Greater London Authority Act 1999 provided for the direct 
election of a Mayor and a city-wide local authority. One is inclined to see there an example 
how the future Regional Assemblies may be organised. This may be justified when the 
candidates are evaluated. The former Labour politician Ken Livingstone has been elected 
Mayor in May 2000. As he is a political “heavy weight”, challenges of the government by his 
office are likely in different ways . Conversely, the new London authority may be seen in
1 Of\the context of a general reform of local government as outlined in a White Paper in July 
1998. Moreover, there have been proposals to establishing English regions alongside the areas 
of the major towns127. At present, it is not obvious which direction the Greater London 
Authority (GLC) may take128.
The proceeding for the introduction of the Authority and the Mayor fulfilled the important 
condition pledged by the Labour government. A referendum was held in the capital in May 
1998 and results were a three-to-one vote in favour. 77.9 per cent voted “yes” whilst 22.03 
per cent voted “no” on a low turnout of 30 per cent129. The concept of the huge 425
isections Act itself, which was introduced into Parliament in 1999, is obviously based on 
equal with the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998, as the GLC will be a body
121 Liverpool beats rest in race fo r elected city Mayor, in: Daily Telegraph, 9 November 1999
122 E.g.: Livinstone tells Dobson: ‘Step down honourably’, in: Daily Telegraph, 20 February 2000
123 See further below
124 Regional Development Agencies Act 1998, section 1, Schedule 1
125 For further information about the candidate’s selection, Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution 1998- 
99, op cit, p 252
126 White Paper: Modem Local Government: In Touch with the People. HMSO, Cmnd. 4014, London June 1998
127 Partridge, S.: Building a New Britain. London, City Region Campaign, March 1996
128 Hazell/O’Leary: A Rolling programme o f devolution, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 40
129 London votes for Mayor but England stays at home, Daily Telegraph, 8 May 1998
130 There are 34 schedules are to add
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corporate131 like the RDAs. The Mayor and the Greater London Authority (GLA) will sit for a
1 ^ 0fixed four-year term and the general elections are to be held on the first Thursday in May. 
The GLA cannot be dissolved. In contrast to the RDAs, however, the GLC’s members will be 
elected on a similar system as in Scotland and Wales, because fourteen members are to be 
elected on a constituency basis whilst eleven will be elected on the GLC area as a whole133. 
Unlike Scotland and Wales, that system allows each voter to express a preference through 
voting for two candidates134. The Mayor is directly elected on the basis of the alternative vote 
system135. No vote of the new GLA’s Assembly is required. However, the Assembly is 
empowered like the devolved bodies and the RDAs to adopt its own rules of procedure136. 
The direct popular mandate gives the Mayor a powerful position137, although he and the GLA 
respectively have only few powers. Section 30 (2) states the principal purposes of the 
Authority which are the promotion economic development and wealth creation in Greater 
London, the promotion of social development in Greater London, and the improvement of the 
environment in Greater London. It includes the running of the new London transport 
authority138, a London development agency139, a Metropolitan Police Agency140 and the 
London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority141. These powers correspond to the powers 
of the RDAs142. Section 30 (7) makes clear that the GLA is dependent on central government, 
as the Secretary of State can issue guidance to the Authority concerning the exercise of its 
powers. Thus, the Act does not devolve any function of central government powers, nor is the 
GLA to have powers of secondary legislation143. Competences like health, training, further 
education, economic regeneration are to remain at Whitehall and as opposed to the Welsh 
Assembly land-use or development as other planning matters are to be exercised by the 
Secretary of State for Environment. The GLA is allowed to raise money144, but unlike Wales 
does not have a block grant. Even this financial power is very restricted, as it has to be only in
131 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 2(1)
132 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 3 (2)
133 Greater London Authority Act 1999, sections 2 (2), 4 (1)
134 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 507
135 Greater London Authority Act 1999, sections 2 (7a), 4; also: Supperstone, Michael; Pitt-Payne, Timothy: The 
Greater London Authority Bill, in: Public Law. Sweet & Maxwell, London Spring 1999, p 581
136 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 36 (1)
137 Supperstone, Michael; Pitt-Payne, Timothy: The Greater London Authority Bill, op cit, p 584; Bogdanor, 
Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 274
138 Greater London Authority Act 1999, sections 141 and 154
139 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 304
140 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 310
141 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 328
142 Hazell/O’Leary, A Rolling Programme o f devolution, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 40
143 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 274
144 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 34
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relation to the functions described in the Act145. Most of the funds are furthermore channelled 
through the London boroughs146. Transport is therefore probably the key issue for the GLA, 
and there is a considerable dissatisfaction in London, which could improve the public 
perception of the new body147. Nevertheless, the GLA is a rather weak body whose main
1 J.Rfunction is that of scrutiny . It has to hold the Mayor to account and can adopt the Mayors 
budget and strategy priorities. The Mayor itself is empowered to prepare and review political 
strategies149 in the areas of transport150, economic development and regeneration151, spatial 
development152, biodiversity153, municipal waste management154, air quality155, ambient 
noise156 and culture157. These strategies, however, can only be adopted if different other
1 fO
bodies were consulted before . Moreover, his strategies must be “consistent with national 
policies and with such international obligations as the Secretary of State may notify”. 
Additionally, the Mayor lacks any power of creation or abolition of public bodies 
(“quangos”). He is only able to make appointments to them159. In further contrast to the 
devolved Welsh model, he presides only a dwarfs staff160 and cannot create a powerful 
executive. It has been stated, that the GLA given its area “will have some, but not all, of the 
characteristics of a regional government”161. However, the fate of the Greater London 
Authority Act may hopefully not be the fate of Regional Assemblies in England. At present, 
the Regional Chambers may have the same status like the GLA, whilst the Chambers should 
only be the first step to a real regional governmental tier. It has also been said that a “basic 
decision [is] the extend to which central government is prepared to give up powers to a 
regional tier” . In providing for such a dwarf model for the GLA, the government might 
have taken “a conscious decision against devolution” in England . Therefore, the London
145 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 30
146 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 274
147 Supperstone, Michael; Pitt-Payne, Timothy: The Greater London Authority Bill, op cit, p 583
148 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 274
149 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 41
150 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 142
151 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 306
152 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 334
153 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 352 “biodiversity plan”
154 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 353
155 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 362
156 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 370
157 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 376
158 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 42
159 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 274
160 Greater London Authority Act 1999, section 67 (1): Not more than 12 persons
161 McQuail, Paul; Donnelly, Katy: English Regional Government, in: Blackburn/Plant: Constitutional Reform. 
op cit, p 273
1 2 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 101
163 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 275
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Mayor and the GLA are a “weak upper tier” of local government164 enjoying only a few 
functional responsibilities165. They are not to be seen as a model of regional devolution in 
England. The legislation which provided for the direct election of a Mayor (first in London, 
later elsewhere) is nothing more than the re-democratisation of local government. Regardless 
of the government’s political strategy, the powers of the London authority are too weak to 
represent the English part of “devolution”.
Indeed, London may be a special case as the “basic decisions” for devolution to England were 
not prepared to be taken when the Bill was introduced in Parliament. London is perhaps 
special due to its role as the capital with an immense spending of central government, too. By 
all meanings, in the context of devolution to Scotland and Wales, Regional Assemblies need 
larger competencies and powers. Therefore, the GLA scheme is too “minimalist” as 
foundation of further Regional Assemblies. A reasonable featured Assembly requires at least 
some basic powers166. It has to have the strategic responsibilities167 of the Regional Chambers 
that means land-use planning, transport, economic development and co-ordination of 
European funding bids168. Regional Assemblies need the power to guide the RDAs from the 
beginning because they are not able to establish a “voice of the regions” if strategic decisions 
can be taken against their consultative advice169. Moreover, the Assemblies must have the 
basic responsibilities for a budget (as considerable as it may be whereby a block grant would 
be preferable170) and a regional “structure” (relations between the Assembly and its leader) 
including the statutory right of consultation by central government on defined issues 
according to their other responsibilities171. Without these competencies the Regional 
Assemblies in England would lack the reasonable power to balance the devolved powers to 
Scotland and Wales. However, this balance is necessary because a model “consisting of four 
units -England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland -  would be so unbalanced as 
unworkable”172. England with four fifth of the population, would be too dominant. That 
conclusion remains essential173 for the prospects of a more federal model for the United
164 Supperstone, Michael; Pitt-Payne, Timothy: The Greater London Authority Bill, op cit, p 581; Bogdanor, 
Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 274
165 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 274
166 McQuail/Donnelly, English Regional Government, in: Blackburn/Plant: Constitutional Reform, op cit, p 21A
167 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 102
168 See further below
169 Against: Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 102
170 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 103-4
171 Constitution Unit: Regional Government in England, op cit, p 101; also McQuail/Donnelly, English Regional 
Government, in: Blackburn/Plant: Constitutional Reform, op cit, p 272
172 Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), Cmnd. 5460-1, op cit, para 531
173 Also Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 268, see further below
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Kingdom. An “English Parliament”174, as proposed by the Bill of Theresa Gorman M P175, 
would inevitably eclipse the “Union” even though the regional “division of England” may 
prove very difficult. In fact, there is no workable federation in the world where one of its parts
1 nf\is greater than one third of the entire state . Therefore, from an English point of view, the 
most important part of the regional debate is, what may happen in England177.
B. Intergovernmental Relations
Fundamental to devolution is the state of relations between the different tiers of government 
within the United Kingdom178. New political institutions and mechanisms for the discussion 
of inter-governmental issues have been introduced into the constitutional structure of the 
United Kingdom179. Generally, such interactions between component governments highlight a 
federal system180. However, the United Kingdom was defined as a unitary state181. Thus, it is 
likely that the existence of these new bodies indicates a new constitutional settlement as far as 
they are going to be entrenched either by convention182 or by a constitutional document. 
However, the precise proceeding and the individual functions of most of the new institutions 
are not yet settled and therefore very difficult to judge. Also, only one part of the new 
institutional mechanisms, those with reference to Northern Ireland, were entrenched in a 
written document. In the constitutional context of the United Kingdom it represents an 
innovation, but the codification of this part was due to the international character of the Good 
Friday Agreement183. The institutional questions are dealt with in the attachment to this 
treaty184. Therefore, at least one part of the new institutions (The British-Irish Council, the 
North-South Ministerial Council and the joint ministerial Committee) are formally 
entrenched. That entrenchment, however, is relative as it depends upon the further
174 See further below
175 Cited in Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 268
176 See Hazell, Robert: Three policies in search o f a strategy, in: Wright, Tony: The English Question, op cit, p 
35
177 Against McQuail/Donnelly, English Regional Government, in: Blackburn/Plant: Constitutional Reform, op 
cit, p 281
178 Rawlings, Richard: The new model Wales, op cit, p 496
179 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 3
180 Cornes, Richard: Intergovernmental Relations in Devolved United Kingdom: Making Devolution Work, in: 
Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 156
181 See above
182 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, pp 30
183 See above
184 Bogdanor, Vernon: The British-Irish Council and Devolution, in: Government and Opposition. Vol 34 (3), 
London 1999, p 287
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development in Northern Ireland185.
Taken together with the devolution Acts, the Good Friday Agreement establishes a new 
constitutional settlement both among the nations, which form the United Kingdom, and
1 QAbetween the nations living in the Isles of Ireland and Great Britain . However, it remains to 
be seen as to whether devolution builds in reality on the logic of a “union state” and
1 87accommodates constitutionally the nations with their powers and interests . It might be 
possible that many political decisions, which are currently internalised in the consultative 
process at Whitehall, will be externalised in “intergovernmental” processes following the 
devolution legislation188. In contrast to the approach in a unitary state, intergovernmental 
relations may create outlandish mechanisms of governmental decisions and a new variety of 
agreements within the United Kingdom may arise. These could even lead to enforceable legal 
obligations189. This produces definitely a new political situation for the British public. After 
the experiences of the British EU-Membership, a new form of summits and ministerial 
meetings will arise.
1. The Joint Ministerial Committee
The Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) is the first of these inter-governmental arrangements. 
It could prove as the main forum for negotiation of devolution issues merely within United 
Kingdom190. It was not proposed by any White Paper on devolution, but it had been 
announced during the Committee stage debates of the Scotland Bill in the House of Lords. 
Then, Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale stated for the government that “there should be standing 
arrangements for the devolved administrations to be involved by the UK government at 
ministerial level”. It was outlined that “it is envisaged that this would be achieved through the 
establishment of a joint ministerial committee of which the UK government and the devolved 
administrations would be members”191. The Committee was to become a mere consultative 
body supported by a committee of officials and a joint secretariat192. The representation of the
185 See above
186 Bogdanor, Vernon: The British-Irish Council and Devolution, op cit, p 287
187 Comes, Richard: Intergovernmental Relations in Devolved United Kingdom: Making Devolution Work, in: 
Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 157
188 Comes, Richard: Intergovernmental Relations in Devolved United Kingdom: Making Devolution Work, in: 
Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 157
189 See further below
190 Hazell, Robert; Morris, Bob: Machinery o f Government: Whitehall, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional 
Futures, op cit, p 139
191 House of Lords Debates, Vol 592, col. 1486-7, 28 July 1998
192 House of Lords Debates, Vol 592, col. 1488-9, 28 July 1998
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Committee was to vary according to specific issues under consideration. Fisheries Ministers 
would be involved on fisheries matters, for example193. The JMC has been established under 
the “Memorandum of Understanding”194 agreed by the UK Government and the devolved 
bodies in Scotland and Wales on 1 October 1999. A supplementary agreement195 sets out the 
basis on which the Committee operates, pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding. The 
JMC does not hold regular meetings and did, in fact, not meet once to date. However, on the 
7th of April 2000 the JMC’s health committee was gathered in Cardiff for a first formal 
meeting. Summit meetings are to be held between the Prime Minister and the First Ministers 
(Secretaries) of the devolved bodies196. At that time, however, as matters of Health were in 
question, the Health secretaries of the devolved bodies and the Health minister of central 
government were included197. Present were thus the leaders of the UK, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland - Tony Blair, Rhodri Morgan, Donald Dewar and Peter Mandelson - plus 
Chancellor Gordon Brown and the health ministers. There is, therefore, no requirement for the 
JMC to meet in London.
The terms of reference of the JMC are198 to consider non-devolved matters, which impinge on 
devolved responsibilities, and devolved matters, which impinge on non-devolved 
responsibilities. Secondly, where the UK Government and the devolved administrations so 
agree, to consider devolved matters if it is beneficial to discuss their respective treatment in 
the different parts of the United Kingdom. Finally, it is to keep the arrangements for liaison 
between the UK Government and the devolved administrations under review, and to consider 
disputes between the administrations. Plenary meetings of the JMC are to be held at least once 
a year199. According to the MoU, the plenary meetings consist of the Prime Minister (or his 
representative), who will take the chair, and the Deputy Prime Minister, the Scottish First 
Minister and one of his Ministerial colleagues, the Welsh First Secretary and another 
Assembly Secretary, [the Northern Ireland First Minister and Deputy First Minister], and the 
Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Other Ministers and Assembly 
Secretaries can be invited to attend as appropriate when issues relevant to their areas of 
responsibility are to be discussed. The JMC can, however, also meet in “functional” formats
193 Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale, House of Lords Debates, Vol 592, col 1489, 28 July 1998
194 See e.g. Official Website of the National Assembly for Wales 
(http://www.wales.gov.uk/works/moucover e.htm). paras 3, 22
195 Memorandum, Annex A 1
196 Qvortrup, Mads; Hazell, Robert, op cit, p 18
197 See Blair to chair first formal meeting ofJmc, in: Western Mail, 06/04/00
198 Memorandum, paras 22 and Annex A 1.2
199 Memorandum, Annex A 1.3
100
that mean for example in an ’’Agriculture Ministers format”. The Secretaries of State for 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are invited to participate in these meetings as 
appropriate. Irrespective of their location, the responsible UK Minister will chair the 
meetings200. There are currently three of such sub-committees of the JMC, one on European 
affairs, one on poverty, and one on the knowledge economy (or “regional co-ordination
committee”). Of these, only the last two have met so far . The regional co-ordination
202committee was set up on 1 December 1999 by the Chancellor and met on 9 December 1999 
presided by the Chancellor, too203. The dominant role of Whitehall is enforced by the 
stipulation that meetings of the JMC, in the appropriate functional guise, are held at the 
request of the UK Government or any of the devolved administrations, but the responsibility 
for convening a meeting lies with the responsible Whitehall Minister204. The proceedings of 
each meeting are to be confidential205. The JMC is administered by a Joint Secretariat at the 
Cabinet Office and Committee of officials, normally civil servants, prepares its meetings206.
9 0 7The Committee has also a role in European affairs . Then, it is chaired by the Foreign 
Secretary (or his representative) and will operate as one of the principal mechanisms for
9 0 8consultation on UK positions on EU issues, which affect devolved matters . In the context 
of the EU, rapid decisions have to be taken to meet the timetable of negotiations in the 
Council of Ministers. However, the government’s wishes to involve the devolved 
administrations as fully as possible in discussions on the formulation of UK policy position. 
Thus, a mechanism, which enables the lead UK Minister where necessary to consult other UK 
Government Ministers and their counterparts in the devolved administrations simultaneously, 
was needed. To establish that function is the task of the sub-committee on European Affairs. 
It is likely that the majority of its business will be conducted through correspondence, 
although meetings will also be convened where necessary209. Thus, the JMC is a consultative 
body rather than an executive body, and so will reach agreements rather than decisions210. It 
cannot bind any of the participating administrations, which will be free to determine their own 
policies while taking account of JMC discussions. Nonetheless, the expectation is that
200 Memorandum, Annex A 1.4
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202 Brown is accused o f ‘devolution in reverse' by Tories, in: Daily Telegraph, 2 December 1999
203 The Times, 10 December 1999
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p 121; also Memorandum, Annex A 1.12-14
07 See further below
208 Memorandum, Annex A 1.9
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participating administrations are to support positions that the JMC has agreed211.
Meetings of the JMC are to be held for two purposes. On the one hand, it has to take stock of 
relations generally and of the way in which the devolution arrangements are working in a 
particular area, and on the other hand, to address particular issues or problems212. In addition 
to shaping a joint policy on devolved issues, the JMC is also to act as arbiter in any cross- 
border wrangles and promote stronger links between the Scottish and British governments at a 
time when their relationship is under intense scrutiny213. Intended as a “peacemaker” at the 
beginning, the JMC was seen finally as a direct attempt to head off growing claims by the 
Scottish National Party that devolution was the first step to independence214. Thus, it was 
argued215 that the JMC would prove as the mechanism for the devolved governments to 
negotiate with central government about reserved matters, which impinge on their functions, 
and to discuss also devolved matters in the different parts of the country. Thus, the JMC 
represents a significant constitutional reorganisation within the United Kingdom and could
91 f\reach a considerable constitutional function . Conversely, the JMC has been attacked by the 
Nationalist Parties stating that the Committee is an attempt to control policy in the devolved 
assemblies in Wales and Scotland by the centre217. Plaid Cymru argued that the nation’s 
health problems should rather be addressed by the Assembly through its committees than by 
the JMC. However, the fact that the JMC comes together to discuss health problems in the 
whole United Kingdom is probably a strength of devolution as the JMC cannot bind the 
participants. Nevertheless, it is to note that “Health“ is a devolved matter to Scotland218. Thus 
the Scottish parliament is to be responsible for the matter independently. At the moment the 
structures need to be put in place, but the centre of the United Kingdom polity is going to be 
enabled to move towards a more federalised settlement219. Then, there may well be “dynamics 
that London cannot dictate”220. If the JMC has been provided for “peacemaking”, the 
conclusion is then that there will be some fights.
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2. The British-Irish Council
The BIC represents the second form of these new summits. It brings together representatives 
of the British and Irish governments (in addition to the British-Irish Intergovernmental
22j 222Conference ), and of the devolved bodies to discuss matters of common interest . Its 
purpose is to institutionalise a new settlement between the different nations forming the 
United Kingdom and the Irish Republic223. It has to “promote the harmonious and mutually 
beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the people of these islands”224. 
The BIC indicates that due to the multiple links between the Republic of Ireland and the 
United Kingdom there must be a more intensive co-operation than during the last decades. 
The Membership of the BIC is not limited to the two States of Ireland and Britain and the 
devolved bodies, but also opened to the English regions “when established, and if 
appropriate”225 and the Crown dependencies of the Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey. They 
are not part of the United Kingdom . The BIC is to meet in different formats: at summit 
level, twice per year; in specific sectoral formats on a regular basis, with each side represented 
by the appropriate Minister; in an appropriate format to consider cross-sectoral matters227. 
The Council is primarily consultative and is allowed to consider a wide range of questions 
like transport, agriculture, and other approaches to the European Union. Moreover, it can 
conceive issues of environment, culture, and education228. It is open to the BIC to agree 
common policies or common actions. Individual members may opt (“opt out”) not to 
participate in such common policies and common action229. The BIC normally operates by 
consensus. In relation to decisions on common policies or common actions, including their 
means of implementation, it will operate by agreement of all members participating in such 
policies or actions230. The BIC has a Secretariat provided by the British and Irish 
Governments. In addition to the structures of the British-Irish Agreement, it is open to two or 
more members to develop bilateral or multilateral arrangements. However, such arrangements 
could raise difficult questions, if nationalist parties in Scotland or Wales would be in power.
221 See above
222 See above
223 Bogdanor, Vernon: The British-Irish Council and Devolution, op cit, p 288
224 British-Irish Agreement, op cit, Strand Three, para 1
225 British-Irish Agreement, op cit, Strand Three, para 2
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Finally, the elected institutions of the members are encouraged to develop inter-parliamentary 
links, perhaps building on the British-Irish Interparliamentary Body231. A similar inter­
parliamentary institution was proposed at the Committee stage of the Scotland Bill in the 
House of Lords to formalise the liaison machinery between Westminster and Edinburgh232. 
The suggestion from the debates on the Scotland Bill was not pursued in statutory terms. At 
present, there is an informal grouping of members of the National Assembly for Wales and of 
the Scottish Parliament entitled the “Scottish-Welsh Inter-Parliamentary Group”. However, it 
has no legal basis and is not a body with which the civil servants have any regular dealings .
The BIC itself met, in fact, for the first and, to date, the only time on 17 December 1999 at 
Lancaster House in London234. There, interestingly, England has been represented by Hilary 
Armstrong, a junior Minister of the DETR. This BIC sought to take forward cross-border co­
operation on issues such as environment, transport, progress on drugs and social exclusion. 
Those present cited improving transport links between Belfast and Scotland as an example of 
what might be achieved235. The Council afterwards issued a communique, which stated that 
the Council agreed a Memorandum on its working procedures. It adopted an initial list of 
issues for early discussion in the BIC and also decided which administrations would take the 
lead in each sectoral area. Therefore, the Irish Government is the leading administration on 
drugs, the Scottish Executive together with the Cabinet of National Assembly for Wales for 
Social Inclusion, the British Government for Environment, the Northern Ireland Executive 
Committee for Transport, and the administration of Jersey for the knowledge Economy. In 
addition, the Council agreed an indicative list of other issues suitable for the Council’s work, 
including areas which members are already taking forward bilaterally. This concerns 
agricultural issues such as plant quarantine, rural development and rural depopulation, the 
development of renewable raw materials and energy crops, salmon fisheries; sea fisheries and 
aquaculture, health issues, regional issues including links between cities, towns and local 
districts, the consideration of interparliamentary links, energy issues, cultural issues, tourism, 
sporting activity, education issues, approaches to EU issues, minority and lesser-used 
languages, and prison and probation issues. Moreover, the Council agreed to hold its next 
summit in Dublin in June 2000, which shall focus on the issue of drugs. However, this 
meeting only takes place if the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly is abandoned.
231 British-Irish Agreement, op cit, Strand Three, para 10
232 Lord Selkirk of Douglas, in: House of Lords Debates, Vol 592, col 1487,28 July 1998
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The BIC is modelled in part on the Nordic Council . This Council in the North of Europe 
has, in contrast to the European Union, never impinged upon the sovereignty of its member 
states237. The unique feature238 of the BIC and the Nordic Council is that they are composed 
not only of sovereign states but also by other political units, which are not “states”. In contrast 
to the Nordic Council, the BIC may not operate on an annual rotation of the presidency 
among all members, but rather be controlled by the two independent nation-states, Ireland and 
Britain239. Only two of the eight BIC’s members are independent states whilst five of eight 
members are independent states within the Nordic Council240. However, the problem of 
English representation might have more significance. The Good Friday Agreement241 
provided for membership of devolved institutions in England “when established, and if
242appropriate” . If there ever were to be devolution in England, it could complicate the work 
of the BIC . This is due to the fact that England is much bigger than all the other members 
of the BIC together244. It was therefore proposed245 to dissociate completely the question as to 
whether there should be devolution in England from the question of the representation at the 
BIC. An excellent solution might actually be that England is represented by a special 
Secretary of State246. When the Department of Environment was first established in 1970 it 
was initially contemplated as Department for England247. Thus, that Secretary of State may be 
the convenient representative for England within the BIC. However, the BIC offers to the 
smaller nations within this institution to counterbalance the tutelage of their larger neighbour. 
This is in contrast to the Nordic Council whose members share a fundamental constitutional 
consensus. The BIC is needed exactly because there is no consensus either on how the Irish 
problem can be resolved or on how the relationship between the non-English nations of the 
United Kingdom should be organised248. On the one hand, the BIC then establishes the 
paradoxical situation that whilst it was created to assure the Unionists of Northern Ireland of
236 Those Members are: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden with three other autonomous areas
237 Qvortrup, Mads; Hazell, Robert: The British-Irish Council: Nordic Lessons for the Council of the Isles, op 
cit; Bogdanor, Vernon: The British-Irish Council and Devolution, op cit, pp 289
238 Bogdanor, Vernon: The British-Irish Council and Devolution, op cit, p 289
239 Qvortrup, Mads; Hazell, Robert, op cit, p 17 stating that the BIC “was imposed upon the dependent 
territories”
240 Bogdanor, Vernon: The British-Irish Council and Devolution, op cit, p 290
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their membership of the United Kingdom the Council may prove to yield greater importance 
to Scotland and Wales at the expense of England249. On the other hand, the BIC may not be so 
important250 in the context of devolution and is likely only to discuss issues with an Irish 
dimension which have not yet been discussed in other institutions like the Joint Ministerial 
Committee251.
Before devolution, the Secretaries of State were entitled to represent the interests of Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland on EU-matters. Especially the Scottish Secretary was ensuring 
that Scottish interests were taken into account in the context of European Union policy252. 
Obviously, the legislation for devolution has changed the situation. In future, particularly the 
Scottish Parliament and Executive are responsible for different parts of European politics253. 
However, the ways in which the devolved institutions are to participate in European Union 
matters are different. Scotland is to have the strongest position, Wales quite a limited one 
whilst Northern Ireland’s position depends on the outcome of the peace process. According to 
the Scotland Act 1998, the Scottish Executive has full responsibility for EU dominated 
matters such as agriculture and fisheries, with contrast to Wales where the Assembly is only 
partly responsible254. Apart from that, the devolved bodies are represented at the Committee 
of the Regions (CoR), where they are able to propose their own representatives following the 
MoU255. The CoR is, however, at the time being, rather a weak institution256. Therefore, the 
devolved bodies may search for other ways of influence on European Union matters.
According to EU-law, a lot of decisions in the area of agriculture and fisheries are made at 
Brussels, and any Minister attending the Council has the power to agree to decisions for his 
country257. The devolved bodies are able to exert a degree of influence on the Commission 
during the pre-legislative period by different non-official ways (By way of their 
representation in Brussels -  Scotland Europa, for example, or by way of the MEP’s, or via
249 Bogdanor, Vernon: The British-Irish Council and Devolution, op cit, p 297
250 Hazell, Robert; Morris, Bob: Machinery o f Government: Whitehall, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional 
Futures, op cit, p 140
251 Qvortrup, Mads; Hazell, Robert, op cit, p 18
252 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 279
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pp 63
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central government258, of course). However, as the United Kingdom is the Member State of 
the European Union, the Council negotiations bind the whole country259. Thus, a Scottish 
Minister does not have the power to negotiate since he operates in a purely Scottish context
9 f \C i 9^1and cannot represent England or Wales . However, it has been admitted that Ministers of 
devolved institutions may participate and be involved, as part of the British negotiating team,
9 / ^ 9
when matters of Scottish and Welsh concern arise at the Council . That proposal was not 
translated into any formal consultation mechanism in the devolution acts. Nevertheless, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland would then become the only “regions” in the European 
Union with individual access to the Council of Ministers . Since the insertion of art 146 in 
the European Union Treaty, the German, Belgian or Austrian regions have been conversely 
able to be represented at the Council, but they cannot put forward their interests in that 
council individually. They are obliged to look for a “common” representative264. 
Nevertheless, the Scottish position must be agreed by Whitehall, whilst the German Lander 
are constitutionally entitled to nominate their own representative. The Scottish White Paper265 
stated that “provided the Scottish Executive is willing to work in that spirit of collaboration 
and trust, there will be an integrated process which builds upon the benefits of the current role 
of the Scottish Office within government”. Bogdanor therefore argues, that the contrast 
between the constitutional status of the devolved institutions and their actual powers are likely 
to cause disillusionment in Edinburgh and Cardiff when it comes to be appreciated that there
9 ( \ f sis a countervailing force to devolution in the form of the European Union . In a situation of
different parties at government in London and the devolved bodies, there is a risk of tensions
about European matters. Constitutionally, the centre will dominate in such conflicts. 
Nevertheless, the devolved bodies are likely to gain influence in the context of their
9fV7contribution to European policy matters .
It has been shown that devolution raises the question as to how England fits in the modified 
constitution. England is the largest part of the United Kingdom and its economic motor.
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Hence, it would disastrous to avoid a solution to the “English question”. Devolution also 
demands a clear structure for co-operation of the different governments and institutions within 
the United Kingdom, and according to the Good-Friday-Agreement within and between the 
states of Britain and Ireland. On the one hand, these intergovernmental arrangements establish 
the forums where political conflicts can be discussed. There is a need in the post-devolution 
for a tighter co-ordination and for an organised co-operation. This can be achieved by the 
JMC. The BIC, on the contrary, is likely to be an institution, which is only made to ensure 
that Northern Ireland is integrated in a larger political background with different actors. The 
main contribution for the peace process will continue to be done between London and Dublin. 
On the other hand, the British-Irish Agreement established some sort of con-federal and 
federal arrangements within the United Kingdom. This mixture of con-federal and federal 
features between two independent states marks the agreement out as novel in the international 
environment. The British-Irish Agreement and its implications for the United Kingdom 
Constitution could become a model for other areas of conflict. However, the underlying 
principle of “power sharing” is also an idea on which the European Union is partly based. The 
main aims of the British-Irish co-operation and the general framework of the European 
Communities are thus quite similar. The British-Irish arrangements currently do not impinge 
on the sovereignty of the member states. It was, however, the same at the setting up of the 
European Communities: Its point of departure has been the economic co-operation. Nobody 
could preview its fast development towards a supra-national organisation. Hence, it is not 
excluded that the British-Irish arrangements develop a dynamics, which leads finally to a 
similar structure. It could then also impinge on the sovereignty of its members. If the 
arrangements of the BIC reflect, however, a “new reality that we are all Regions of Europe” 
and if the BIC becomes a balance to the core to the European Union in the Benelux area, as 
the British Irish Council is likely to be dominated by its “peripheral member-regions ”, 
remains to be seen. The British-Irish arrangements may develop a system of concurrent, but 
co-operative regions within the British Isles. Especially for Northern Ireland, the Membership 
of the European Union continues to integrate and to put pressure for both parts of Ireland to 
co-operate. This could prove an economic success given their shared peripheral geographical 
position, and similar interests in functional activities such as agriculture and tourism270. It was 
argued that Northern Ireland could even join the European Monetary Union with the
1/2000, Deutsch-Franzosisches Forum, Freiburg/Paris 2000, pp 44
268 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement: Power-sharing plus, op cit, p 6
269 Cited in Bogdanor, Vernon: The British Irish Council and devolution, op cit, p 295
270 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement: Power-sharing plus, op cit, p 7
108
971Republic, if Britain itself remained outside . It is, however, not the same for Scotland and 
Wales.
271 O’Leary, Brendan: The British-Irish Agreement: Power-sharing plus, op cit, p 8 , fn 9. It would be necessary 
that the Assembly agreed and the Secretary of State and the Westminster Parliament consented.
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V. The “devolved” bodies and the new constitutional framework
Devolution does not only establish new institutions outside central government. Devolution 
does especially affect the centre. Thus, it is likely that it changes the shape of the whole 
constitutional structure of the United Kingdom. This chapter analyses the influences of 
devolution for the centre in the context of a general division of powers. Such a division of 
powers is normally associated with federal systems. The analysis may help to identify the 
constitutional nature of devolution. Also, the following chapter points out where it is most 
likely that problems within the new constitutional settlement may occur. Therefore, the 
different areas of power are scrutinised separately. Firstly, we shed light on the legislative 
powers and their division between the centre and the nations. Secondly, the administrative 
organisation is scrutinised. As a third point, it is questioned as to whether there is a clear 
financial settlement for the United Kingdom. Fourthly, this chapter examines the judicial 
review of devolution. By way of this investigation, various issues are outlined which arise 
with devolution, but which are avoided by a clear federal structure.
A. Legislative powers
For a United Kingdom-wide analysis of legislative competences it is necessary to take into 
account the different devolution schemes. The Scottish case provides the best example to 
scrutinise the realm of competences, which will remain at Westminster even if devolution 
would be strengthened in Wales or extended to England. The Scotland Act 1998 lists1 not the 
devolved, but rather the reserved matters, which is in contrast to the abortive Scotland Act 
19782. Reserved matters are those, which are to be carried out at central level that means at a
-5
United Kingdom level. These reserved functions are outlined in Part I as follows: first, the 
constitution, including the Crown4, along with the succession to the Crown and a regency, the 
Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England, the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the 
continued existence of the High Court of Justiciary as a criminal court of first instance and of 
appeal, the continued existence of the Court of Session as a civil court of first instance and of 
appeal. The high judiciary remains in the realm of Westminster. Thus, the appointments to the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
1 Scotland Act 1998, schedule 5
2 See above, also Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution, op cit, p 169
3 Scotland Act 1998, schedule 5
4 Legislation on private-law subjects fall outside the restriction
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Council continue to be made by central government5. This is to be inferred from the 
reservation of the “constitution, including the Crown... and the Parliament of the United
/T
Kingdom” and from the absence of any reference to those bodies in other provisions dealing 
with devolved matters7. A likely change may be that the Lord Chancellor consults further the 
First Minister instead of the Secretary of State before making his recommendations for the 
high judiciary to the Prime Minister8. The question is as to whether the Scottish parliament 
could abolish the appeal to the House of Lords and create a Scottish Supreme Court. If it is 
argued that the right to appeal is part of the civil procedure, which is not a reserved matter, the 
Scottish parliament would be able to do so9. However, if the right of appeal is seen as an 
aspect of the “constitution, including ... the Parliament of the United Kingdom”10, it might be 
prohibited to do so, as the jurisdiction of the House of Lords in Scottish cases is an aspect of 
parliament, which substituted the former right of appeal to the Scots Parliament11. Apart from 
that it could be “beyond the scope of the Scottish parliament”12 to abolish the right of appeal, 
as far as the Scotland Act13 implies that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (as part 
of the House of Lords) is part of the Act which creates the Scottish parliament itself and is the 
ultimate institution of decision for devolution issues. However, this argument implies the fact 
that the Privy Council’s function of ultimate decisions for devolution issues cannot exist 
without the residual role of the House of Lords. This conclusion is, however, not inevitable.
Secondly, the reserved matters include the registration and funding of political parties. 
Thirdly, foreign affairs, the European Union and the defence of the realm. Fourthly, the civil 
service and treason. Part II14 states specific reserved matters as fiscal, economic, and 
monetary policy (excluding local taxes funding local government expenditure), the currency, 
financial services and markets, in the area of home affairs: the elections and the franchise for
local government elections (except of the organisation of local government elections),
immigration and nationality, the misuse of drugs and scientific procedures on living animals, 
the national security and emergency powers, extradition, firearms, betting, gaming and 
lotteries, in the area of trade and industry: Business associations, insolvency, competition and
5 Reed, Robert: Devolution and the Judiciary, op cit, p 30
6 Scotland Act 1998, schedule 5, para 1
7 Reed, Robert: Devolution and the Judiciary, op cit, p 30
8 Reed, Robert: Devolution and the Judiciary, op cit, p 30
9 Reed, Robert: Devolution and the Judiciary, op cit, p 30
10 Schedule 5, para 1
11 Lord Fraser of Tullybelton: Stair Encyclopedia of the Laws of Scotland. Vol 5, para 638
12 Reed, Robert: Devolution and the Judiciary, op cit, p 30, fn 68
13 Sections 33, 103; schedule 6
14 Scotland Act 1998, schedule 5
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intellectual property, import and export control, sea fishing, consumer protection, product 
standards, telecommunications and postal offices and services, the designation of assisted 
areas, the industrial development advisory board, in the whole area of energy policy, further 
the road, rail and marine transport. Part III of the Schedule concerns finally social security 
policy, employment and industrial relations, health and safety, the law of abortion and 
broadcasting. However, these matters can be changed15 by Order in Council.
The Northern Ireland Act 1998 reserves a similar area of matters to the Westminster 
parliament16. The outline of the excepted -  which correspond to the expression “reserved” of
1 n
the Scotland Act -  matters includes the Crown, but does not limit the exceptions to “aspects 
of the constitution”18. Thus, the Northern Ireland Assembly has the power to affect the 
Crown’s interests to a significant extent19. This Schedule covers the international relations 
and European affairs, too, but excludes some cross-border matters for the Irish Isle. 
Moreover, Northern Ireland is subject to certain restrictions in view of its judiciary20. The 
Northern Ireland Act 1998 distinguishes, however, between excepted and reserved matters, as 
the latter can be legislated by the Northern Ireland Assembly -and  are therefore “devolved”-  
if they are ancillary, but the assent of the Secretary of State and Westminster is needed21. 
These matters include for example the establishment of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). 
Whilst in the Scottish case matters referring to police and security are reserved at present, the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998 empowers to “devolve” such competences. However, this might be 
due to the special situation of Northern Ireland. General conclusions are not to be drawn on 
the differences between the reserved matters in the Northern Ireland Act and the reserved 
matters of the Scotland Act 1998. Only a comparison between Northern Ireland’s excepted 
and Scotland’s reserved matters makes sense.
The distinction between the legislative powers of the Assembly in Wales and the bodies in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland is that both of the latter have primary and secondary legislative 
competences, whilst Wales enjoys only the devolution of secondary legislation22. However,
15 Scotland Act 1998, section 30 (2)
16 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 16
17 Northern Ireland Act 1998, schedule 2
18 Schedule 2, para lc  (Other liberations are less important as the foreshore or the sea bed or subsoil or their 
natural resources so far as vested in Her Majesty in right of the Crown)
19 Taylor, Greg: Devolution and the applicability o f statutes to the Crown in the inter-govemmental context, in: 
Public Law. Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000, p 10
20 Schedule 2, para 11
21 See above
22 Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, op cit, p 70
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the power of the Assembly to make secondary legislation in the context of “Henry V1H 
clauses” gives to the Assembly such powers, which are in other states only attributed to “real” 
parliaments. One could therefore argue that even the Assembly is a real legislator as the 
powers conferred by these clauses is very important23. Thus, secondary legislative power is 
real power24. Therefore, it can be concluded that devolution implies the transfer of legislative 
power to the newly created institutions, even though this legislative power includes “only” the 
power to make secondary legislation under the scheme of “Henry VIII clauses”.
1. Reserved and devolved legislation
At present, it might be difficult to imagine that there is to be an “entrenched” relation between 
Westminster and the devolved parliaments, as Westminster was until currently the ultimate 
institution in the United Kingdom. The question is as to whether problems can arise 
concerning issues that both bodies are allowed to deal with. The relationship between the 
legislatures can be broken down in two component parts: the power of Westminster with 
regard to devolved matters on the one hand and, on the other hand, the power of the devolved 
legislature to debate or scrutinise non-devolved matters25. Initially, it might be helpful to bear 
in mind the situation when the Northern Irish Parliament at Stormont enjoyed devolved 
powers. In the 1920s, the two legislatures organised their relationship alongside the doctrine 
of ministerial responsibility26. The speaker of the Westminster parliament ruled then that 
“with regard to those subjects which have been delegated to the government of Northern 
Ireland, questions must be asked of ministers in Northern Ireland and not in this [the 
Commons] house. In the case of those subjects which were reserved to [Westminster]
questions can be addressed to the appropriate ministers”27. In return, the speaker of the
Stormont parliament ruled that “since... we have no power to make laws on any of these
9ftreserved matters, they are n o t ... subjects for discussion here” . However, the general nature 
of the relationship between Westminster and the devolved bodies is most clearly expressed in 
the Scotland Act29, where it is stipulated that the provisions of the Act “do not affect the 
power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland”. This general 
position has been maintained in the MoU where it is stipulated that “the United Kingdom
23 See Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 210
24 Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, op cit, p 75
25 Also: Hadfield, Brigid: The nature of devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 22
26 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 23
27 House of Commons Debates, col 1623-25, 3 May 1923
28 Northern Irelands Debates, col 490-2, 29 March 1927
29 Section 28 (7), see also Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 5 (6)
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Parliament retains authority to legislate on any issue, whether devolved or not. It is ultimately 
for Parliament to decide what use to make of that power“30.
The Scottish Office’s notes on the Act31 confirm the sovereignty of the United Kingdom 
parliament by providing that section 27 which empowers the Scottish Parliament to make 
legislation does not affect the power of Westminster to make laws for Scotland . This means 
that Westminster is in theory allowed to legislate on all matters -  including the right to block 
intra-vires legislation33. However, devolved matters should - in  theory -  be legislated at the 
devolved parliaments and assemblies, and -in  practice -  they are to be dealt with at that level. 
Why else introduce devolution34? There could only be an exception if the devolved bodies 
would agree and consent formally that Westminster should legislate for the United Kingdom 
as a whole . Such procedures may be developed by convention . However, conventions are 
partially based on a durable application. A practice is seen to have become a convention at the 
point at which failure to act in accordance with it gives rise to legitimate criticism37. At 
present, no practice has developed. This was shown most apparently in the (perhaps special) 
case of Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Act 2000 overruled the devolved body without 
great attempts to avoid such direct rule by way of other political measures. “Constitutional” 
thoughts were not made at that time. Therefore, the development of conventions in favour of 
the devolved bodies might be doubtful or, by all meanings, the rights that they give are not 
“entrenched” “for ever”38. That point of view is supported by the arguments of Hadfield39, 
who quotes two meaningful examples. In the House of Lords’ second reading of the Scotland 
Bill, it was said that the Lords “would expect a convention to be established that Westminster 
would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent 
of the Scottish parliament”40. That quotation of “normal” is contrasted with Calvert’s41 
observation of the operation of the then Northern Ireland convention. He put forward that the 
United Kingdom parliament “has frequently during the forty six years since the establishment
30 Memorandum of Understanding, part I, para 13, available at the official Website of the Assembly: 
http://www.assemblv.wales.gov.uk/works/mouestats e.html
31 Scotland Act 1998, section 27 (7)
32 Quted in Hadfield, Brigid: The Belfast Agreeement, Sovereignty and the State o f the Union, in: Public Law. 
London, Sweet & Maxwell Winter 1998, pp 599, p 603
33 See further below
34 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 23
35 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 23
36 Lord Sewel, in: House of Lords Debates, Vol 592, col 791, 21 July 1998
37 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 36
38 See above (The problem of the diceyan theory concerning the Scotland Act which was concluded “for ever”)
39 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 24
40 Lord Sewel, in: House of Lords Debates, Vol 592, col 791, 21 July 1998
41 Calvert, Harry: Constitutional Law in Northern Ireland, Belfast, SLS 1968, pp 87
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of the Northern Ireland parliament, legislated with respect to transferred matters, but almost 
invariably only with the consent of the Northern Ireland government, even though that 
consent may not always have been readily forthcoming”. The issue of Westminster’s power to 
legislate is, however, independent of the question of its desirability42. Thus, the point of 
desirability could be handled by formal, but not statutory mechanisms, as for example through 
a Speaker’s Ruling or by Standing Orders, that Westminster will not legislate on devolved 
matters43. However, it remains to be seen if Westminster may take that experience to be more 
reluctant or if the devolved legislatures of this century are more readily forthcoming.
Another question is as to whether the Westminster parliament could or should debate and 
scrutinise devolved matters. The MoU is clear about that as it cites that “the United Kingdom 
Parliament retains the absolute right to debate, enquire into or make representations about 
devolved matters. It is ultimately for Parliament to decide what use to make of that power, but 
the UK Government will encourage the UK Parliament to bear in mind the primary 
responsibility of devolved legislatures and administrations in these fields and to recognise that 
it is a consequence of Parliament’s decision to devolve certain matters that Parliament itself 
will in future be more restricted in its field of operation”44. However, one could see 
Westminster’s role, in fact, limited to the reserved matters. Then, Westminster’s Standing 
Orders might exclude Private Member’s Bills on devolved matters. It is likely that opposition 
MPs of Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland try to challenge the devolved government by that 
way at Westminster. Private Members’ Bills are promoted by an individual Member of 
Parliament, as opposed to the government or in order to propose a matter, which the 
government has been unable to fit in its government programme45. However, that possibility 
raised questions at the Northern Ireland’s Bill in the House of Lords. There, the government 
referred to the future law of Northern Ireland and outlined that “if there is to be a change, the 
preferable way for it to happen is in a devolved administration in Northern Ireland, or, 
alternatively by way of a Private Member’s Bill from a Northern Ireland Member”46. The then 
Secretary of State Paul Murphy supported the statement by proving a Diceyan character of 
constitutional approach: “I cannot simply rule out that parliamentary time may at some stage
42 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 25
43 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 25
44 Memorandum of Understanding, part I, para 14, available at the official Website of the Assembly: 
http://www.assemblv.wales.gov.uk/works/mouestats e.html
45 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 534
46 Worthington, Tony, in: House of Lords Debates, Vol. 593, col 209-210,5 October 1998
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be made available for a Private Member’s Bill”47. However, it is true that the arguing for a 
preclusion of Westminster legislation on devolved matters underlies a federalist approach to
AQ
the devolution model . Devolution does not establish exclusive legislative powers and the 
“national interest” can still be defined at Westminster. That may be the meaning of the 
general legislative power at Westminster ruled in Section 28 (7) of the Scotland Act49. That 
can also be taken from Sections 35 and 58 giving the Secretary of State certain limited 
intervention powers50. Nevertheless, there are unsolved questions referring to the relationship 
between Westminster and the devolved bodies. The Westminster parliament considered 
recently the question “whether it is possible to lay down clear principles as to the relationship 
with the new bodies, even if only in outline, or whether changes should be evolutionary and 
limited to particular responses to particular problems. If it is possible to define clear 
principles, should the United Kingdom exercise a ‘self-denying ordinance’ on matters within 
the competence of the Scottish parliament or the Welsh or Northern Ireland Assembly and if 
so, what should it cover, and how should it be placed?”51 That is, in fact, first a question at 
Westminster and not at the devolved bodies. It might be true that in the context of a devolved 
structure of government the airing of as a wide range of opinions on any given matter can be 
beneficial rather than threatening. However, the experience of the Stormont parliament 
showed that the devolved bodies must be made responsible for a clear political realm. This is 
not in contrast to the general legislative power of Westminster, but it may help to establish a 
definite political responsibility.
It is the same with the devolved bodies themselves. They may claim the right to discuss 
reserved matters, too52. For the Scottish case, the White Paper stated that the parliament in 
Edinburgh will be able to “debate a wide range of issues of interest and concern in Scotland, 
whether devolved or reserved”53. That could be the case if Westminster legislates against the 
majority of MPs stemming of one devolved nation54, with reference to an international treaty 
for example. In such cases the devolved bodies may express through its general debates their 
opposition to what was being done. This position is supported in the MoU wherein “the 
devolved legislatures will be entitled to debate non-devolved matters, but the devolved
47 House of Lords, Written Answers, WA 132-33, 19 October 1998
48 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 24
49 See Section 5 (6) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998
50 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 25
51 Select Committee on Procedures, Press Notice N°9 of Session 1997-98, 30 July 1998
52 Hadfield, Brigid: Scotland’s Parliament: A Northern Ireland perspective on the White Paper, in: Public Law. 
London, Sweet & Maxwell Winter 1997, p 668
53 White Paper: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, para 2.5
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executives will encourage each devolved legislature to bear in mind the responsibility of the 
UK Parliament in these matters”55. The Speaker of the Stormont parliament saw no reason for 
the discussion of matters outside the devolved issues, too. It was argued56 that this ruling was 
unacceptable as resolutions of the devolved legislature on reserved matters “would be 
destitute of legal effect, but of considerable moral significance”. In addition, it was stated that 
“if you give your politician a restricted field he may well lose a sense of proportion”. 
However, devolution is the transfer of distinct not general power and it is based on the 
principle of the continuing general power of the Westminster parliament57. In contrast to 
federalism where a general power relies upon the assemblies, devolution implies that the 
devolved assemblies have only a restricted realm of power. Thus, it is impossible to reproach 
the assemblies with that restriction. A system of devolution, where the assemblies are allowed 
to issue their opinions on matters for which they have no political responsibility may function 
with two or three devolved bodies and in a political situation of friendly terms. However, if 
there is more than a handful of devolved institutions (following future devolution to England) 
and if the devolved assemblies want to challenge the Whitehall government for party reasons, 
it is foreseeable that the tensions may increase considerably. Then, it is not necessary to 
outline the probable cacophony in the United Kingdom. However, it was objected that there is 
paramount importance for the acquisition of as a wide range of views from within the United 
Kingdom as possible58. That was explained with the diction of the philosopher Karl Popper 
who wrote as following: “It is easy to centralise power but impossible to centralise all that 
knowledge which is distributed over many individual minds, and whose centralisation would 
be necessary for the wise yielding of centralised power”59. It is, however, questionable if the 
airing of as wide a range of opinions on any given matter seems to be beneficial rather than 
threatening in the public perception as far as the constitutional structure is a devolved one60. 
Even in federal systems like Germany for example, the federal states, although not prohibited, 
do not discuss reserved matters. Therefore, the issue of debating powers could be best solved 
by the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. Thus, the devolved bodies are to discuss the 
devolved matters, whilst Westminster has a certain degree of choice as the Secretary of States
54 Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, op cit, p 77
55 Memorandum of Understanding, part I, para 15, available at the official Website o f the Assembly: 
http://www.assemblv.wales.gov.uk/works/mouestats e.html
56 Newark, Francis: The Constitution o f Northern Ireland, in: Neill, Desmond: Devolution of Government: The 
Experiment in Northern Ireland. Unwin, London 1953, p 12
57 See above
58 Bogdanor, Vernon: Power and the people. OUP, Oxford 1997, p 22; Hadfield, Brigid: Scotland’s Parliament:
A Northern Ireland perspective on the White Paper, in: Public Law. Sweet & Maxwell, London Winter 1997, p 
668; and in: The nature of devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 28
59 See Bogdanor, Vernon: Power and the People, op cit, p 22
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are to remain at the beginning . In future, the interparliamentary body proposed both at the 
Committee stage of the Scotland Bill and in the British-Irish Agreement might become an 
appropriate institution to debate issues, which are not in the realm of the respective 
institutions.
Whilst the issue of debating powers can thus be resolved, a different group of arguments may 
apply to preclude the scrutiny of devolved matters through the Select Committees at 
Westminster. The Scotland Act attributes to the Scottish parliament the power to send for 
persons, witnesses, papers and records . That power is confined to the scrutiny of devolved 
matters and may be delegated to the appropriate Committees64. This implies that the devolved 
institutions are the appropriate forum to scrutinise such matters. Even if that devolved 
responsibility may only be virtually exclusive65, the overloaded Westminster parliament may 
well concentrate on the non-devolved matters. Westminster is to have an overarching 
responsibility, which might reveal itself in the future by way of the institution of a Select 
Committee on Devolved Affairs as a whole66. This Committee may be in charge of scrutiny 
for general devolution issues, for the work of the JMC (together with the devolved bodies), 
and for the intergovernmental concordats67, for the crucial non-statutory aspects of devolution 
should not be allowed to float free of parliamentary supervision68. There, the Westminster 
Select Committee on Procedure may well play an important role to develop appropriate 
proceedings.
The scheme of devolution, which applies to Wales is different and leaves the Assembly in a 
weaker position compared with Northern Ireland and Scotland. There are a larger number of 
cases where problems may arise. On the one hand, the Westminster Parliament could pass 
primary legislation which applies only to Wales, and which is unacceptable to the majority of 
Welsh MPs, but acceptable to Westminster as a whole. On the other hand, the Assembly may 
tend to influence the primary legislation, which is made at Westminster or may even try to 
promote its own proposals. Whilst the first issue concerns the debating powers, the second
60 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 26
61 Also Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 26
62 See above
63 Sections 23-25, see also Northern Ireland Act 1998, sections 44-45, and in more limited terms Government of 
Wales Act 1998, sections 74-75
64 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 26
65 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 26
66 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 27
67 See below
68 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 27
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issue is dependent on the power to make primary legislation. It is hard to formulate any 
substantial argument for different or larger debating powers of the Assembly. Its task is to 
deal with devolved matters, and as far as Wales is treated inappropriately by Westminster 
legislation, the Welsh MPs may well criticise it there. The ministerial responsibility and the 
legislative power lie at London. However, the difference of the Welsh devolution model 
concerns primary legislation. In the past, there has been very little specifically Welsh primary 
legislation at Westminster69. In the pre-publication stages of legislation affecting Wales, the 
Welsh Office used to be consulted70. The concordats71 arrange, however, only for relations 
between the Executives. Thus, further consultation is limited to the Assembly Secretaries. At 
the beginning of a parliamentary session, at a moment when the legislative proposals come 
into the public domain, the Secretary of State for Wales has the duty to consult the Assembly 
about the government’s proposals, and the Assembly can then make representations about any 
matter affecting Wales72. However, the question is as to whether the Welsh Assembly has 
there an effective role. Generally, Westminster could amend existing legislation so that the 
Assembly does not have any freedom of action in secondary legislation73, and Assembly 
orders could even be repealed74. The entitlement in the Act is not very clear f  either. The
initial consultation of the Assembly is to take place “as soon as reasonably practicable after
the beginning of the session”. Much depend also on the relationship between the two 
Executives75. It is up to the devolved institution to monitor bills and when necessary to 
propose amendments which may be introduced by the Secretary of State or the Welsh MPs76. 
Future Acts could also confer to the Assembly the power to make specific provisions for 
Wales or the Speaker of the House could designate any bill affecting only a devolved Welsh 
function, and such a Bill could be exempt from the procedures under the Parliament Acts, or 
subject to the consent of the Assembly77. However, these devices are not yet developed and it 
depends upon the “generosity” of the Westminster parliament if they will evolve. 
Nevertheless, the Assembly has one way of being heard at Westminster. Section 37 (1) of the 
Government of Wales Act 1998 provides for the promotion and opposition of private bills in 
Parliament. Generally, one might think that the Assembly is the most appropriate place for the
69 Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, op cit, p 75
70 Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, op cit, p 75
71 See further below
72 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 31
73 See above
74 Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, op cit, p 76
75 Patchett, Keith: Dealing with primary legislation, in: The National Assembly Agenda. Institute of Welsh 
Affairs, Cardiff 1999, p 86
76 Patchett, Keith: Dealing with primary legislation, op cit, p 91
77 Silk, Paul: The Assembly as a legislature, op cit, p 77
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regulation of matters of the kind normally dealt with by private legislation as far as only 
Welsh interests are concerned. Such bills are usually promoted outside central government
no
and are handled by special parliamentary procedures . A private bill is, in contrast to a public 
bill, one which affects only an individual or bodies as for example local authorities79.
However, as part of primary legislation, these powers remain principally at Westminster.
Nevertheless, even if that section was added late in the day80, the Act confers the power to the 
Assembly to promote such bills but only as far as two-third of the Assembly have authorised
Q 1
the bill . Such bills are not very likely to arise, as the powers of private bills have become 
less important in recent times. Westminster expects that if primary objectives can be fulfilled 
by other ways than by private bills these other ways are to be followed82. An important part 
for private bills is, however, excluded through section 37 (3) of the Act.
2. Representation in the Commons
Since earliest times, devolution has raised the question of popular “representation” in the 
United Kingdom83. Nowadays this issue is commonly associated with the “West-Lothian- 
Question”84 and refers to the representation of the people from devolved areas at the 
Westminster parliament. The question got its name85 with reference to the constituency of the 
Labour MP Tam Dalyell, who was sitting at Westminster in the 1970s when devolution to 
Scotland was debated for the first time86. The “author” of the West-Lothian question set out 
his argument in some detail in 1977, when he asserted that
“if the United Kingdom is to remain in being, there can be no question but that the
Scottish constituencies must continue to be represented at Westminster. [...] Yet once
the Assembly had come into being, and was legislating for those areas that had not 
been reserved to the United Kingdom government, the position of the seventy-one 
Scottish Westminster MPs would become awkward and invidious. Their credibility -  
like those of their counterparts of the Assembly -  would be deeply suspect, simply
78 Patchett, Keith: Dealing with primary legislation, op cit, p 92
79 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 534
80 House of Commons Debates, Vol 309, cols 594
81 section 37 (2)
82 Patchett, Keith: Dealing with primary legislation, op cit, p 93
83 Concerning Irish Home Rule, see above
84 See above
85 Himsworth, C.; Munro, Colin: Devolution and the Scotland Bill. Green, Edinburgh 1998, p 32: “Its naming 
has been attributed to Enoch Powell“
86 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 227
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because there would be so many areas of concern to their electors on which they could 
not pronounce”87.
Dalyell, however, was not the first to raise that question88. The question asks as to whether it 
is justifiable for Scottish MPs, after devolution, to continue to be able to vote for English 
domestic affairs whilst non-Scottish MPs are no longer able to vote on Scottish domestic 
affairs89. However, each scheme of asymmetrical devolution must raise issues about equal 
parliamentary representation, about fairness90. However, a reasonable approach to that 
question is required because questions of this type of unequal representation are not stressed 
in the same way in other European states, where they exist, too91. To some the issue has been 
seen to be a way of undermining their opponents’ arguments by exposing their inherent 
illogicality and their potential danger for the United Kingdom as a whole92. In return, 
generally to the people on the other side of the argument, the issue seems to be as irrelevant or 
as a serious challenge to their devolution plans93. The “West Lothian” question might be the 
crucial question for the constitutional structure of the United Kingdom. The Kilbrandon 
Commission summarised the problem as follows: “if devolution were to be to selected regions 
only, a problem would arise over the extent and level of representation of those regions in the 
House of Commons compared with that of regions which did not have legislative assemblies 
of their own”94. In essence, this question concerns the over- or under-representation in the 
Westminster Parliament once legislative power is devolved to a regional Parliament95.
The only completely logical answer to the “West-Lothian” question would be the 
implementation of devolution all round. This implies, however, that Britain becomes a federal 
state96. Hence, this solution is quite unlikely to come into being. It was outlined97 that the 
problem with the “West Lothian” question would not be that it has no answer but that none is 
remotely feasible. So, it might not really be a “question” only because “Tam [Dalyell] simply
87 Dalyell, Tom: Devolution -The end of Britain?, op cit, p 245
88 Hadfield, Brigid: The constitution of Northern Ireland, op cit, p 89, “those with short memories called this the 
‘West Lothian Question’”.
89 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 227
90 Hazell, Robert: Westminster, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 121
91 Winetrobe, Barry: The Scotland Bill: Some constitutional and representational aspects. House of Commons, 
Research Paper 98/3 ,7  January 1998, p 16
92 Winetrobe, Barry, op cit, p 16
93 Winetrobe, Barry, op cit, p 16
94 Royal Commission on the Constitution, op cit, paras 810-15
95 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 437
96 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 228; Winetrobe, Barry, op cit, p 31
97 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 109
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waits a while and then asks again”98. As far as the English regions do not have legislative 
powers or even administrative devolution -and this seems to be unlikely at present99- 
devolution remains asymmetrically. In consequence, the representation problem can be 
directed by different ways. First, the MPs representing the devolved region could be excluded 
from being at Westminster. Secondly, it would be possible to reduce the strength of the 
regional representation at Westminster. Thirdly, Westminster could legislate to ensure that the 
regional representatives only have a legislative role in relation to legislation concerning their 
own region, and not in relation to legislation which has purely English dimension, the so 
called „in and out“ approach100.
The exclusion of these devolved parts of the country, in which a devolution scheme of 
legislative powers was established, is difficult to justify101. That solution was already put 
forward by Gladstone in the “Irish Home-rule” debate hundred years before, but it was at that 
time as absurd as today given the premise that Westminster remains responsible for the 
reserved matters. The exclusion of Scottish representation at Westminster would in fact 
require independence for Scotland. That, however, is not provided by the Scotland Act 1998 
and the large majority of the people do not want it. Thus, it would be unjust for Scotland to be
109legislated by Westminster on reserved matters without being represented at Westminster .
As the main issue of the “West Lothian” question is that Members in the Westminster 
Parliament representing seats in areas enjoying devolution are able to vote on English matters, 
the obvious solution would be to divide the matters in devolved and reserved and to prevent 
the Members of the devolved parliaments from voting on devolved i.e. domestic English 
matters at Westminster103. Moreover, it would be possible to divide that non-participation in 
different grades, from being absolutely out of process, including all forms of parliamentary 
business such as questions, motions and debates, or only a non-participation in relevant select 
committees. Thus, a self-denying ordinance104 of Scottish and Welsh MPs could be thinkable, 
but it would be even possible to prevent those MPs only from voting on relevant bills. This 
solution is commonly known as the “in and out” solution, which was already discussed in the
98 Miller, Bill, in: The Scotsman. 23 January 1995
99 See above
100 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, pp 227
101 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 229; Winetrobe, Barry, op cit, pp 24
102 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 108; Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 
229
103 Wintrobe, Barry, op cit, p 24; Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 229
104 Hazell, Robert: Westminster, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 121
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context of Irish “home rule”. In addition, the Ferrers amendment105 in 1978 was an example
of how the solution could be implemented. However, the “in and out” solution raises difficult
problems. Firstly, a crucial question concerns the way in which legislative projects are
classified. Gladstone’s “home rule” proposal included that the Speaker of the House had to
decide as to whether a matter is purely domestic and if the Irish MPs are entitled to vote for it
or not106. Section 66107 of the Scotland Act 1978 provided for a parliamentary procedure to
decide if a second vote must be taken when the bill fell within a domestic matter and only
secured in order to the Scottish vote. Generally, one might be inclined to think that the
classification of legislative proposals in domestic and reserved matters must be possible, but
the “cumbersome procedure which would be unlikely to affect the outcome except when the
House is very closely divided, but would keep on drawing attention to the anomalous position
108of Scottish members. [Thus, the] trouble-making provision... would be better ignored” . 
Apart from the difficulties109 for the Speaker’s position, however, the implication of the 
financial arrangements is to create further problems. Under the Barnett formula110, which is in 
action at present, every increase of expenditure on a domestic English service has effects on 
the block grant and therefore on the total Scottish expenditure111. The Kilbrandon 
Commission stressed this fact by noting that the “ability to vote could not depend simply on 
whether the matter at issue related to reserved or transferred subject. Any issue in 
Westminster involving expenditure ... is of concern to all parts of the United Kingdom since it 
may directly affect the level of taxation and indirectly influence the level of a region’s own 
expenditure”112.
Apart from the general question of the “equality” of representation, often, the interrogation
about two different classes of MPs at Westminster is put forward as an argument against this
idea. When political majorities in Scotland and the United Kingdom were different, as in
1 1-3
1964, the “in and out” solution is likely to paralyse the government . A Labour government 
at Whitehall could easily “lose” its parliamentary majority if the Scottish MPs withdraw. That
105 See above
106 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 230
107 I.e. the Ferrers amendment, see above
108 Smith, Geoffrey: Westminster and the Assembly, in: Mackay, D.: Scotland: the framework of change. 
Edinburgh 1979, p 121
109 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 230
110 See further below
111 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 230
112 Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution, op cit, para 813
113 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 231
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would have grave consequences for the government’s position114. In addition, the equality of 
all MPs was stressed during the debates of the Scotland Act 1978 since “the nature of this 
House is that it is a body corporate. What concerns any part of it concerns us all. We are, in 
the best sense of the word, peers in every respect and sit on the basis of equality of 
responsibility and rights”115. The “in and out” solution would, on the contrary, create a 
situation of MPs of different status and therefore question the basis of equality. However, that 
view has been partly disputed as no parliament since the war has over-ruled a majority of 
English MPs116. So, the main problems of that “solution” remain in being117.
Finally, a reduction of Scottish and Welsh representation is possible. Scotland is hugely over­
represented at the House of Commons118. The average constituency in the United Kingdom is 
at present at 67,261 heads of population whilst the figure of Scotland is at 54,822, in Wales it 
is at 58,476, in Northern Ireland at 68,373 and in England at 69,571119. That over­
representation of Scotland (and Wales) has been defended on the basis of “reasonable 
assurance for minority countries”120. In the same way, the Kilbrandon Commission argued 
that “the maintenance of the representation of Scotland and Wales at their present levels 
would be justified by their national status. England already has a preponderance if 
representation in Parliament compared with the smaller nations. To base representation only 
on the basis of counting heads is to ignore the important nationality factor”121. However, the 
legislation for a Scottish parliament and the National Assembly for Wales make sure that the 
“minority countries” have now a certain degree of autonomy. Thus, the over-representation 
might be decreased. However, even the cutting of the number of Scottish and Welsh MPs 
does not exclude the possibility of a vote for a domestic English bill secured by those MPs,
199but the likelihood of such an event might be lessened .
In relation of Wales, no changes are to likely, as the limited realm of the National Assembly 
for Wales would not justify such measures123. The only statement concerning the role of the 
Welsh MPs was made in the White Paper “A voice for Wales”, where the government puts
114 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 109
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forward that the “Members of Parliament representing Welsh constituencies will have a 
continuing role, but one which will be based upon a new partnership with the Assembly”124. 
The Welsh over-representation, it was argued, may be seen as compensation for the absence 
of legislative devolution125. In view of Scotland, the respective White Paper noted that 
“Scotland’s Members of Parliament will continue to play a full and constructive part in the 
proceedings of the House of Commons. This is right both for Scotland and the United 
Kingdom because devolution is about strengthening the United Kingdom. The Parliamentary 
Boundary Commission will review the distribution of seats in the House of Commons, which 
follow criteria defined in statute. At present, special statutory provisions stipulate a minimum 
number of Scottish seats. The Government have decided that in the next review this 
requirement will no longer apply” . This has been confirmed by the Scotland Act 1998 
that repeals the protected minimum of Scottish MPs. Thus, the Scottish Representation at 
Westminster is likely to decrease in 2005 to around 57 MPs128. However, that reduction is not 
an answer to the “West-Lothian” question; it may be a political response, at least129. The only 
way out of this “insoluble constitutional conundrum” would be greater regionalism in the 
United Kingdom, which requires the devolution of legislative power to regional assemblies130.
If the “West-Lothian” question cannot be completely solved, then the reverse question arises 
whether English issues cannot be discussed otherwise131. It has already been outlined132 that 
the proposal of an English Parliament is not workable. It might be justified to say this was 
intended as a centralist alternative to the devolution of power within England133. Another 
possible way to counterbalance the implication of Scottish MPs especially could be the 
creation of an English Grand Committee134, as it was proposed by the Conservative leader 
William Hague in February 1998. Such a Committee could carry out some of the functions 
attributed to an English Parliament135, but it would be a less drastic measure. The English 
Grand Committee would create a forum for domestic English issues and it would be merely
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composed of English M Ps136. This Committee may demand, however, much more powers
than have been hitherto been ceded to the Welsh and Scottish Grand Committees. There is
already a Standing Committee on Regional Affairs, a kind of English Grand Committee137,
but that Committee has not met since 1978 as it might prove to be a “cumbrous talking- 
1shop” . However, in April 2000 the Labour government sought to revive the Standing 
Committee for Regional Affairs as a forum for discussion of English issues. Obviously, that 
proposal does not meet the proposals for regional assemblies in England -  and it is not a 
solution to the West Lothian Question. The regional standing committee for England could, 
however, balance out the fact that Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland already have their 
own Grand Committees at Westminster. In a recognition that the English regions have been 
“somewhat disadvantaged”, the government envisages that the Regional Committee provides 
for a forum in which MPs could debate matters affecting specific English regions or touching 
on regional affairs generally139.
3. Representation in the Lords
Devolution and constitutional reform were put together when the Labour government started 
its legislative activity. Generally, devolution as a mere transfer of power does not imply that 
the devolved bodies elect the upper House of Parliament or are represented in it. However, 
there are good reasons that it should be so. The function most often proposed for a reformed 
House of Lords -regardless of its powers140 -  could be the representation of the nations (or 
regions) of the United Kingdom. That would realise a quasi-federal structure for the United 
Kingdom141. A powerful argument for such a regionally based Second Chamber is that it 
would encourage the growing development of regional and national identity in providing an 
all-British representation-body142. Hence, the reform of the House would strengthen the 
Union and help to counterbalance the centrifugal forces released by devolution143. Also, it 
would balance the asymmetrical nature of devolution, because all nations would be 
represented in the House of Lords. Moreover, a regionally based House of Lords would give
136 Hazell, Robert: Westminster, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 121
137 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 267
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to the regions a stake at the centre144. This could be expected to prove as an anchor of regions, 
which do not dispose of constitutionally entrenched powers. Different possibilities for its 
composition are thinkable145. The members of the chamber could be directly elected. 
However, direct election has some disadvantages. It would create no difference to the House
1 Af\of Commons and, it would not create a common approach of the regions of their functions 
at the centre147. Indirect election or nomination would give the devolved institutions a direct 
power at the centre. In Germany, the Lander governments are represented in the “second 
chamber”148. This has to do with the co-operative nature of German federalism. However, 
there is nothing that could prevent to provide for a representation of the devolved assemblies 
at the House of Lords.
The government faced this issue by a two-step approach. The first step should be the removal 
of the hereditary peers. The House of Lords Bill 1999 Act provided effectively for the 
removal of the hereditary peers of the House of Lords. This was a popular measure of reform, 
which should set in train a power to entail a general review of the Second Chamber’s role. 
However, some horse-trading was necessary to pass the Bill smoothly through both Houses. 
Different changes were made to the Bill including the remaining of 92 hereditary peers in the 
house149. The public may find it, in fact, difficult to focus only on the composition of the 
House150. The Labour manifesto, however, announced that removing the hereditary peers 
would be “an initial, self-contained reform, not dependent on further reform in the future”151. 
Therefore, doubts were put forward if there would ever be step two152. These doubts were, 
initially, alleviated by the nomination of a Royal Commission on Reform of the House of 
Lords under the chairmanship of Lord Wakeham. This commission published its report153 in 
January 2000 and its recommendations are, however, rather minimalist. Concerning the 
composition of the future House of Lords, the Commission conclude that “we cannot 
recommend a wholly or largely directly elected second chamber; [or] indirect election from 
the devolved institutions (or local government electoral colleges) or from among British
144 Hazell, Robert: The new constitutional settlement, op cit, p 242
145 See: Constitution Unit: Reform of the House of Lords. London 1996 and Reforming the Lords: A step bv step 
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MEPs“154. However, a largely appointed chamber is proposed. The report outlines that “an 
independent appointments system should be supplemented by an arrangement which would 
give the regional electorate a voice in the selection of regional members and that the political 
balance in the reformed second chamber should match that of the country as expressed in 
votes cast at the most recent general election44155. The commission could not find an 
agreement about a single composition model and proposed three options with 65, 87 and 195 
elected of around 550 members. The rest is to be proposed by an independent commission156. 
The small elected part of the House is supposed to represent the nations and regions. These 
members are to serve twelve to fifteen years. The proposals were, obviously, not well 
received by the press157.
Generally, a Second Chamber with hereditary peers being removed and a large part of 
appointed members is not a big progression: it is still an undemocratic and unrepresentative 
chamber158. The House of Lords should be reduced in size and built around the British nations 
and regions. This would considerably add to its role and improve the overall aim of 
devolution for two further reasons159. First, there could also be a counterbalance of different 
population sizes. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland could be given a certain form of over­
representation, whilst their relative strength in the House of Commons is to cease. Thus, their 
distinctive national status could be recognised without any conflict of democratic 
representation principles. Secondly, there is a good reason for giving each English region the 
same representation regardless of their population size. This would well contribute to a 
increasing regionalisation of England160. This “weighting representation” could also improve 
the public perception of the House of Lords. Thus, further reform could complete the 
constitutional context of devolution.
The legislative powers are likely to be settled down quickly. The choice to define only the 
reserved rather than the devolved powers cuts a clear and logical division. Also, the 
precedents from the Stormont time give Westminster a certain experience to deal with 
legislative devolution. The 4West-Lothian” question is likely to be avoided by a certain
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reduction of Scottish and Welsh over-representation. The government may, therefore, well 
prefer to “muddle along” as the concerned MPs are nearly all of the Labour party. It is the 
same with the House of Lords. There is a great chance to establish a regionalist or even 
federalist scheme within the United Kingdom with the House of Lords as the central actor. 
However, the Wakeham report seems to have the support of the government. Hence, a 
“minimalist” reform is to likely. Thus, devolution faces no real problems with reference to 
legislative powers, but this hesitating policy does not boost devolution and regionalism in 
England.
B. Executive powers
It has been argued that devolution presents “the largest, the most significant and the least
certain of the changes” to the machinery of government161. This is true if one looks at the
challenges that are created by devolution. Firstly, the organisation of ministerial offices is to
change as the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are muting their
tasks even if they are likely to remain in the mid-term. Secondly, the unitary civil service has
to adapt with its new role as an exclusive supporter for the government at London, but now
also for the devolved executives at Belfast, Cardiff and Edinburgh and later perhaps in the
English regions. Thirdly, the intergovernmental co-operation within the United Kingdom
creates a challenge for the development of the administrations. The JMC and the conclusion
of concordats most apparently show this. Additionally, the machinery of government faces the 
1consequences of the proportional electoral systems in the devolved areas, what is likely to 
lead to a more frequent change of government as coalitions have to be concluded. There may 
be even other challenges for Whitehall but they are not due to the devolution legislation like 
for example the Freedom of Information Act and the Human Rights Act 1998 .
Consequently, they are not considered here.
1. Whitehall
The famous “West-Lothian” question concerns directly only the representation of MPs of the
160 Russell, Meg: Reforming the House of Lords, op cit, p 254; Osmond, John: Reforming the Lords, op cit, p 25
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devolved areas at the Westminster parliament164. The importance of this question was 
increased when it became likely that general elections could return a Labour government with 
a Scottish Shadow Secretary of State for health, although the party wanted to devolve the 
matter of “health” to a Scottish parliament. The then Shadow Secretary denied the possibility 
for a Scot to become Minister in an area of devolved responsibility. He said, “once we have a 
Scottish parliament handling health affairs, it would not be possible for me to continue as 
Minister of Health, administering health in England”165. Apart from this “national” capacity 
for certain offices, the question is as to whether the devolved areas should enjoy having a 
continuos special treatment at Whitehall166. When Northern Ireland enjoyed “Home Rule” 
from 1921, it did not have its own Secretary of State167. There was a Governor, who had 
certain statutory powers including the power to reserve the royal assent from a bill. This 
was, however, attempted only once when the Northern Ireland parliament envisaged altering 
the system of voting from proportional representation in local government elections to first- 
past-the-post169. The Governor’s position, therefore, lacked real meaning170. Thus, one might 
be asked today, if the offices of the Secretaries of State are to remain after devolution. It is to 
question what functions a remaining Secretary of State in the present devolution scheme may 
have. In the 1978 Devolution Act the post of the Secretary of State was to remain with 
significant powers, although the Kilbrandon Commission agreed on the dropping of that 
office171. Six functions for the Office of the Secretary of State have been identified under the 
then devolution proposal172. First he or she has the function of a Cabinet Minister. Secondly, 
there is the function of a “wet nurse” at the beginning of the parliament or the assembly. 
Thirdly, he or she accomplishes “viceregal” or “continuity” functions inviting someone to 
form a government after the elections. Fourthly, “veto” functions are characteristic for that 
office as it can adjudicate on whether legislation is “ultra vires” and asking for the removal of 
offending sections. Fifthly, the Secretary may be the channel for all communications with 
Europe and finally, he or she has the function of a chief advisor to the Whitehall government 
on all aspects of the respective territory’s affairs. Generally, these functions are to continue173.
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The government’s White Papers on Scotland and Wales, however, were quite clear about the 
further role for these offices. They are not only to secure the passage and implementation of 
the legislation to establish the Scottish parliament and then to support its initial development, 
but also to establish the liaison between Whitehall and the devolved administrations174. The 
White Paper stated that once the Scottish parliament is in being, and the Scottish Executive 
established, the responsibilities of the Secretary of State will change. His focus will then be 
on promoting communication between the Scottish parliament and Executive and between the 
UK Parliament and Government on matters of mutual interest, and on representing Scottish 
interests in reserved areas175. Representatives of the UK government (usually the Secretary of 
State) and the Scottish Executive will meet from time to time, to discuss particular issues or 
simply to take stock of relations. These arrangements will be updated regularly to reflect the 
evolution of administrative conventions of co-operation and joint working”176. And “A voice 
for Wales” outlined177 that ’’Wales’s voice must be felt in cabinet and parliament”. Thus, there 
is “a continuing role for a separate Secretary of State for Wales, with a seat in the cabinet, to 
safeguard Welsh interests”. Therefore, there are current functions of the territorial Secretaries 
of State which are justified, but when devolution is working successfully their roles must be 
transformed. However, these positions could remain for other “non-devolution” reasons as
178political balance, patronage or symbolic aims . More generally, indeed, the territories need a 
continuous voice at Whitehall. This could be achieved in the long-term by replacing the three 
offices by a single minister responsible for the generality of territorial affairs179. Its principal 
business would be the management of intergovernmental relations in broadest terms, what 
was put forward in the MoU as follows: “The UK Government and the devolved 
administrations commit themselves, wherever possible, to conduct business through normal 
administrative channels, either at official or Ministerial level. The Secretaries of State for 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, whose functions include the promotion of good 
relations between the UK Government and the respective devolved administrations, should be 
consulted in any significant case of disagreement”180. For all non-devolved matters, it is 
central government at Whitehall, which represents the United Kingdom interest. This cannot
Wales, op cit, p 80 with slightly different meanings
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only be concluded by the different devolution Acts, but it is also stated in the MoE181. Policy 
responsibility for the non-devolved matters lies with the relevant United Kingdom Ministers 
and departments. Within the government, the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland continue to ensure that the interests of those parts of the UK in non-devolved 
matters are properly represented and considered. In the MoU the devolved administrations 
agreed to provide Whitehall with any factual information and expert opinion available to them 
relevant to such non-devolved matters182.
However, the Secretaries of State will be confronted by different problems. First, the situation 
may arise, where the political majorities in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland differ from 
London. That constellation might be similar to the French “cohabitation ”183. Then, the role 
for the Secretary of State may prove very difficult184. On the one hand, the Secretary is 
constitutionally charged to represent the Scottish interests at the central government and, on 
the other hand, he or she is member of the majority party at Westminster and has to follow the 
discipline of the cabinet. Tensions may therefore arise due to the claims of Scotland about 
drafted legislation on reserved matters or about the implementation of reserved matter 
legislation in Scotland by Whitehall. Especially European matters may put the Secretary in 
difficulties as for example when the French government stated during the French “beef ban” 
at the end of 1999 that it offered to Whitehall to import Scottish beef whilst the newly 
established Scottish parliament has not been informed about that proposal185. Such situations 
are likely to cause disturbances at the Secretary’s office, as it is impossible for him or her to 
fulfil both the will of the Scottish and the British parliament. The Scotland Act 1998 itself
does not give much information about the relationship between Edinburgh and Whitehall,
1 86albeit it gives the Secretary of State express and limited overruling powers . Similar powers 
are provided by the Northern Ireland Act 1998187. Whilst these two devolution schemes 
attribute a more controlling role to the Secretary of State, the Welsh scheme needs a more 
supporting role of this Minister. That special relationship with the Secretary of State is due to 
the fact that the Assembly itself does not have legislative power. Thus, it is up to the 
Secretary of State to advocate for Wales at Westminster and at Whitehall concerning primary
http://www.assemblv.wales.gov.uk/works/mouestats e.html
181 Memorandum of Understanding, op cit, part I, para 21
182 Memorandum of Understanding, op cit, part I, para 21
183 Rawlings, Richard: The new model Wales, in: Journal of Law and Society, op cit, p 488
184 Himsworth/ Munro, op cit, p 35
185 See Bulldog gegen Marianne, in: Die Welt, 17 December 1999
186 Sections 35 and 58
187 Sections 14 and 25
132
legislation. On the one hand, the Act188 sees it as a responsibility of the Secretary of State to
consult the Assembly concerning the legislative proposals of the British government, but only
1 8 0as far as parliamentary legislation is concerned . The Assembly may be able to press for the 
inclusion of a bill in the legislative programme, and the Secretary will probably remain 
entitled to request a place for a legislative proposal in the programme190. On the other hand, 
he might, however, have more information than his colleagues at the Assembly or the Welsh 
MPs. That may create further questions about the freedom of information191, but most of all it 
is likely to create tensions when the Secretary of State takes part at the sessions of the 
Assembly. The Government of Wales Act 1998192 provides for the Secretary of State to attend 
and to participate in any proceedings of the Assembly. This does, indeed, not include the right 
to vote. The Assembly needs complete autonomy from any Whitehall office, although the fact 
that there was a close relationship with the Secretary of State during the first months of the 
Assembly supported the general work of the devolved body193. When the Wales Bill 1998 
was introduced in the Commons, there were some fears that a role combining the office 
Secretary of State and of the First Secretary may give the wrong “message to the Welsh 
people about the position of the Assembly”194. Conversely, the Membership of two different 
persons being the Secretary of State and the First Secretary would be likely to cause troubles 
at the JMC with two different voices for Wales195. However, that situation did not arise until 
recently. Thus, a convention may develop that the Secretary of State is a different person from 
the First Secretary and that only the latter is entitled to take part at the JMC meetings. The 
nature of the intergovernmental relations is of crucial importance as much depends on 
whether the Secretary of State is envisaged as having a defensive or proactive role196,
1 0 7although the Acts do not provide for clear proceedings . These are provided by non statutory 
concordats198. Nevertheless, much is thus left to the vicissitudes of political bonhomie -  or the 
lack of it199. The territories are furthermore represented200 in the Privy Council, which takes 
important decisions although not being part of Whitehall. There the Scottish First Minister,
188 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 31
189 Patchett, Keith: Dealing with primary legislation, in: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 84
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the Welsh and Northern Irish First Secretaries are represented. It could be possible that Privy 
Counsellorships are conferred to the Leader of the Opposition in the devolved Parliaments as 
it is the invariable practice in London201. Thus, the influence of the territories at Whitehall 
machinery would be even stronger.
As already outlined, the nature of the relations between the devolved and central government 
are of crucial importance. The Scottish Office’s Guide to the Scotland Bill stated202 that “for 
the most part, relations will be conducted on the basis of formal, non-statutory understandings 
between departments and so no provision is required or made in the Scotland Bill”. These 
non-statutory “mutual understandings” have been called concordats and in response to a 
written question at the House of Commons, the then Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr 
Donald Dewar, has described their nature as the aim “to ensure that the business of 
government in Scotland and at the UK level is conducted smoothly, by setting the ground 
rules for administrative co-operation and exchange of information. Their purpose is not to 
create legal obligations or restrictions on any party, or to constrain the discretion of the 
Scottish Executive, or Parliament or that of any UK department”203. Additionally, the White 
Paper204 outlined that
“the Scottish Executive will need to keep in close touch with departments of the UK 
government. Good communication will be vital. Departments in both administrations 
will develop mutual understandings covering the appropriate exchange of information, 
advance notification and joint working. The principles will be as follows: the vast 
majority of matters should be capable of being handled routinely among officials of 
the departments in question; if further discussion is needed on any issue, the Cabinet 
Office and its Scottish Executive counterpart will mediate, again at official level; on 
some issues there will need to be discussion between the Scottish Executive and 
Ministers in the UK government”205.
Similar provision was included in the Welsh White Paper.
Questions have however arisen about the organisation of the relationship between Whitehall
201 Brazier, Rodney: The Scottish Parliament, in: Public Law, op cit, p 215
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and the Northern Irish Executive . As the setting up of the Northern Irish Assembly was 
provided by an international treaty i.e. the Good Friday Agreement, which makes no mention 
of concordats, one could ask if the conclusion of such concordats for Northern Ireland is 
possible at all. During the Committee stage of the Northern Ireland Bill implementing the 
Good Friday Agreement, an amendment was made that required to call arrangements under 
clause 2 1 207 “concordats” and to provide for both Parliamentary and Assembly approval of 
the drafts. It was argued, that “there is a suspicion... that concordats were a mechanism for the 
exercise of control over the peripheral parts of the United Kingdom to which devolution was 
to be granted”208. The government replied that “concordats may well be developed in future 
between the Northern Ireland Assembly and the UK parliament, but they will not, as has been 
suggested, be a means of central control. The clause 21 arrangements ... work at an 
operational level, not at a policy level. With a concordat, we would be dealing with policy and 
the development of different policies”209. Later, in the House of Lords’ Committee stage on 
the same bill, the government indicated210 that there would be concordats with regard to 
Northern Ireland as a way of promoting effective communications between, and the joint 
working of the two “governments” (only). Leaving apart the precise difference, generally, it is 
necessary that all legislatures, both Westminster and devolved, to develop close scrutiny 
procedures for such matters of intergovernmental co-operation211.
The government’s “guidance”212 setting out the principles which might govern the concordats 
outlined that all formally agreed concordats should be published in accordance to the grounds 
set out in the White Paper on Freedom of Information213. The general task of the concordats is 
therefore to organise the executive co-operation within the devolved structure of the United 
Kingdom. However, a single framework applying equally to all Whitehall departments would 
not be practicable214. Thus, there was a need to develop a “tailored” structure for contacts and 
exchange between the devolved administrations and their counterpart at Whitehall when the 
concordats were prepared in 1999. The devolved bodies did not have any experience in 
drawing upon such agreements. However, the very fact that the devolved Executives were 
entitled to conclude these agreements on equal level with their Whitehall colleagues must be
206 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 28
207 Now: Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 28
208 Grieve, Dominic, MP, in: House of Commons Debates, Vol 316, col 1331, 23 July 1998
209 Worthington, Tony, MP, in: House of Commons Debates, Vol 316, col 1335, 23 July 1998
210 Lord Dubs, in: House of Lords Debates, Vol 593, col 1292, 19 October 1998
211 Hadfield, Brigid: The nature o f devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, op cit, p 28
212 See Lightman, Ivor: The Assembly and Whitehall, in: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 350
213 White Paper, Your right to know. HMSO, Cmnd. 3818, London, December 1998
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seen as an important event. In October 1999, finally, the concordats where published and 
agreed by the Parliaments and Assemblies framed in a “Memorandum of Understanding 
supplementary agreements44 between the United Kingdom Government, Scottish Ministers
r
and the Cabinet of the National Assembly for Wales . The Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU), supported by a series of supplemental agreements, set out principles for the devolved 
administrations in Scotland and Wales but have been drafted with devolution to Northern 
Ireland in mind. The Memorandum and Concordats refer, where appropriate, to devolved 
institutions in Northern Ireland216.
The MoU is composed of two main parts. In the explanatory note it is outlined that “it is not 
intended that these agreements should be legally binding, but the expression of political 
intent442 1 7. The principal agreement is the MoU (part one) itself. Supplementary agreements 
provide for the establishment of the JMC218 and for four separate overarching Concordats, 
which are intended to apply broadly uniform arrangements across government to the handling 
of European Union matters, to financial assistance to industry, to international relations 
touching on the responsibilities of the devolved administrations, and concerning the statistical 
work in the United Kingdom219. The Explanatory note also proposes that individual 
government departments should enter into bilateral Concordats with their counterparts in 
Scotland and Wales. Some of such bilateral Concordats are already published in by the 
departments concerned. There are concordats with nearly all government departments220. All 
of the concordats refer where appropriate to devolved institutions in Northern Ireland. The 
arrangements as regards Northern Ireland are, however, without prejudice to the position of 
the Northern Ireland Executive Committee to be established in accordance with the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998221. Moreover, nothing in the Memorandum is to be construed as conflicting 
with the Belfast Agreement.
The MoU clarifies anew the general principles of co-operation between the devolved bodies 
and London. However, these principles were already guiding the devolution legislation in
214 Lightman, Ivor: The Assembly and Whitehall, in: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 344
215 Memorandum of Understanding, see: Official Site of the Scottish Parliament, SE/99/36 October 1999 
(http://www.scotland.gov.uk or http://www.assemblv.wales.gov.uk/works/mouestats e.html)
216 See Northern Ireland Office, New Understandings for UK devolution, Information Service, 1 October 1999 
(http ://w w w. nio. go v.uk/991001e-ni o .htm)
217 Memorandum of Understanding, part one, op cit, para 1.2
218 MoU, op cit, para 3
219 Memorandum of Understanding, op cit, Explanatory note
220 See list of 19 concordats between Scottish Ministers, United Kingdom government and the Cabinet o f the 
National Assembly for Wales: http://www.government.scotland.gov.uk/concordats/ e.html
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1998. The concordats are to facilitate the day-to day business of the devolved and central 
administrations, which is nevertheless to adjust through bilateral agreements between the 
different departments. Thus, the MoU sets out that “all [four] administrations are committed 
to the principle of good communication with each other, and especially where one 
administration’s work may have some bearing upon the responsibilities of another 
administration. The primary aim is not to constrain the discretion of any administration but to 
allow administrations to make representations to each other in sufficient time for those 
representations to be fully considered44222. The MoU merits to be analysed more precisely as 
one might argue that the arrangements of the concordats are the only co-operative option of 
the devolution scheme within the British Isle and that all other intergovernmental co­
operation is only dependent of the (Northern) Irish question. This would imply that devolution 
does not attribute much importance to the meaning of the “devolved nations” as the 
concordats stress especially the individual contact between the United Kingdom government 
and the devolved governments. In that relationship, however, the balance of power is 
evidently in favour of the centre and the position of the devolved bodies is weak. The MoU 
could therefore have excluded the issue of the JMC, which has been established by the Good 
Friday Agreement and would theoretically not need further definition of parties like the 
Scottish and Welsh Executives on the one hand, and Whitehall one the other223. Even if that is 
only due to its late start, the administration of Northern Ireland was being left apart in the 
formulation of the MoU. However, the MoU makes special arrangements for the JMC, which 
is in fact a summit of the different governments within the United Kingdom. Thus it 
recognises the constitutional position of the devolved nations, especially of those within the
00  ABritish Isle. Admittedly, the MoU does not create legal obligations , but the settlement of 
the concordats may well establish a convention that the JMC is to continue even if the Irish 
Question is solved one day by an Irish confederation or re-unification.
2. Freedom of Information
A special problem is to be addressed in the context of the new Freedom of Information (FOI) 
legislation in the United Kingdom. The government published in December 1997 a White 
Paper “Your right to know”225, which outlined the proposals for an improved access of the
221 Explanatory note, Memorandum of Understanding, op cit
222 Memorandum of Understanding, op cit, part I, para4
223 See above
224 Memorandum of Understanding, op cit, Part I, 2
225 HMSO, London 1997, Cmnd. 3818
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99  f \citizens to governmental information. The Bill has been published in May 1999 to provide 
for greater access to government information. The provisions of the Bill were, however, 
widely criticised as being too limited: special focus has been put on the exemption provisions
99 9and on the capacity to create new exemptions by ministerial order . The Bill provides for a 
general right of the citizen to be informed by public authorities228. These authorities are 
defined in Schedule 1 of the Bill. Scotland is, of course, not covered by the Bill, as FOI is not 
a reserved matter. Thus, it is up to the Scottish Parliament to legislate for freedom of
99Qinformation at the Parliament’s institutions . The Scottish Executive published for 
consultation in November 1999 its own proposals for a statutory FOI regime which will apply 
to Scottish public authorities230. One of the main features of the Scottish proposals is the 
establishment of an independent Information Commissioner, who will have powers to order 
public authorities to disclose information if it is in the public interest. There 
will also be a statutory duty on public authorities to specify categories of 
information which the authority intends to publish. All public authorities in Scotland who will 
be included by the scope of the proposed legislation will be subject to the same FOI regime.
The position for the Assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland is slightly different. While 
they will be bound by the terms of the new Bill231, there is nothing in it to prevent them from 
being more open if they want to do so. Indeed, the Government of Wales Act232, for example, 
requires the Assembly to act openly and to make information available to the public except in 
specified circumstances. Accordingly, the new First Secretary of the Assembly, Rhodri 
Morgan, made a statement to the Assembly in March 2000 setting out proposals for even 
greater openness in Wales233. While it is possible that the Assembly publishes more 
information than the UK Government, the First Secretary has made clear that only applies to 
information generated by the Assembly.
However, the practice may prove as to whether problems between discretion at Whitehall and 
Westminster prevents the devolved bodies to “open” information to the public. One
226 See: Freedom of Information Bill 1999 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pabills.htm)
227 Hazell, Robert (et al.): The British Constitution 1998-99, in: Parliamentary Affairs, op cit, p 257
228 See e.g. Craig, Paul: Administrative Law, op cit, pp 220
229 Freedom of Information Bill 1999, clause 29
230 An Open Scotland, Freedom of Information, A Consultation, see 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/librarv2/doc07/opsc-00.htm
231 Freedom of Information Bill 1999, clause 34, also Schedule 1 (Wales), and clauses 3 (8), Schedule 1 
(Northern Ireland)
232 Government of Wales Act 1998, section 70
233 See http://www.wales.gov.uk/newsite.dbs7380313AC00046B17000028C300000000-i-current
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II
! meaningful example was the French ban of British beef at the end of 1999 (“beef-ban”). In
December 1999, it has been revealed by the French government that it had offered to import 
Scottish beef, but not British beef234. The Scottish Parliament, however, has not been 
informed about that proposal. The problem might be, however, that either the Scottish First 
Secretary has not been informed or that he did not communicate his information to the 
Parliament. Next time, the MSPs may be inclined to ask for “all” information. Clause 26 of 
the Westminster Bill proposes that information is exempt information if its disclosure under 
the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice, relations between any administration in the 
United Kingdom and any other such administration235. Administration in the United Kingdom 
includes here the Whitehall government, the Scottish Administration, the Executive 
Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the National Assembly for Wales. The duty 
to information (“confirm or deny“) does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with 
these purposes would, or would be likely to, prejudice any of the matters mentioned . Also, 
under clause 33, information held by a government department is exempt information if it 
relates to the formulation or development of government policy or ministerial 
communications. Then, there is no duty to inform (“confirm or deny”) in relation to 
information , whilst “government department” includes the National Assembly for Wales 
and the Law Officers, and “Ministerial communications” means any communications between 
Ministers of the Crown, Northern Ireland Ministers or Northern Ireland junior Ministers and 
includes, in particular, proceedings of the Cabinet or of any committee of the Cabinet and
O O Q
proceedings of the Executive Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly . All this 
implies, indeed, that the devolution may well challenge the forthcoming Freedom of 
Information Act, as the devolved bodies might be inclined to adopt in their Standing Orders a 
greater openness than the Act. Then, however, Ministers or Secretaries may be in trouble 
especially if the nature of the concerned information is difficult to define. On the one hand, 
they are bound by the Freedom of Information Act and, on the other hand, the Standing Order 
allow for the publication. The Assemblies might be tempted to use that information for their 
own purposes. At the time being, the Act is not yet made and the amendments to the Standing 
Orders are not tabled in this concern. However, the Executive Committee of the National 
Assembly in Wales publishes its records in the meanwhile239. Thus, temptations and problems
234 See Bulldog gegen Marianne, in: Die Welt, 17 December 1999
235 Clause 26 (1)
236 Clause 26 (3)
237 Clause 33 (2)
238 Clause 33 (3)
239 See Western Mail. 27/04/00
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for the administrations in Edinburgh or Cardiff are well foreseeable.
3. The Civil Service
For the impact of devolution on the Civil Service, a review of the first experience of 
devolution may illuminate some problems. When Northern Ireland gained its own Assembly, 
a separate Northern Irish Civil Service was also established240. Thus, two Civil Services were 
active in Northern Ireland, one for the devolved functions and, another for the reserved 
(“imperial”) functions such as Revenue, Customs and Defence with definitely different 
responsibilities241. Then, however, the definition of a civil servant as “a servant of the Crown, 
other than holders of political or judicial offices, who is employed in a civil capacity and 
whose remuneration is paid... by parliament”242 is to be changed, because he or she can serve 
the Crown or a devolved body. This division implied that the staff of the respective service 
had different loyalties. This system was expected to be questioned by the Kilbrandon 
Commission. However, the Commission advocated in favour of the extension of two different 
Civil Services to Scotland and Wales for devolved affairs. It argued that elected governments 
are “not comparable to departments of the same government; the former have their own 
power bases while the latter do not. We think that regional governments would wish to be 
responsible themselves for the selection of their senior officials and would not be prepared to 
accept that personnel matters should be handled by a department of the central 
government”243.
Nevertheless, the Devolution Acts in 1978 did not provide for a separate Civil Service in 
Scotland and Wales244, as they would be more expensive reproducing functions at Edinburgh 
and Cardiff which exist already at Whitehall. Moreover, it could not be assumed that all civil 
servants of the Scottish or Welsh Office would transfer into a devolved Civil Service. The 
problem of “divided loyalty”, however, would according to the then government not have 
caused major problems to the Service as they were used to give “wholehearted service to 
whichever Ministers are in charge of their departments”245. The maintenance of a unified 
Civil Service would allow the Scottish Executive “to draw its officials more easily from a 
wide pool of talent and experience” and foster the co-operative relationship with other
240 Constitution Unit: An Assembly for Wales, op cit, p 86
241 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 114
242 Report on the Royal Commission on the Civil Service, 1929-31, Cmnd. 3909, HMSO, London
243 Royal Commission on the Constitution, Cmnd. 5460-1, op cit, para 807
244 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 115
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Ministries, which have implemented devolution246. Whatever a future Scottish government 
might have concluded, the then Whitehall government thought that it would take “some 
years” to establish a new service247.
That was the departing situation which framed the Civil Service question in the context of a 
new devolution scheme. When the new Labour government came to power in 1997, there 
were practical arguments strong enough for the maintain of a unified service248. It seemed to 
be reasonable to establish the devolved bodies with an experienced civil service. Moreover, 
the recruitment of a new Service would have been necessary before the Scottish Parliament 
and the Welsh Assembly were to be created. Thus, every decision would have been 
provisional subject to later parliamentary or assembly decisions about the precise terms of 
employment249. In the meanwhile, new challenges have been put on the Civil Service. 
Different changes following the White Paper “The Civil Service: Continuity and Change”250, 
including a new Civil Service Code251, have created a “potentially more encouraging 
framework” for a unified Civil Service252. The Welsh White Paper253 stated that the staff of 
the Assembly will be members of the Home Civil Service and Section 34 of the Act repeated 
this fact is terms of status, pay and management. Similarly, the Scottish White Paper stated254 
that “as the Executive powers will broadly include all areas of policy currently within the 
remit of the Scottish Office, its staff will be drawn largely from the existing staff of the 
Scottish Office and its Agencies. All officials of the Executive will hold office under the 
Crown on terms and conditions of service which will be determined in accordance with the 
provisions of the Civil Service Management Code -  thereby remaining members of the Home 
Civil Service”. Thus, “these arrangements will give the Scottish Executive the support of a 
tried and tested civil service machine, and access to wide pool of talent and experience”255. 
The Scotland Act 1998 itself repeats that standpoint and the guidance issued to civil 
servants outlined257 that “constitutionally, the position of the Civil Service will be unchanged
245 Cited in: Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 115
246 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 115; see also White Paper, Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 
32
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248 Hazell/ Morris: Machinery o f Government: Whitehall, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 138
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by devolution”. That implies that the “ultimate loyalty” of the British Civil Service remains to 
the Crown, but in practice, the loyalty of individual civil servants is “to whichever 
administration they are serving” . That expression has been interpreted as “obviously 
reassuring”259. To take Scotland as an example, most civil servants in Scotland are not in the 
Scottish Office, but in administrative units which are not part of the devolved bodies. The 
Ministry of Defence and the Department of Social Security have the most important part of 
the 30.000 servants of non-devolved services . And even within the devolved administration 
the majority of the staff works in civil service agencies with their own more autonomous 
structure . Generally, the principle of a United Kingdom-wide Service applies and the only 
difference might be that the Scottish administration continues to be drawn upon “fast-stream 
recruitement” procedures for its future heads262. However, the decisions for the Scottish 
administration follow the Civil Service Management Code and therefore do not all need the 
approval by Whitehall. The Civil Service in Scotland does not include the staff of the Scottish 
Parliament. The corporate body of the Parliament has its separate organisation263. Thus, 
unlike Wales, conflicts are not likely.
On the government’s side, there is a wish to preserve a common basis of employment and 
professional behaviour. However, one might be inclined to question as to whether such 
guidance is a proof against new developing loyalties and alternative centres of power. One 
might question how the office holders at Edinburgh or Cardiff will view themselves in 
relation to their counterparts in Whitehall264. Apart from that, it has been argued that even if 
the governments in Edinburgh or Cardiff and Whitehall are of the same party, it cannot be 
assumed that there is automatically a common approach to questions265. Thus, it is likely that 
the unified Civil Service will encounter problems which are able to cause tensions and 
pressure from the devolved administrations for their own service, like it is the case in
0(\f\Northern Ireland . It is not difficult to imagine that scandals may be taken as an opportunity 
for the Welsh or Scottish Executives to claim an individual module of Civil Service including
258 Welsh Office guidance, para 14, February 1998 cited in Lightman, Ivor: The Assembly and Whitehall, in: The 
National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 342
259 Hazell/ Morris: Machinery o f Government: Whitehall, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 138
260 Parry, Richard: The Scottish Civil Service, in: Hassan, Gerry: A guide to the Scottish Parliament, op cit, p 66
261 Parry, Richard: The Scottish Civil Service, op cit, p 65
262 Parry, Richard: The Scottish Civil Service, op cit, p 65
263 Scotland Act 1998, Section 21
264 Lightman, Ivor: The Assembly and Whitehall, in: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 343
265 Hazell/ Morris: Machinery o f Government: Whitehall, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 138 
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the control of the recruitment and career development of their own officials. Even without any 
spectacular event, the fact that the Welsh or Scottish Civil Services have their professional 
head at the Cabinet Secretary in London , may create the “inevitable desire of elected 
Assembly members to be masters in their own house” . Therefore, conflicting loyalties can 
be expected to become increasingly real as time passes. Thus, the issue of the devolved but 
unified civil service is not yet settled . It might be an advantage for the civil servants 
themselves as their mobility and careers are not restricted. Those who are politically 
responsible in Cardiff and Edinburgh, however, might tend to see therein a problem of owed 
loyalty. This has been shown by the standing out of the main senior officials at the Scottish 
Office. Their retreat was based on the thought that they presage a new breed of more visible 
public officials in Scotland at a time when the new Civil Service searches a balance between 
the traditions and practices it has inherited and the novel political context it will face270. The 
challenges of the Civil Service will appear at a moment when the devolved bodies will have 
“settled down” and will claim different political working practices within and outside the 
devolved Parliament/ assemblies.
Devolution is likely to create problems at Whitehall and at the administration of central 
government. The different loyalties and the distinct responsibilities have not been sufficiently 
considered when the legislation has passed. In part, the issue is due to the asymmetrical nature 
of the current devolution module. Whilst Scotland (and Northern Ireland later) should 
theoretically not need their own Secretary of State, Wales is in some way dependent on this 
position having no primary legislative powers. Additionally, all forms of cohabitation lead 
normally at least to a certain stagnation of government, as the French example shows. 
Ironically, the argument of a political deadlock has been put forward against federalism271. 
With devolution, it may be now more likely to happen in a situation where the political parties 
in Edinburgh and Westminster differ. Lastly, the unified civil service does, in the foreground, 
not really create problems, as almost all departments can independently choose their servants 
at the lower and middle level. However, the senior figures continue to be chosen by central 
government. This is likely to create, in theory at least, tensions between the governmental
267 Hazell/ Morris: Machinery o f Government: Whitehall, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 138
268 Lightman, Ivor: The Assembly and Whitehall, in: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 343
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272responsibility . Administrative competences are thus a neglected issue in the devolution 
framework.
C. The Fiscal constitution
One decisive feature of a federal system would be a certain degree of financial autonomy for 
the various parts of the state273. Thus, the financial settlement of devolution also exerts a 
dominant influence on whether the purposes of devolution are supported or “frustrated”274. 
Financial devolution may well be the “heart of the problem”275. There are two main 
precedents of how the financial responsibility can be organised in the United Kingdom. First, 
the Northern Ireland module between 1921 and 1972 and later the proposals for the 1978 
devolution scheme.
1. Regional integration in the budget
Devolution conferred to Northern Ireland no autonomy in financial matters. Initially, the 
module framed in the 1920 Act should provide for an autonomous fiscal unit as the province
27 f%should have its own revenue which was to be used for the “transferred services” . Northern 
Ireland’s taxing power was divided between reserved and transferred taxes, but Stormont was 
not supposed to be able to pay the whole of the transferred services by transferred taxation277. 
The province should not enjoy financial autonomy at the expense of the centre, albeit the 
British government had pledged to treat Ireland with generosity278. Therefore, on the one 
hand, Northern Ireland had to pay an “Imperial Contribution”, which was to be determined by 
a Joint Exchequer Board with members of the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance in 
Belfast279. Since tax relief could not be given at the expense of that imperial contribution, 
Stormont never used its power to offer tax rebates which would have meant cuts in public 
services280. On the other hand, financial devolution did not include major taxes. As the 1920
272 See Welsh Case above
273 Maunz, Theodor; Zippelius, Reinhold: Staatsrecht. op cit, p 119
274 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 235; also Tomkins, Adam: Devolution: A constitutional 
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275 Lawrence, R.J.: Devolution reconsidered, in: Political Studies, Vol 4, Clarendon, Oxford 1956, p 3
276 Lawrence, R.J.: The government of Northern Ireland. Clarendon. Oxford 1965, p 40
277 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 81
278 Lawrence, R.J.: The government of Northern Ireland, op cit, p 41
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Act was initially conceived for both parts of the Isle281, Ireland had only the tax raising power 
for minor taxes like the motor-vehicle licensing tax, entertainment and stamp duties. These
0 9 0taxes constituted only approximately 20 per cent of the total revenue in the province. 
Therefore, it was treated as a separate fiscal unit concerning its expenditure, but as a part of 
the United Kingdom concerning the taxation283. Northern Ireland’s income was based on 
attributions of revenues, which were decided at Westminster -there was no financial 
devolution in practice. The financial arrangements were unsuitable from the beginning, 
although the estimates in 1920 showed a surplus of £2.25m284. The revenue fell by 1925 to 
little more than a half, but the British government was unwilling to allow domestic 
expenditure to eat up the imperial contribution285. In 1923, a Northern Ireland Special 
Arbitration Committee was set up under the Chairmanship of Lord Colwyn. The Colwyn 
Committee argued that the initial arrangements were to be changed fundamentally as the 
connection should be between the per capita spending on services in the province and the per 
capita expenditure on services in the residual part of the United Kingdom, but not between the
0 9 f iNorthern Irish revenue and its expenditure . Thus, the Imperial Contribution became not a 
first charge on the Northern Irish budget, but a residual reduction thereby guaranteeing that 
the services in Ulster would be improved in the same way as in the rest of the United 
Kingdom given the premise that the transferred taxation was equal to the taxation in Britain. 
This implied obviously that Northern Ireland’s budget became increasingly dependent upon 
the British government287. However, being based on different needs, that formula did not 
imply an equal standard of services in Northern Ireland and the rest of the country288. There 
remains a certain uncertainty, as the Joint Exchequer Board has never published any reports 
and it is apparently taken for granted that the public did not have the right to know in detail, 
how the province was financed289.
This model of financial support led the British government in 1938 to the establishment of the 
“principle of parity”290 between Belfast and London, which eliminated finally any financial
281 Green, Arthur J.: Devolution and Public Finance: Stormont from 1921 to 1972, in: Studies in Public Policy. 
No. 48, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow 1979, p 1; see also above
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I| autonomy as it was based on the idea that if “a deficit on the Northern Ireland Budget, which
was not the result of a standard of social expenditure higher than that of Great Britain nor the 
result of a standard of taxation lower than that of Great Britain”, central government would 
“make good this deficit in such a way as to ensure that Northern Ireland should be in a 
financial position to continue to enjoy the same social services and have the same standards as 
Britain”291. Additional expenditure of central government was finally necessary after the 
introduction of the “concept of leeway”292 of the then Chancellor, Sir Kingsley Wood, stating 
that “in certain spheres Northern Ireland has considerable leeway to make up in order to attain 
equality of standard with the United Kingdom, and [Northern Ireland’s government] can 
confidently rely on the Treasury always considering such a case sympathetically, as indeed 
the principle of parity requires... to do.“293 At the end of alterations, the Northern Irish 
finances were determined by its needs and the Whitehall government had to spend more for 
Northern Ireland than foreseen294. Nevertheless, the Stormont government developed in some 
areas of devolved matters its own module of policy: In the realm of agricultural and industrial 
development and of regional planning the advantages of transferred responsibility were 
manifest. The regional autonomy of Belfast was additionally attributed with a better economic 
performance than the other regions of the United Kingdom, which were confronted with the
<2QC
same problems at the same time . On the contrary, there were areas of devolution, which 
made less sense as, for example, health and social security . The main problem was that the 
Ulster government was not accountable for its decision to its electorate, but to the Treasury in 
London. Northern Irelands budget was decided in private negotiation between the two 
governments. Therefore, it has been written that the government at Stormont was “both 
compelled and entitled to look to Britain for help in future budgetary difficulties”297. At last, 
such arrangements proved to be neither efficient nor democratic298.
The devolution schedule proposed under the 1978 Act envisaged that the devolved 
Assemblies should not enjoy substantial tax-raising powers299. The major funding was to be
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provided by a block grant, which was to be annually negotiated between Whitehall and the 
devolved governments. However, that grant should be subject to an annual vote in the House 
of Commons and thus lie emptily at the government’s discretion. The proposition of an 
annual block fund constituted an improvement for the Secretaries of State for Wales and 
Scotland, as they were not longer obliged to press their case in cabinet as before. The service- 
by-service determination of public expenditure ensured an easier position for the devolved 
institutions in this sense, because each service was provided with the respective funds 
referring to the formula of the block300. In the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs301, the 
Scottish Office told in 1980 that “it was calculated that the arrangement was advantageous 
because public expenditure control was getting tighter and more complex and that the days of 
table-thumping were ceasing to have their effect. This was the consideration that was borne in 
mind in accepting this arrangement”. Apart from this, the then White Paper “Our Changing 
Democracy” proposed , on the one hand, that the devolved Assemblies should be able to 
secure extra finance by imposing a surcharge on local authority rates. That purpose was, 
however, abandoned less later as it was foreseeable that it would create immense tensions 
between the devolved administrations and local government . On the other hand, the White 
Paper made clear that the government was not intended to follow the proposals of the 
Kilbrandon Commission, which had recommended that the amount of the block grant should 
be determined by an independent Joint Exchequer Board as it was the case in Northern 
Ireland304. The White Paper replied that “no neat formula could be devised to produce fair 
shares for Scotland (and for England, Wales, and Northern Ireland) in varying circumstances 
form year to year. The task involves judgments of great complexity and political 
sensitivity”305. Also, it rejected the idea that the Scottish Assembly could be funded from the 
gains of the North Sea Oil at the Scottish off-shore, an idea often put forward by the Scottish 
Nationalists306. The White Paper told “that the oil must be treated in the same way as other 
natural resources and the benefits brought into the national pool for distribution in accordance 
with relative needs. Any other course could destroy not only economic unity but also political 
unity”307. However, that approach was similar to the Northern Irish experience as the new
300 See further below
301 Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Minutes o f Evidence, in: House of Commons Debates, Vol 689, Qu 50, 
7 July 1980
302 White Paper, Our Changing Democracy. HMSO, London 1978, paras 95
303 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution, op cit, p 197; see further below
304 Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), op cit; see also above
305 White Paper, Our Changing Democracy, op cit, para 100
306 See above
307 White Paper, Our Changing Democracy, op cit, para 97
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bodies should enjoy wide political powers, but should be unable to raise their own revenue308. 
That criticism was replied by the then Prime Minister, James Callaghen, by the following: 
“We are not against it [i.e. revenue- raising powers] in principle. We have simply not yet 
found a scheme which would be satisfactory”309. However, the Scottish Executive should be 
able to borrow up to £75m to cover short term problems in managing its finances310. In the 
aftermath of the critics concerning the tax-raising powers, the government published another 
White Paper called “Devolution: Financing the Devolved Services”311, where it put forward 
the idea that the block grant could be based on a non-statutory formula relating to the total of 
devolved public expenditure in Scotland or Wales to comparable expenditure elsewhere in the 
country on the basis of relative need. That formula should reduce the range of conflict 
between Whitehall and the devolved administrations, but it did not introduce any revenue- 
raising powers for the latter. However, this project was shelved after the referendums in 1979. 
What survived was the formula of the annual block, called after the then Chief Secretary of 
the Treasury, Joel Barnett312. In 1976, the Treasury was asked to undertake a “needs 
assessment study” to calculate the relative amounts of expenditure per capita required to 
provide the same range and levels of service in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and,
“3 i  "5
England . The study assessed relative levels of spending need for England (100), for 
Scotland (116), for Wales (109) and, for Northern Ireland (131)314. Generally, the study 
concluded that if the devolved services should provide the same range and levels of service as 
in England, a higher expenditure would be necessary for them. However, in 1976-77 the share 
of spending was already higher outside England, as Wales had a spending of 106 compared 
with England at 100. In Scotland (122) and in Northern Ireland at 135 the spending was even 
higher than the study assessed. Consequently, the “Bamett-formula” allocated increases or 
decreases in public expenditure to Scotland, Wales and England in the ratio of 10:5:85, 
which corresponds to the rounded share of the United Kingdoms population in 1976. For 
every marginal £85 on comparable expenditure on English services equivalent to those in the 
Scottish and Welsh block, the Scottish block automatically received £10, the Welsh block 
£5315. That system was enlarged to Northern Ireland, which received £2.75 extra on an
308 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution, op cit, p 198
309 James Callaghen, in: House of Commons Debates, Vol 922, col 990, 13 December 1976
310 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 80
311 HMSO, Cmnd. 6890, July 1977, para 76
312 For the Bamett-forumula see basically: Heald, David: Territorial public expenditure in the United Kingdom, 
in: Public Administration. Vol 72, London 1994, pp 147
313 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 65
314 See for more details, Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 65 (e.g. table 3); or House of 
Commons Research Paper 98/8, The Barnett formula. January 1998
315 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 243
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increase of £100 in England. The then government expected that over time these incremental
01/ '
changes could bring about a gradual convergence of country-wide spending .
In the aftermath of the 1978 calculations, however, the whole system of public finance has 
become more and more divorced from the allocation of functions to the public authorities317. 
The progressive weakening of the local authorities under the Thatcher-era limited their tax- 
bases considerably. Currently, local authorities raise only around 20 per cent of their revenue
010
locally . However, even the Kilbrandon Commission advocated in 1973 a more 
decentralised financial system stating that the present “degree of financial dependence on the 
centre is generally considered unhealthy”319. Bogdanor320 identifies two main factors being 
responsible for the increasing drift to the centre. A first point to be made is that public 
expenditure in Britain is generally allocated to relative need and not to geography or 
population. That implies that any transfer of taxing power leads easily to a benefit of the 
richer parts of the country at the expense of the poorer parts. However, devolution in the 
United Kingdom has been made in favour of Scotland and Wales, which are not the 
whealthier parts of the country generally spoken. That is with difference to federal states like 
Germany or Spain, where the wealthier parts of the state are looking for more financial 
autonomy . In Britain, the view is taken that only central government is able to allocate 
public finance on the basis of need both on the left and on the right part of the political 
spectrum322. A second point is that there are different approaches between central and local or 
devolved authorities concerning the spending of revenues, although that issue exists in all 
regionalised or federalised states. Central government is generally responsible for the 
economic stability whilst local or regional government want to finance their expenditure 
plans. Therefore, there is a fear that the dispersal of tax raising powers makes economic 
management more difficult or even impossible323. Thus, there was a general trend against tax- 
raising powers for the future devolved bodies. Nevertheless, one of the most distinctive 
proposals of the Scottish Constitutional Convention was that the Scottish Parliament should 
have a certain power to vary levels of income tax in Scotland324.
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2. Financial devolution in 1997
The SCCs proposal for tax varying powers of the Scottish Parliament was followed by the 
White Paper325 and the Scotland Act 1998326. The Scottish Parliament has therefore the power 
to vary the basic rate of income tax by 3p in the pound. That was the maximum even for the 
Liberals within the SCC because there was the fear that opponents of devolution could attack
^77it as a new “tartan tax” . Though the tax-varying power has been put forward as a common 
feature of the Scottish devolution model , that power is in the present economic climate 
likely to remain symbolic rather than practical. The media’s focus on taxation, in fact, 
diverted attention from real weaknesses in the financial aspects of devolution, which are 
crucial for the whole project329. Since each lp  change made by the Scottish Parliament would 
currently increase or decrease by around £150m330, the volume to levy or reduce income tax 
for basic rate taxpayers in Scotland lies at around £450m331. Compared with the total of the 
Scottish Office budget of £14.6bn the power is in fact minimal332. It would therefore not yield 
very much. Moreover, the collection of higher taxes in Scotland would generate additional 
costs for employers who are maintaining PAYE. Setting up costs are estimated at £50m and 
the running costs at around £6- £15m333. Thus, the hurdles for the effective use of that power 
are quite limited. Furthermore, this tax would be collected by the central government. Apart 
from this, the power is most likely only to be used to raise taxes334. As the resources available 
to the Scottish Parliament are to be adjusted upwards and downwards by the appropriate 
amount335, the cut of taxes would be followed by a cut of the expenditure on public services in 
Scotland. Thus, the raise seems little financial gain to set against the political pain as raising 
tax is electorally very unpopular nowadays336. The Scottish Parliament will, however, depend 
completely on central government for its financing as the Labour government pledged not to
325 Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, para 7.11
326 Section 73
327 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 239
328 Heald, David; Geaughan, Neal: Financing a Scottish Parliament, in: Tindale, Stephen (ed.): The State and the 
Nations. Institute for Public policy research, London 1996, p 167
329 Hopkins, John: Devolution from a comparative perspective, in: European Public Law. Vol 4 (3), Kluwer 
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January 1998, p 17
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use the power during the first term of office337. In addition, the leader of the Conservative 
party in Scotland has promised338 not to use the tax-varying powers, too. Thus, Scotland is to 
be in the same situation as the National Assembly for Wales and the Assembly of Northern 
Ireland, which do not have such powers according to the respective legislation. The future of 
any tax-varying power for the devolved institutions is therefore unpredictable. On the one 
hand, one might have been able to presume that a success of those powers could lead to the 
introduction of more fiscal freedom for all devolved administrations. On the other hand, the 
longer the powers are not used in Scotland the more likely they will be never used. Therefore, 
it has been hinted339 that there might be events which upset these analysis such as for example 
a “national disaster” in Scotland. However, such speculations are not very “real”. 
Consequently, the United Kingdom is very likely to remain a financially centralised state.
In Scotland and Wales, however, a large part of the grant is directed to local government 
expenditure. Support for local authority current expenditure remains within the new block, 
and capital allocations to councils, too340. Almost 40 per cent of Scotland’s annual block of 
£14.6bn, that is £5.2bn, is meant for local government expenditure341. The Scottish Parliament 
is able to decide whether to distribute the whole amount or to retain a certain part. It is the 
same for the Welsh administration in Cardiff, which takes over the distribution of the block 
grant. In Wales, local government is dependent upon that funds for 85 per cent of its 
income342. £2.7bn of the annual block grant for Wales, which is at £7.4bn, goes to local 
authorities343. It is different in Northern Ireland due to the fact that the Assembly has lesser 
responsibilities over local authorities344. Thus, Scottish and Welsh local authorities depend 
largely upon the devolved institutions and seek funds at Edinburgh and Cardiff. However, the 
devolved administration may find its budget small enough to squeeze the revenue “support” 
grant to local government, even if the capacity to do so is limited. For it was given evidence 
in the Lords that the proportion of local authority expenditure funded by the council tax could 
rise from 20 to at least about 25 per cent345. Nevertheless, this blurred competence of the 
devolved bodies to raise revenue is more considerable than the power of the Scottish
337 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK, op cit, p 240
338 David McLetchie, in: The Daily Telegraph, 17 September 1998
339 Hazell/Cornes: Financing devolution, op cit, p 208
340 White Paper, Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, para 7.23
341 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 239
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Parliament to raise income taxes by 3p in the pound346. The volume of that revenue does not 
affect additional costs and is higher and politically more effective than a “special charge” in 
Scotland. That contradiction is a considerable source of conflict between both levels of
047
government . Especially in Wales, the danger may be the biggest, because the Assembly 
does not have any source of revenue under its own control.
Local government was, however, already in a difficult situation before devolution. The 
introduction of the unitary authorities in Scotland in 1994 and the introduction of the poll tax 
were the challenges for the Scottish local government348. In Wales, there has been a continual 
interference by central government. This concerns not only the funding of local government, 
but also the powers, functions and structures together with a significant centralisation of 
power349. The relationship between upper tiers of government and local government has been 
marked by the lack of partnership. Thus, the ultimate financial power of the devolved bodies 
was seen as a threat to local government. Therefore, it has been proposed to take into account 
the important function of local government. The SCC effectively recommended a 
constitutional entrenchment of local government by way of insertion in the devolution 
legislation and the guarantee of subsidiarity350. Moreover, a concordat between local
government and the devolved bodies has been proposed, which could enshrine the general
«1
principles for the conduct of the relationship . In Wales, co-operation between the Assembly 
Committees and local government has emerged in the Partnership Council352. In Scotland, a 
Commission on local government and the Scottish Parliament has been established353. The 
financial relationship between the devolved bodies and local government is difficult354 as it 
appears in the legislation with an attitude of supremacy355. Thus, funding and financial control 
are the indicators of successful co-operation between local government and the devolved 
institutions.
An excessively increase in local government expenditure due to the withdrawal of a part of
346 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 240
347 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 240
348 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 122
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152
the grant by the devolved bodies, however, would cause a reaction at the centre. This 
possibility is mentioned in the Scottish but not in the Welsh White Paper. As “local 
government” is not a reserved matter, the responsibility for the control of local authority 
spending lies within the Scottish Parliament . Whitehall expects the Scottish Parliament to 
exercise this control strictly, for “if growth [of local government expenditure caused by the 
reduction of the block grant support] relative to England were excessive and were such as to 
threaten targets set for public expenditure as part of the management of the UK economy 
[being a reserved matter], and the Scottish Parliament nevertheless chose not to exercise its 
powers, it would be open to the UK government to take the excess into account in considering 
the level of their support for expenditure in Scotland”357. As to whether that mechanism is 
capable to secure sufficient funding for the local authorities remains to be seen.
The White Papers for Scotland and Wales stated that “the government have therefore 
concluded that the financial framework for the Scottish Parliament should be based on the[se] 
existing arrangements with, in future, the Scottish Parliament determining Scottish spending 
priorities”358. These existing arrangements have been made 20 years ago and they were, at 
that time, advantageous for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland359. Then, the government 
intended to converge the spending in the whole country by way of a temporary higher 
spending in these areas360. Enquiries to the “Bamett-formula” discovered, however, that in 
1997 expenditure in Scotland was 19 per cent, that in Wales 12 per cent higher than in 
average of the United Kingdom361. A convergence between Scotland, Wales and England 
following the “Bamett-formula” was dependent upon two factors : The first factor depends 
on the population relativity within the United Kingdom. The second factor was less clear as it 
relied completely on the growth of public expenditure in England. In fact, the faster the rise of 
spending in England, the higher the absolute surplus in the other areas and, thus, the faster the 
convergence363. However, the aim of convergence has not been realised. Scotland’s 
population has fallen absolutely and relatively to England364. In addition, the policy of slight 
budgets under the Thatcher era ensured that the cumulative effects of the formula was
356 White Paper, Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, para 7.23
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limited . Nevertheless, the “Bamett-formula” has been adjusted in 1992, following a census 
in 1991, to reflect the decrease of the Scottish population366. The new ratios were then 85.7: 
9.14: 5.16. That change, however, did not transform the system of Scottish and Welsh over­
spending according to their population and the spending in England. The Labour government 
has proposed that the population shares which underlie the formula are to be recalculated
' l f . n
annually on the basis of the latest population estimates .
Apart from the block grant, the 1978 Act allowed the Scottish Parliament to borrow in order 
to cover short term problems in managing the Scottish finances . The SCC did not mention 
that source of spending. However, the Scotland Act369 provides for borrowing up to £500m 
directly from the Secretary of State. The Treasury may issue such sums out of the National 
Loans Fund if they are required by the Secretary of State to make loans under the Act’s 
provisions. Thus, the sums available to the Scottish administration is strictly limited for short­
term contingencies as it has been proposed by the Constitution Unit370.
The treatment of the funds given by the European Union is also to be re-examined in the 
context of devolution. This concerns especially the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF)371. Expenditure in agriculture is negotiated separately from the main block, with a 
support being provided by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in a large measure for 
Wales372 and a slighter part for Scotland373. The ERDF, however, is required to be matched by 
funds provided by the recipient according to the principle of additionality. Additionality is a 
jargon word denoting the principle whereby sums received from the Budget of the Union in 
support of particular projects (most commonly from the structural funds) are supposed to be 
additional to those received from national sources374. The great temptation - and few Member 
States of the European Union have been able always to resist it - is to allow receipts from 
Brussels to take the place of national aid375. Theoretically, the public expenditure for the
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365 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 66
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matching funds in Scotland is included in the block fund, but that seems to be far from being 
clear . However, the principle of additionality, according to the regulations, allows differing 
interpretations by the Member States377. Generally, nontheless, the principle requires that the 
financial arrangements distinguish between funds from central government and funds from 
the European union. The “additionality” should occur at the Scottish rather than at the central 
government level378. At the time being, however, no change to the block occurred in that 
concern. The Treasury has always treated all European receipts as simply “recycled” 
taxpayers money and insisted on treating it as part of the overall United Kingdom budget. For 
Wales, for example, this means that Structural Funds receipts from Brussels are only passed 
on through the Assembly’s budget as “Departmental Expenditure Limit”. In the case of the 
National Assembly’s budget, that “Departmental Expenditure Limit“ is set through the 
“Barnett formula”, which means that Wales receives a consequential of equivalent spending - 
including the European Structural Funds - in England. In the Treasury’s view, the fact that the 
Assembly thinks that it “deserves” a greater share of European and regional development 
monies than it receives through the Barnett formula is offset by the fact that in other areas 
Wales may “need” less, but is supported nonetheless379. Conversely, the Assembly 
administration is taking the view that the Bamett formula is not adequate to deal with the 
situation, which is faced thanks to the success of Wales in obtaining Objective 1 status for 
nearly two-thirds of its population, and intends to press, in the context of the Spending 
Review, for the Structural Funds to be taken outside the Bamett formula. This would mean 
that additional resources would be made available over and above whatever Bamett might 
attribute to Wales, to ensure that the Structural Funds allocations are passed on completely. 
The Welsh administration holds that the Spending Review380 is the place to resolve this issue. 
The results may prove as to whether European Funding will become “additional”.
3. A fair assessment
It has been written381 that the fiscal constitution of the United Kingdom has contained since 
1886 only one rule: “what is politically acceptably is fair”. The question is, in fact, if the 
formula offers an adequate basis for funding in the mid-term after devolution. The system of
376 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 80
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378 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 80
379 As for example pre-5 education, where Welsh provision has always been more generous than in England, but 
where Wales now benefits from consequentials of money to provide pre-school places for all 4 year olds in 
England
380 Taking place in summer 2000
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the “Bamett-formula” can be questioned for different reasons. First, it is to examine as to 
whether the formula issues “fair” solutions to the United Kingdom as a whole. There are 
different issues concerning its “fairness”. Initially, the starting point of the block formula is to 
be scrutinised. A crucial point about the operation of the formula is that it is composed of two 
parts. First, there is the inherited expenditure base as at the date of implementation of the 
formula in 1979. Second, there is the incremental expenditure, which is determined by the 
operation of the formula itself382. The formula itself, however, applies only to the block 
expenditure. Scotland and Wales, fare well on measured relatives. There, the spending in 
Scotland remained significantly higher, at a time when the Nation has become wealthier than 
six out of eight standard regions of England . The problem may well arise that the sub­
national elections are dominated by comparisons about funding treatment. As a foretaste of 
what may come, for example, the independent candidate for the Mayor of London, Ken 
Livingstone, argued in 1998 for more territorial justice in the context of the funding . The 
Scottish Mirror replied “You want £2bn from Scotland? Get lost! Fury over cash demand
OOf
from man who would be Mayor of London”. However, it has been outlined that the 
difficulty consists in the fact that there are many unmeasured impacts of policy. As an 
example, the matter of “defence” has been taken. The rationale of military facilities is to 
defend the whole country. The military bases and the defence contracting has, however, a 
significant impact on regional economies. Here, the concentration of this “expenditure” on the 
English regions of South-East and South-West were amazing being 51.5 per cent of the UK as 
a whole386. Another issue concerns the argument that the financial arrangements must include 
an element of equalisation387. The initial Northern Irish finance arrangement failed also due to 
the lack of any equalisation element. The present system is in that sense quite equal, because 
it leaves the devolved bodies with the money which is necessary for an equal public service. 
They are, however, able to switch these funds for other purposes. This is in contrast to the
q o o
Kilbrandon Commission, which argued in favour of a expenditure basis as it would be the 
only way of a need dependent distribution.
This leads us to a second point referring to the basic idea on which devolution is based: the
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dispersal of power that devolution is intended to achieve . Even for local government it is 
accepted that its revenue-raising power is not contrary to a fair distribution of public funds as 
far as it is accompanied by an element of equalisation390. Thus, there can also be good 
justifications for different choices in public expenditure between the devolved authorities. 
This is not incompatible with devolution but rather its purpose. However, the formula is quite 
unsuitable to encourage such competition. The more expenditure patterns differ from the
OQ1
English reference (for the block), the more arbitrary the formula may appear . Policy 
diversity is the object of devolution, but the “Bamett-formula” does not allow for policy 
variation392. Moreover, the bulk of the devolved budgets comes from a grant whose 
calculation remains to a large part at the Treasury’s discretion393, although the government 
has promised a greater transparency in the operation of the formula394. Through their power to 
determine the English budget for services in the block, they continue to dominate the
o n e
devolved schedule from the centre . In Germany, for example, the Basic Law makes 
detailed provisions concerning the power of the Federation and the states to their rights to 
have revenues assigned to them396.
Thirdly, one may scrutinise the democratic responsibility for financial, i.e. fiscal decisions. 
An issue of limited interest might be the hidden tax power of the devolved bodies. Even if the 
power can lead to a squeeze of local government, it can be seen as a democratic advance that 
this power has been withdrawn from the Secretary of State as part of the Executive and is 
furthermore attributed to a democratically elected parliament397. However, another issue is of 
greater importance in this context. The central criticism of the maintenance of the “Bamett- 
formula” is the separation of power to raise money and the power to spend it. That criticism 
has been made398 in order to follow a recommendation of the Primrose Committee setting up, 
in 1912, the financial relationship between Britain and Ireland after Home Rule. The 
Committee stated that it was “a first principle of sound government that the same authority
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that has the spending of revenue should also have the burthen , and not infrequently the odium 
of raising that revenue”399. The argument for a higher autonomy in revenue-raising, however, 
might be unanimous400, although such competences are in the context of other European states 
quite unusual401. It is argued that the essence of the argument for revenue-raising powers is 
that -  when differentials in needs and resources have been addressed -  the marginal 
expenditure decided upon by sub-national governments should be self-financed from an 
economically appropriate and politically acceptable tax base. It is obvious that elected office 
and responsibility for the raising of revenue has been linked since the first parliaments got the 
right to vote for the budget in the 18th century. In this concern, Tony Blair’s comparison of the 
devolved parliaments with English parish council in 1997 is quite illuminating. In Scotland 
and Wales, both powers are -  apart from the Scottish 3p in a pound- separated. Thus, the 
temptation will exist that the devolved executives claim for funds at the centre instead of 
allocating their own budget tightly402. Additionally, they will spend more easily money that 
they get from central government than money they have to raise themselves403. This is most 
apparent in Germany, where the Constitutional Court was challenged in 1999 which 
stipulated that the financial arrangements are to be changed partly404.
Finally, one may ask what happens if there is to be regional government in England. The 
whole assessment of the “Bamett-formula” is based on a notional “English block”, which is 
decided first and in secrecy405. However, as soon as that block is unravelled to the English 
regions, the base of the formula disappears406. It is, at the moment, not even possible to 
unravel the block as there are no data on relative needs and on spending variation in the 
English regions407. Only the allocation of expenditure is identifiable in all English regions. 
However, it is obvious that the English regions are already interested in the overall allocation 
of public expenditure and the effects on them408. It has also been shown that the population
399 Cited in Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 241, footnote 26
400 Blow, L.; Hall, J.; Smith, S.: Financing Regional Government in Britain. Institute for Financial Studies (IFS), 
June 1996, p 62
401 The Australian example is cited with around 20 per cent of revenue raised with devolved taxes, see: Hazell, 
Robert: The shape o f Things to come: What will the UK Constitution look like in the early 21st century?, in: 
Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 9
402 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 242
403 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 242
404 BVerfG, 2 BvF 2/98 of 11/11/1999, see http://www.bverfg.de/
405 Heald, David: Territorial public expenditure in the United Kingdom, in: Public Administration, op cit, p l59
406 Hazell/ Cornes: Financing devolution, op cit, p 202
407 Hazell/ Cornes: Financing devolution, op cit, p 202
408 See for example: Treasury Committee, The Barnett formula, in: House of Commons Debates, Vol 341, Qu 
156, p 21; also Tomkins, Adam: Devolution: A constitutional imperative, in: Devolution and the British 
Constitution. Key Haven, Society of public teachers of law, London 1998, p 113
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roundings inherent in the formula have “non-trivial effect”, as even small differences in the 
calculation have large consequences in reality409.
It has been hinted that the Bamett-formula introduces a “quasi-federal funding element” in the 
United Kingdom, as it guarantees to Scotland and Wales a fixed proportion of expenditure 
allocated to England and thereby preserving some historical advantages410. However, this 
does not correspond to what could be called a fiscal constitution for the United Kingdom411. 
Therefore, a “financial pillar” would be necessary for the constitutional settlement. It should 
be composed by the devolved governments to decide about the division of their “share” of the 
budget412. Currently, financial devolution means that the Welsh and Scottish proportion of the 
budget to a certain degree is fixed, but only in relation to England. As to whether such 
autonomy is a suitable condition for a quasi-federal system might be doubtful, as the main 
decision for the budget of the devolved authorities remains at Whitehall. Additionally, various 
“bypasses” to the formula are possible to be undertaken by central government. This concerns 
a large range of policy areas413, but especially the power of outward investment, which 
remains centralised. The fiscal subsidies of the centre can be given without territorial 
reference, as they are concentrated at the Department of Trade and Industry.
However, the idea414 that if the government is forced to agree on a new formula, the Scottish 
and other devolved government would have little confidence in the results assessed by the 
Treasury, might be more important for a quasi-federal financial arrangement. If an 
intergovernmental commission or an independent Territorial Exchequer Board was entrusted 
with that task, it would mark the beginning of a new financial “formula”. In Germany, the 
Lander are entitled to revenues in place of the relationship of dependence which the Scotland 
Act and the Government of Wales Act created415. However, in the German Federation this 
entitlement is crucially dependent upon the role of the Lander in the process of determining 
how much revenue they receive from federal government as fiscal legislation needs the
409 Heald, David: Territorial public expenditure in the United Kingdom, in: Public Administration, op cit, p 164
410 Kellas, James: The Scottish and Welsh Offices as Territorial Managers, in: Regional and Federal Studies. Vol 
8 , Frank Cass, London 1998, p 96
411 See also McLean, Iain: A fiscal constitution for the UK, in: Wright, Tony; Chen, Selina: The English 
Question, op cit, p 80
412 McLean, Iain: A fiscal constitution for the UK, op cit, p 90
413 See Heald, David: Territorial public expenditure in the United Kingdom, in: Public Administration, op cit, p 
168
414 Hazell/ Cornes: Financing devolution, op cit, p 201
415 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 253
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agreement of the Bundesrat (Second Chamber). The House of Lords, however, is not likely to 
become a regional Chamber. Hence, it might be true that the greatest tensions in the 
devolution settlement are to arise over finance416.
D. Judicial review and devolution
An important indicator for the identification of federalism, which may have been reached with 
the present devolution legislation is the way in which disputes between the different levels of 
government are resolved. In federal constitutions, the courts have the responsibility of 
umpiring disputes between the federation and the states about their respective competences417. 
The courts are constitutionally enabled to strike down federal or state legislation418. 
Generally, however, in these states as Germany and the United States the essentials of the 
relationship between federal government and the lower levels of government are set down in a 
basic constitutional document, which distributes powers and responsibilities within the 
federation419. That document can only be changed with the consensus of both levels involved. 
A “real” federal settlement would thus require a written constitution for the United 
Kingdom420. The United Kingdom, indeed, does not seek a written constitution421. Since the 
glorious revolution in 1688, where the Parliament demonstrated its power lastingly, the role 
of the courts has been very limited concerning the scrutiny of “vires” in this country422. Only 
in the 1960s423, the House of Lords discovered its role of the highest court for all disputes, 
including the question of “ultra-vires”414 and the Supreme Court Act 1981 is nowadays the 
basis for judicial review in the United Kingdom425. Generally, however, the courts are not 
expected to scrutinise the constitutionality of the acts of parliament, but in practice they 
conquered a more significant position than the constitutional theory attributes to them426.
416 Hazell, Robert: The shape o f Things to come: What will the UK Constitution look like in the early 21st 
century?, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 9; see also Hopkins, John: Devolution from a 
comparative perspective, in: European Public Law. Vol 4 (3), op cit, p 327
417 Bamett, Eric: An Introduction to Constitutional Law, op cit, p 62; Hesse, Konrad: Grundziige des 
Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 19th ed., C.F. Miiller, Heidelberg 1996, pp 90, pp 263
418 For the Federal Constitution of the United States see e.g. Breyer, Stephen: Does Federalism make a 
difference?, in: Public Law. Sweet & Maxwell, London, Winter 1999, pp 651
419 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 34
420 See proposals of Institute of Public Policy Research: Constitution of the United Kingdom, London 1991 and, 
Home Rule (Scotland) Bill 1995, HMSO, London 1995
421 See above
422 Wiedmann, Thomas, op cit, p 64
423 Constitution Unit: The constitutionalisation of Public Law. London, May 1999, p 2
424 Wiedmann, Thomas, op cit, p 65
425 Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, pp 921
426 See H.W.R. Wade: Administrative Law, 1982. p 29
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Amid all constitutional changes there has been a consistent rejection of judicial review of 
parliamentary legislation427. However, where legislative and administrative power is divided 
between several institutions it is inevitable that there will be arguments about the exceeding of 
powers by one or another institution428. This cannot be resolved through intergovernmental 
“consultation”429. At the end, it may be necessary to resolve disputes about the vires or 
competences of the respective institutions through the courts. Hence, judicial review is of 
central importance to the devolution legislation430.
1. Precedents
First, it might be useful to look backwards to previous devolution legislation. There, one can 
see how devolution disputes have been addressed in former legislation. The 1920 Act431 
provided for the resolution of disputes at the Northern Irish courts, with an ultimate appeal to 
the House of Lords. On constitutional matters, reference was made to the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council432. This Committee is composed of the Lord Chancellor, Lord President 
and former Lord Presidents of the Council, Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and the Lord Justices 
of Appeal, former Lord Chancellors and retired Lords of Appeal433. It has already experience 
with written constitutions, as it is the final court of appeal for some formerly British 
territories, which have later adopted a constitution434. Following the 1920 Act, the courts were 
enabled to declare invalid statutes made by a parliament if they were “ultra vires”435. That 
was a unusual conception in British constitutional law at this time, as the new institution of 
Northern Ireland was called “parliament”436. However, the ultra vires principle is consistent 
with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty437. “Ultra vires” refers to action which is
427 Williams, David: Constitutional Issues Facing the United Kingdom, in: The Law Librarian. Vol 30 (1), 
London, March 1999, p 17
428 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 45
429 See above
430 Craig, Paul; Walters, Mark: The courts, devolution and judicial review, in: Public Law. London, Sweet & 
Maxwell Spring 1999, p 274
431 Sections 49
432 Section 51
433 See Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, p 362. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has been set up under statute 
by the Judicial Committee Act 1833 and has been enlarged by the Judicial Committee Act 1844.
434 See Bradley, Anthony W.: The Sovereignty o f Parliament- in perpetuity, op cit, p 83: E.g. Jamaica
435 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 72
436 Newark, F.H.: The Law and the Constitution, in: Wilson, Thomas: Ulster under Home Rule. OUP, Oxford 
1955, p 31; also Hadfield, Brigid: The constitution of Northern Ireland, op cit, p 51: The Northern Irish 
parliament copied the House of Commons
437 See Barnett, Hilaire, op cit, pp 941; see also for the current discussion about the “ultra Wrej”-principle: Craig, 
Paul: Competing models o f judicial review, in: Public Law. Sweet & Maxwell, London, Autumn 1999, p 428, 
and Jowell, Jeffery: O f Vires and Vacuums: Constitutional Context o f Judicial Review, in: Public Law. Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, Autumn 1999, p 448
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outside -  or in excess of -  powers of decision making bodies438. To state an example, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson defined the “ultra vires” concept recently as follows: “If the decision 
maker exercises his powers outside the jurisdiction conferred, in a manner which is 
procedurally irregular or is Wednesbury unreasonable, he is acting ultra vires his powers and 
therefore unlawfully”439.
The procedure at the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was, in fact, used only once440. 
The “ultra vires” disputes arose in other proceedings as, for example, Gallagher v Lynn441. 
There442, the House of Lords was called upon to determine the validity of the Milk and Milk 
Products Act 1934 (NI). The appellant was a dairy farmer from Co Donegal (Republic for 
Ireland) who sold his milk in Northern Ireland previously. The Act in question provided that 
only milk of specified grades could be sold in Northern Ireland and acquisition of the relevant 
licence was dependent on previous inspection of the premises by the Northern Irish 
Agricultural Ministry. Section 4 of the Northern Irish constitution443 prevented Stormont from 
legislating with respect of matters outside Northern Ireland. As the appellant was living 
outside Northern Ireland, he was consequently refused. He argued therefore that the Act was 
“ultra vires” Northern Ireland’s Constitution, whose Section 4 made an excepted matter of 
subjects “in respect of trade with any place outside Northern Ireland”. The House of Lords 
held, however, that the Act’s true nature and character, its pith and substance444 was lawful, 
because it protected the health of the inhabitants of the province. The Act, following this 
view, was not passed “in respect o f ’ trade, even if it might have affected trade outside Ulster.
The use of the “pith and substance” principle was possible due to the fact that the Government 
of Ireland Act 1920445 listed the reserved matters only. Thus, the Stormont Parliament was 
responsible to “make laws for the peace order and good government” with several limitations. 
All non- specified matters fell consequently within the remit of the devolved institution. In 
contrast to the approach taken in 1920, the 1978 Act specified in great detail the legislative
438 Bamett, Hilaire, op cit, p 940
439 R v Hull University Visitor ex parte Page, [1993] 2 AC 237
440 In re a Reference Under the Government o f Ireland Act 1920 [1936], A.C. 362
441 [1937] AC 863. In that case, applications were made to have the question of the Act’s validity referred to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council under Section 51, but these were not acceded to.
442 For more detail see: Hadfield, Brigid: The constitution of Northern Ireland, op cit, pp 84
443 Government of Ireland Act 1920, see above
444 Referring to Russell v The Queen, [1882] 7 A.C. 829. This case concerned a dispute between the Canadian 
federal Parliament and the provinces.
445 Section 4, cited in Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 36
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and executive competences devolved from Westminster446. Hence, it has been criticised447 
that the absence of clarity was the biggest failing of the 1978 Act and that this led to a more 
considerable likelihood of litigation. Thus, it has been added that the problem to “trace any 
discernible principle or rationale upon which the subjects to be devolved have been selected, 
will cause difficulty to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, or any other court, in 
attempting to provide a corpus of consistent rulings on the legislative competence of the 
Assembly”448. Conversely, the devolution legislation in 1998 followed, in general, the 
approach of the Government of Ireland Act 1920. There is another difference to the legislation 
suggested in 1978. At early stages of the then devolution proposals, the government even 
preferred devolution issues, in general, to be decided by the Executive449. The obvious 
danger450 of blurred distinction between legality and policy has been avoided at all times in 
the 1998 legislation. The legality of devolved legislation must be controlled judicially451. 
Legality, however, had limited application under the 1978 legislation, as the initiative for 
issues of legality of Assembly Bills lay only with the Secretary of State452. That proceeding 
had been put forward by the Kilbrandon Commission453. Thus, the Secretary of State was not 
obliged to submit “Acts of the Scottish Assembly” for Royal approval, even if the Privy 
Council held at the pre-assent stage that the Act was “intra vires”454.
2. Disputes about competences (“vires”)
The Government of Wales Act 1998 makes encompassing provision for legal challenge in 
case that the National Assembly overrides its powers. Schedule 8 of the Act defines the 
“devolution issues” which may arise. They can mean
(a) a question whether a function is exercisable by the Assembly,
(b) a question whether a purported or proposed exercise of a function by the Assembly is, 
or would be, within the powers of the Assembly (including a question whether a purported 
or proposed exercise of a function by the Assembly is, or would be, outside its powers by
446 See above
447 Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 37
448 Council of the Law Society of Scotland, cited in Constitution Unit: Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 36
449 White Paper, Our changing democracy, op cit, paras 57
450 Jones, Timothy: Scottish devolution and demarcation disputes, in: Public Law. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
Summer 1997, p 286
451 Jones, Timothy: Scottish devolution and demarcation disputes, op cit, p 286
452 Dickinson, I.: The Secretary o f State and Assembly legislation, in: Journal. Law Society of Scotland, 
Edinburgh 1978, Vol 23, p 89
453 Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), op cit, Vol I, paras 756 (entitled “maintenance of 
minimum standards”!)
454 Jones, Timothy: Scottish devolution and demarcation disputes, in: Public Law, op cit, Summer 1997, p 290
163
virtue of section 106(7) or 107(1)),
(c) a question whether the Assembly has failed to comply with a duty imposed on it 
(including a question whether the Assembly has failed to comply with any obligation 
which is an obligation of the Assembly by virtue of section 106(1) or (6)), or
(d) a question whether a failure to act by the Assembly is incompatible with any of the 
Convention rights.
The Scotland Act 1998455 for its part provides for more “devolution issues”. Similar to the 
Government of Wales Act, they are defined in a Schedule as follows
a) a question whether an Act of the Scottish Parliament or any provision of an Act of the 
Scottish Parliament is within the legislative competence of the Parliament,
(b) a question whether any function (being a function which any person has purported, or 
is proposing, to exercise) is a function of the Scottish Ministers, the First Minister or the 
Lord Advocate,
(c) a question whether the purported or proposed exercise of a function by a member of 
the Scottish Executive is, or would be, within devolved competence,
(d) a question whether a purported or proposed exercise of a function by a member of the 
Scottish Executive is, or would be, incompatible with any of the Convention rights or with 
Community law,
(e) a question whether a failure to act by a member of the Scottish Executive is 
incompatible with any of the Convention rights or with Community law,
(f) any other question about whether a function is exercisable within devolved competence 
or in or as regards Scotland and any other question arising by virtue of this Act about 
reserved matters.
Such a “devolution issue” can arise even if the proceeding began in other parts of the United 
Kingdom456. However, a court or a tribunal is entitled to disregard a devolution issue if the 
claim is frivolous or vexatious457.
For Scottish legislation, a higher degree of legal scrutiny is necessary according to the very 
powerful position of the Scottish Parliament due to the stipulation of the reserved matters
455 Section 98, Schedule 6
456 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 6 , Parts II, III, IV; Government of Wales Act 1998, Schedule 8 , Parts II, III, IV
457 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 6 , para 2; Government of Wales Act 1998, Schedule 8 , para 2
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only458. Thus, a special interpretative obligation is imposed on the courts, as they have to read 
both Acts and Bills and subordinate legislation of Holyrood as being “intra vires’’ rather than 
“ultra vires”459. Where any provision could be read so as to be “ultra vires”, it is to be read as 
narrowly as is required for it to be “intra vires”, if such a reading is possible. Then, the 
provision is to have effect accordingly460. The Scotland Act, however, does not state “vires” 
but rather “competence”461. The competence of the Scottish Parliament relies upon the 
Scotland Act, which means that the Parliament must have legislative competence for primary 
legislation and in relation to subordinate legislation, the powers must have been conferred by 
the Act462. There are, generally, detailed rules for two different ways in which devolution 
issues may be resolved.
Any devolution issue which arises in judicial proceedings in the House of Lords is to be 
referred to the Judicial Committee unless the House considers it more appropriate, having 
regard to all the circumstances, that they should determine the issue463. It can, however, also 
be resolved by direct reference to the Judicial Committee. That Committee has not played a 
role for Wales since the unity of both legal systems. Thus, it has been asked why it was 
attributed with that new role, although the National Assembly only deals with subordinate 
legislation. The explanation may lay in Scottish sensitivities vis-a-vis the House of Lords and 
the desire to establish a common pattern of jurisdiction for devolution issues464. That is, of 
course, an advantage for the Principality. However, the irony in a historical perspective is that 
the Judicial Committee having its roots with the Empire and jurisdiction over dependent 
countries is “recycled” when devolution was realised465.
The Scotland Act466 provides for pre-enactment scrutiny of Bills of the Parliament467. The 
Advocate General, the Lord Advocate or the Attorney General may refer the question as to 
whether a Bill or provision of it would be within the competence of the Scottish Parliament to
458 See above
459 Scotland Act 1998, section 101 (1). Lord Hope held, confusingly, that “there is to be created for Scotland a 
new kind of sovereignty. It is not parliamentary sovereignty...”, cited in: Himsworth, Chris: Securing the tenure 
of Scottish judges, in: Public Law, op cit, p 17
460 Scotland Act 1998, section 101 (2)
461 A term which is used in the German Basic Law, too. See Art. 72-4 GG
462 Scotland Act 1998, section 101 (3)
463 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 6 , para 32; Government of Wales Act 1998, Schedule 8, para 29
464 Williams, David: Devolution: The Welsh perspective, in: Cambridge Centre for Public Law: Constitutional 
Reform in the UK, op cit, p 49; also Rawlings, Richard: The new model Wales, op cit, p 495
465 Rawlings, Richard: The new model Wales, op cit, p 496
466 Scotland Act 1998, section 33
467 Reed, Robert: Devolution and the Judiciary, in: Cambridge Centre for Public Law: Constitutional Reform in 
the UK. op cit, p 24-5
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the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for decision . The Judicial Committee is the 
ultimate dispute resolution institution. Section 103469 provides that decisions made by the 
Privy Council are binding in all legal proceedings other than proceedings of the Privy Council 
itself. The Presiding Officer of the Parliament must not submit a Bill for Royal Assent at any 
time when such one of these law officers is entitled to make a reference, or where the 
reference has been made but the Privy Council has not yet disposed of the matter470. If the 
Privy Council has decided that a Bill is “ultra vires” then the Presiding Officer cannot submit 
the Bill for Royal Assent in its unamended form471. Section 34 of the Act provides for cases in 
which the Privy Council may make reference to the European Court of Justice.
With difference to that proceeding for Bills, reference to the Privy Council can be made from 
existing proceedings at any court or tribunal. As the law officers must be informed about all 
devolution issues which may arise, they can take part in the proceedings so far as they relate 
to a devolution issue472. Then, they may require the court or tribunal to refer the issue to the 
Judicial Committee473 and they are even entitled to refer devolution issues which are not 
subject to the proceeding474. Apart from that, the relevant law officer is independently able to 
institute proceedings for the determination of a devolution issue and to refer it to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, but they are not obliged to any action475. The Lord Advocate 
(as a Member of the Scottish administration) is normally the defendant in such actions.
In Wales, proceedings for direct reference to the Privy Council are very similar. Section 31476 
states that the Attorney General or the Assembly may refer to the Judicial Committee any 
devolution issue which is not the subject of civil or criminal proceedings. Where reference is 
made by the Attorney General in relation to a devolution issue which relates to the proposed 
exercise of a function by the Assembly, the Assembly is to be informed of that fact, and the 
Assembly shall not exercise the function in the manner proposed during the period beginning
with the receipt of the notification and ending with the reference being decided or otherwise
disposed of477. This form of reference concerns the pre-enactment challenge and scrutiny of
468 Craig, Paul: Administrative Law, op cit, p 212
469 Scotland Act 1998, section 103 (1)
470 Scotland Act 1998, section 32 (2)
471 Scotland Act 1998, section 32 (3)
472 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 6 , paras 5
473 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 6 , para 33
474 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 6 , para 34
475 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 6 , paras 4, 15,25
476 Government of Wales Act 1998, Section 31 (1)
477 Schedule 8, para 31 (2)
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the Judicial Committee478. As Paragraph 31 does not provide for a time limit of the Attorney 
General’s action, a second possibility is that of post-enactment challenge even if the 
devolution issue has not arisen in independent proceedings479. An issue of subordinate 
legislation that is subsequently seen to exceed the devolved realm of the Assembly can be 
referred to the Judicial Committee even if the legislation in question has not been contested in 
other previous proceedings. Additionally, the Attorney General is entitled480 to require a court 
or a tribunal to transfer to the Privy Council any devolution issue which has arisen in any 
proceedings before it to which he is a party. The Courts are obliged to inform the Assembly 
and the Attorney General about devolution issues arising in any proceedings481 and the person 
or body to which notice is given has the right to take part in the proceedings so far as they 
relate to the devolution issue482. Apart from that, the institution of proceedings due to the 
determination of a devolution issue can also be made by the Attorney General, the Advocate 
General for Scotland or, the Attorney General for Northern Ireland. These law officers are 
entitled by the Government of Wales Act to refer the devolution issue to the Privy Council 
in one of these ways of direct reference. However, they may have reasons not to exercise this 
power484. It has been blamed485 that the Law Officers being part of central government should 
serve Welsh, i.e. devolved institutions in such matters. It is true that this conflict of interest 
may be a basic constitutional issue, but this will depend on the way of exercising those 
functions. Devolution is not federalism and thus, central government is entitled to overview 
its own legislation. Hence, the conflict of interest might be more political than constitutional. 
However, the Chief Legal Adviser of the Assembly is supposed to inform the Secretaries 
about these issues.
Devolution issues may also arise in a civil proceeding in a court in proceedings involving
A Q H
individuals or between an individual and a public body . Provision is made that a court can 
refer a devolution issue to a higher court. The Scotland Act establishes a reference system for 
all jurisdictions: criminal, civil and, judicial review. In non-criminal proceedings, magistrates’
478 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 278
479 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 278
480 Schedule 8, para 30 (1)
481 Schedule 8, para 5(1)
482 Wales Act, Schedule 8, para 5 (2)
483 Wales Act, Schedule 8, paras 4, 13,23
484 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 278
485 Rawlings, Richard: The new model Wales, op cit, p 494
486 It was one of the first appointments made on behalf of the Assembly
487 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 286
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courts can refer devolution issues to the High Court488. Other courts may refer devolution 
issues to the court of appeal, but not the magistrates’ courts, the court of appeal or the House 
of Lords489. For criminal proceedings, the Scotland Act490 empowers the courts, other than the 
court of appeal or the House of Lords, to refer devolution issues to the High Court (for 
summary proceedings) or the court of appeal (for indictment proceedings). A tribunal from 
which there is no appeal has to refer any devolution issue which arises in proceedings before 
it to the Court of Appeal; and any other tribunal may make such a reference491. The court of 
appeal can refer to the Privy Council any devolution issue arising before it other than by a 
court’s reference492. Appeals from a High Court or a court of appeal lie to the Privy Council, 
but leave is required493. These provisions concern only England and Wales, but proceedings 
in Scotland are very similar, taking account, indeed, of the differences of the Scottish 
jurisdiction494. Ironically, of course, although “the legal system is at the heart of the Scottish 
difference that justifies devolution”495, the “continued existence” of the High Court of 
Justiciary and the Court of Session is a reserved matter496.
The Government of Wales Act497 makes similar provision that a court can refer a devolution 
issue to a higher court. A distinction is, however, made between civil and criminal 
proceedings. Civil proceedings are all proceedings other than criminal proceedings. Thus, the 
rules for civil proceeding include judicial review498. As in Scotland, the referred court has to 
decide the devolution issue, and once that court has issued a decision, the proceeding is to 
continue at the lower court for final decision of the dispute. A magistrates court may thus 
refer a devolution issue to the High Court499 or to the Court of Appeal, albeit the latter one 
can neither be questioned by a magistrates’ court and nor does it apply to the Courts of 
Appeal, the House of Lords or a magistrates’ court overtaking a case from a magistrates’
^  .5 0 0court .
488 Scotland Act, Schedule 6 , para 18
489 Scotland Act, Schedule 6 , para 19. Further exception is made for a High Court acting under para 18.
490 Schedule 6 , para 21
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492 Scotland Act, Schedule 6 , para 22
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168
The rules for criminal proceedings are, in fact, quite similar. If the devolution issue arises in 
criminal proceedings, a court, other than the court of appeal or the House of Lords, may refer 
the issue to the High Court in the case of summary proceedings, or to the Court of Appeal if 
the proceedings are on indictment501. The court of appeal can decide itself as to whether it 
wants to refer the issue arising in its proceedings other than by way of reference from a lower 
court on to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council502. In order to the provision of 
Paragraph 8503 tribunals from which there is no appeal must refer the devolution issue to the 
court of appeal, but if there is an appeal from the tribunal’s decisions it has the power but not 
the duty to refer the case504. This is a general principle in the Act, as it is entirely at the 
discretion of the courts to refer devolution issues or to decide it themselves. However, they 
are not completely unconstrained in retaining cases. As the courts or tribunals have to inform 
the Attorney General or the Assembly who might then take part in the proceedings, some 
cases may well be referred to upper courts on the Attorney’s advice505.
Finally, the Act provides for appeals from superior courts to the Judicial Committee. The 
appeal against a determination of a devolution issue by a High Court or a court of appeal lies 
then to the Privy Council. However, the appeal needs in such circumstances the leave of the 
court concerned, or failing such leave, with special leave of the Judicial Committee506.
Devolution issues may also arise in other ways than directly at a court. This may be the case 
when legislation of the Assembly is enforced and the applicant claims that the enforcement of 
the legislation is “ultra vires”501. Recent decisions of the courts have been more open in
508allowing collateral challenge, even if there remain some uncertainties . Hence, it remains 
also to be seen as to whether the courts will allow collateral challenge for ultra vires 
questions. It has been argued509 that the Government of Wales Act resolves the question by 
giving a right to challenge devolution issues collaterally and directly. On the one hand, the 
court’s power to refer a case implies vice versa not to refer a case and to make a decision. 
That view boosts indeed the right to collateral challenge. However, on the other hand, one
501 Schedule 8, para 9
502 Schedule 8, para 10
503 Schedule 8
504 Schedule 8, para 8
505 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 280
506 Schedule 8, para 11
507 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 280
508 Boddington v British Transport Police [1998] 2 W.L.R. 639, for Scotland see: Mullen, Tom; Prosser, Tony: 
Devolution and administrative law, in: European Public Law. Vol 4 (4), Kluwer, Amsterdam 1998, p 482
509 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 280
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may well argue that any constraints imposed by the general law on collateral challenge 
structure the conditions under which a court has the authority to decide this type of case for 
itself. Nevertheless, applicants should normally be able to challenge vires issues collaterally 
or directly510. This would also contribute to take away critics about an increase of uncertainty 
of law after devolution, but the question depends entirely on the courts.
The Scotland Act511 gives to the courts the power to make an order removing or limiting any 
retrospective effect of the decision, or suspending the effect of the decision for any period and 
on any conditions to allow the defect to be corrected. Under the restriction to try reading Acts 
within the Parliament’s competence, the jurisdiction can find Acts or subordinate legislation 
to be “ultra vires”. The courts must also take into account the extent to which persons who are 
not party to the proceedings would otherwise be adversely affected512. However, the Scotland 
Act allows the passage of subordinate legislation in an extensive way513. This concerns 
especially the “Henry VIII clauses”514. Thus, the Scottish Executive can use subordinate 
legislation515 to remedy the defects in an Act of the Scottish Parliament516, which has been 
found to be “ultra vires” . That subordinate legislation, however, is then to be -politically -
scrutinised by Westminster518.
Like in Scotland the courts are without a precise duty to act if they have decided that the 
Welsh Assembly did not have the power to make a provision of subordinate legislation. The 
Government of Wales Act519 empowers the courts also “to make an order removing or 
limiting any retrospective effect of the decision, or suspending the effect of the decision for 
any period and on any conditions to allow the defect to be corrected”. However, even if there 
is no detailed obligation, the courts “shall have regard to the extent to which persons who are 
not parties to the proceedings would otherwise be adversely affected by the decision44. The 
Lord Advocate and the respective law officer are to be given notice and the Assembly and
510 Craig, Paul: Administrative Law, op cit, p 757
511 Section 102 (2)
512 Scotland Act, section 102 (3)
513 Scotland Act, section 104 (1)
514 See Bates, T. St. J.: The future o f parliamentary scrutiny o f devolved legislation, in: Statute Law Review. Vol 
19 (3), London 1998, pp 155; see also above
515 See Scotland Act, Schedule 7
516 That is with significant difference to the Government of Wales Act, see above
517 Scotland Act, section 107
518 See Scotland Act, Schedule 7, para 1 (2), for the principles for scrutiny see Bates, T. St. J.: The future of 
parliamentary scrutiny o f devolved legislation, op cit, p 156
519 Section 110
520 Scotland Act, section 102 (4)
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the Attorney General are to be informed of such a decision in advance following section 110 
(4) of the Government of Wales Act.
Northern Ireland has not been considered yet. This is due to the fact that Northern Ireland’s 
devolution scheme must differ in several points from the general organisation in Scotland and 
Wales521. Thus, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 makes different special provisions which have 
been made with the bearing in mind that the province is to have a distinct position in the 
constitutional settlement of the United Kingdom. Hence, the provisions made in the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998 following the Good-Friday-Agreement are not as important as other 
devolution legislation.
The Northern Ireland Act 199 8522 defines the devolution issues slightly different as
(a) a question whether any provision of an Act of the Assembly is within the legislative 
competence of the Assembly;
(b) a question whether a purported or proposed exercise of a function by a Minister or 
Northern Ireland department is, or would be, invalid by reason of section 24;
(c) a question whether a Minister or Northern Ireland department has failed to comply 
with any of the Convention rights, any obligation under Community law or any order 
under section 27 so far as relating to such an obligation; or
(d) any question arising under this Act about excepted or reserved matters.
Sub-section (b) makes reference to a provision of the Act, which is based on non­
discrimination, and sub-section (c) refers to section 27, where provision is made that the 
United Kingdom retains full control over Northern Ireland. Both different provisions are due 
to the special situation in Northern Ireland and therefore, they are not really important for the 
general scope of devolution.
The general ways in which a devolution issue can come before the courts is similar to the 
provisions of the Scotland and Government of Wales Acts. There is a pre-enactment 
challenge and scrutiny provision523, and there is also the possibility of a direct reference to the 
Privy Council from existing proceedings524. Moreover, direct reference can be made to a 
devolution issue, which is not the subject of existing proceedings . As under the Scotland
521 See above
522 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Schedule 10, para 1
523 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 11(1)
524 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Schedule 10, para 33
525 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Schedule 10, para 34
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Act, the relevant law officers are allowed to institute proceedings . These proceedings are to 
be observed by the First and Deputy First Minister acting jointly or the Attorney General for 
Northern Ireland as defendant527. The reference to upper courts by a court or by appeal is 
provided as in the previous described Acts. Additionally, the courts are able to lay down Acts 
and subordinate legislation.528 Special provision is given to the Secretary of State to remedy 
“ultra vires” legislation. In contrast to other devolution legislation, he or she may make such 
provision as he considers necessary or expedient in consequence of any provision of an 
secondary act of the Assembly which is not, or may not be, within the legislative competence 
of the Assembly; or any purported exercise by a Minister or Northern Ireland department of 
his or its functions which is not, or may not be, a valid exercise of those functions529.
3. Review of intergovernmental co-operation and finance
The relations between the devolved administrations and central government are of crucial 
importance530. However, these relations are not regulated in the devolution Acts but only in 
the Concordats. The only provision made in the Scotland Act is, that even though there were 
some contradictory precedents531 under the Northern Ireland legislation rights and liabilities 
can exist between the governments532. This stresses the divisibility of the Crown in right for 
the Scottish administration or acting by way of central government for the purpose of 
devolution. Each government can owe duties to and be sued by another533.
The concordats, however, are of a very informal nature. The Scottish Office stated that 
“relations will be conducted on the basis of formal, non-statutory understandings”534. The 
concordats, explicitly, deny any legal binding and state that the “memorandum is a statement 
of political intent, and should not be interpreted as a binding agreement. It does not create 
legal obligations between the parties. It is intended to be binding in honour only” . The then 
Secretary of State’s description that their “purpose is not to create legal obligations or
526 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Schedule 10, para 22 (1)
527 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Schedule 10, para 22 (2)
528 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 81
529 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 80
530 See above
531 See Taylor, Greg: Devolution and the applicability o f statutes to the Crown..., in: Public Law, op cit, Spring 
2000, p 12 citing the presumption that statutes do not bind the Crown.
532 Scotland Act 1998, section 99
533 Taylor, Greg: Devolution and the applicability o f statutes to the Crown..., in: Public Law, op cit, Spring 2000, 
p l l
534 Scottish Office: Guide to the Scotland Bill. Edinburgh 1997, para 23
535 MoU, Part I, para 2
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restrictions on any party, or to constrain the discretion of the Scottish Executive, or 
Parliament or that of any UK department” thus became reality. The inter-governmental 
relationship is therefore completely uncovered by judicial review on the grounds of “vires”. 
That is, however, one feature of devolution with clear contrast to a federal state. There, the 
co-operation between federal and state level is statutorily organised and the states are entitled 
to take part in several matters537. The MoU stipulates in the same way, but its nature is not a 
statute but an agreement. Thus, in principle, the courts have no possibility to be challenged for 
violations of the MoU.
It has been shown that tensions between Whitehall and the devolved administrations will be 
most significant over finance. However, the block grant is currently a matter completely at the 
discretion of central government, and even if there should be greater transparency about 
finance, this does not imply that the devolved bodies are empowered to claim a certain 
percentage of revenue, for example in relation to their population. Finance is a reserved 
matter -  withheld by Whitehall from devolved administrations and the judiciary.
The Scotland Act provides for the first time statutorily for review of primary legislation by 
the courts. It does -indirectly -  also provide that Scottish Acts cannot be challenged for 
procedural grounds if they came into existence different from the “devolution issues” outlined 
in Schedule 6538. Hence, the judges have to adapt to a new role of “vires” jurisdiction, but 
they do not need to operate in a vacuum539. There is a certain degree of devolution experience 
of Northern Ireland and there are the experiences of the Commonwealth and Federal States. 
The devolution Acts are statutes of the United Kingdom Parliament, but they are, of course, of 
constitutional significance540. The constitutional quality of the Acts may not only be of 
theoretical interest but also of vital meaning for the interpretation of the courts. The Acts can 
be interpreted as usual statutes according to the canons of statutory construction or in a liberal 
manner stressing the shifting of social and political context541. The importance of such a 
constitutional interpretation would be that the text’s meaning may evolve in time542. In the 
United Kingdom, however, even if some legal acts were attributed with labels as
536 Hansard’s Written Answers, 23 February 1998, Question of Rosemary McKenna
537 Maunz/ Zippelius: Staatsrecht. op cit, p 119
538 The 1978 Act provided that Scottish Acts could not be challenged on procedural grounds (section 17 (4))
539 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 288
540 Hazell/ Cornes: Introduction, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 8, see above
541 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 289; see also: Hesse, Konrad: Grundziige 
des Verfassungsrechts der BRD, op cit, pp 24
542 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 290
“fundamental law”, the courts have been very reluctant to infuse these acts with justiciable 
force543. It might be different for the devolution Acts 1998. The best way to bring up such a 
constitutional view of that legislation might lay in the development of a convention 
preventing the Westminster Parliament from amending the Scotland Act unilaterally544. That 
possibility has already been proposed by the Kilbrandon Commission545.
Primary (Scottish) legislation within the United Kingdom is thus to be determined by a 
process of reasoning that involves the classification of challenged legislation according to the 
subject matter. A contested Act is to be invalid if it is made “in respect o f ’546, or if it “relates 
to”547, a matter over which the legislature has no competence. A law is so invalid because it 
invades a matter over which the legislator has no competence rather than conflicting with a 
law made by another institution in their realm548. That sort of competence limitation has 
nothing to do with concurrent legislative competence. Even if the questioned act touches on 
matters outside the scope of the legislator in a way, which is consistent with existing laws it is 
invalid549. Hence, the problem is to define what acts are within the realm of the devolved 
matters and what acts are beyond. Statutes are likely to touch always on more than only one 
precise matter. Then, some of the issues touched by the statute may lie within its realm, others 
beyond. The question is how to unravel these connections and to identify the constitutionally 
relevant issue550.
One of the ways, which have been used in British constitutional law, has already been 
outlined when the Northern Irish model of judicial devolution has been analysed551. It is the 
pith and substance doctrine552. For a court to strike down all legislation affecting matters 
outside the legislature’s realm would leave the institution with small scope of action. As long 
as the predominant aspect (that is the pith and substance or the true nature and character) of 
the contested act is within the legislative competence then the measure is valid in all aspects 
even if it affects partly subject matters over which the legislature has no authority553. Thus,
543 E.g. MacCormick v Lord Advocate, op cit, see above
544 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 291, see also Constitution Unit:
Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 49
545 Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), op cit, para 768
546 Government of Ireland Act 1920, section 4(1)
547 Scotland Act 1998, section 29 (2)
548 Craig, Paul: Constitutionalism, Regulation and Review, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 71
549 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 297
550 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 297
551 See above
552 See Hadfield, Brigid: The constitution of Northern Ireland, op cit, pp 86
553 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 299
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the pith and substance doctrine implies concurrent legislative power. It clearly tends to 
enlarge legislative power of the authority in question554. The relevance of this doctrine to the 
Scotland and Northern Ireland Act (Wales is not concerned) might be complicated555 by 
provisions of the Acts. The Scotland Act 1998 provides for protected provisions556, which an 
Act of the Scottish Parliament cannot modify, or confer power by subordinate legislation to 
modify These provisions are as follows
(a) Articles 4 and 6 of the Union with Scotland Act 1706 and of the Union with England 
Act 1707 so far as they relate to freedom of trade,
(b) the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act 1936,
(c) the following provisions of the European Communities Act 1972- Section 1 and 
Schedule 1, Section 2, other than subsection (2), the words following “such Community 
obligation” in subsection (3) and the words “subject to Schedule 2 to this Act” in 
subsection (4), Section 3(1) and (2), Section 11(2),
(d) paragraphs 5(3)(b) and 15(4)(b) of Schedule 32 to the Local Government, Planning 
and Land Act 1980 (designation of enterprise zones),
(e) sections 140A to 140G of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (rent rebate and 
rent allowance subsidy and council tax benefit) and,
(f) the Human Rights Act 1998.
The Northern Ireland Act 1998 provides also for entrenched enactments557, which an Act of 
the Assembly or subordinate legislation made, confirmed or approved by a Minister or 
Northern Ireland department shall not modify
(a) the European Communities Act 1972;
(b) the Human Rights Act 1998; and
(c) section 43(1) to (6) and (8), section 67, sections 84 to 86, section 95(3) and (4) and 
section 98 of the Northern Ireland Act.
• Furthermore, an Act of the Scottish Parliament558 cannot modify, or confer power by 
subordinate legislation to modify the law on reserved matters559. This does, however, not 
apply to modifications which are incidental to, or consequential on, provision made 
(whether by virtue of the Act in question or another enactment) which does not relate to
554 Hadfield, Brigid: The constitution of Northern Ireland, op cit, p 86
555 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 300
556 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 4, Part I
557 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 7
558 For Northern Ireland, only the consent of the Secretary of State is necessary, see Northern Ireland Act 1998, 
section 8
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reserved matters, and do not have a greater effect on reserved matters than is necessary to 
give effect to the purpose of the provision560. Thus, Schedule 4 intends to address not 
incidental effect on subject matters but incidental modification of rules of law, subject to 
rather a strict form of proportionality requirement561. One could see this in a way that 
Scottish Acts predominantly concerned with non-reserved matters may incidentally affect 
reserved subject matter, and when these incidental provisions conflict with rules of law in 
the reserved sphere they prevail and serve to modify those rules of law so far as they 
would otherwise apply for Scotland. Conversely, one might be inclined to read that this 
provision is only applicable to incidental effects modifying rules of law in the area of 
reserved matters, because they are directly addressed562, but not to incidental effects to the 
reserved matters themselves. This might lead to the fact that the Scottish Parliament has a 
power to modify rules of law on reserved matters incidentally, but that is has no power to 
enact laws that simply touch on reserved matters incidentally without actually changing an 
identifiable rule of law on the reserved matter. That would be, however, an anomalous
563conclusion . The courts, hence, have two solutions. Either one accepts simply that there 
is not any jurisdictional difference between an act incidentally affecting and an act 
incidentally modifying a rule of law of a subject matter, or that the distinction between 
affecting incidentally reserved matters and modifying incidentally rules of law on 
reserved matters is possible. In the first case, the consequence would be that any and all 
incidental effects on reserved matters fall within the realm of Schedule 4 thus limiting the 
scope of the Scottish Parliament. The second solution makes that Scottish acts, which 
affect incidentally reserved matters, are not invalid. Such acts would still have to “relate 
to” a reserved matter for being “ultra vires”564. “Relate to” means, however, that only 
such acts, which relate in pith and substance to reserved matters, are “ultra vires”565. The 
provisions of the Scotland Act are actually very far reaching for this concern. The 
principle guiding the definition of legislative realm in Germany is simpler, although the 
distribution of power is similar to that of Scotland. The German states are also entitled to 
legislate over matters which are not reserved to the federation as far as these matters are
559 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 4, para 2
560 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 4, para 3
561 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 300
562 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 4, para 2 (b)
563 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 301
564 As under the Northern Ireland Act 1920, see above
565 For more detail see: Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, pp 299 and Hadfield, 
Brigid: The constitution of Northern Ireland, op cit, p 86; Calvert, Harry: Constitutional Law in Northern 
Ireland, op cit, p 194
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not especially attributed to the Lander566. However, in these cases the federal legislation
C f L H
prevails over the state legislation . Only the federal legislation is supposed to intrude in 
a limited way into the vacuums of the distribution of constitutional competences .
At face value, a challenged act may appear to relate to a subject matter over which the 
legislature is competent, but this legislation may have a purpose or effect relating to a 
reserved matter. In Canada, such acts have been called “colourable” and being “ultra 
vires”569. The idea that law might be valid in form, but invalid because of underlying purpose 
or actual effect was also applied in Gallagher v Lynn570. The Scotland Act follows this 
direction stating that the question whether a Scottish Act related to a reserved matter is to be 
determined with reference “to the purpose of the provision, having regards to its effect in all 
circumstances”571. The Northern Ireland Act 1998, however, does not have such a 
provision572. This might be due to the fact that the legislation for Northern Ireland may be 
devolved one day completely.
The conclusion about judicial review in the post-devolution is that the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council has to issue decisions about all these questions in the near future. The way 
in which the Judicial Committee is to operate under the devolution legislation is incremental 
and silent on different matters of principle. It relies mostly on informal practices573. 
Devolution requires a strong legal system, and a system which commands confidence and 
respect on all sides574. Thus, the Union should be held together even if political tensions will 
became stronger. Hence, some doubts have been put forward as to whether the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council is able to comply with this task575. At the House of Lords 
stage, a number of amendments were tabled to establish a constitutional “final” court, based 
on the Judicial Committee, so as to “protect the independence of the judiciary and the
566 See Hesse, Konrad: Grundziige des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, op cit, p 97
567 Art. 31 GG
568 See e.g. Hesse, Konrad: Grundziige des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, op cit, p 97
569 Craig/ Walters: The courts, devolution and judicial review, op cit, p 297
570 See above
571 Scotland Act 1998, section 29 (3)
572 See Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 6
573 Oliver, Dawn: Comment, in: Public Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, Spring 1999, p 2
574 Hazell, Robert: Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State survive?, in: Public Law, Spring 1999, op cit, p 
93
575 Craig, Paul: Constitutionalism, Regulation and Review, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 
71; Hazell, Robert: Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State survive?, in: Public Law. Spring 1999, op cit, p 
93
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c n f.
constitutional separation of powers in the determination of constitutional issues” . For the 
time being, however, the Judicial Committee has considerable flexibility in terms of 
membership, extending to those who hold or have hold high judicial office577. Thus, a practice 
could emerge of including judges with strong “national” connections on panels hearing 
disputes involving the devolved bodies578. Different proposals have been made as to achieve a 
national composition of the Committee579.
The Privy Council is thus likely to create a dual apex for the legal system in devolution 
cases580. The Judicial Committee may also become flexible to hear devolution issues in 
Scotland and Wales581. Nevertheless, the Privy Council could well become in future a 
troublesome institution being part of the House of Lords. It is not the final court of appeal in 
the United Kingdom legal system, but stands largely outside it. Thus, it may be a temporary 
arrangement, which will be re-opened when wider reform of the House of Lords opens up the 
question, as to whether a Supreme Court would not be the best solution. Then, it would be a 
real apex of the judiciary and completely independent. Thus, Walter Bagehot’s dictum that 
the English Constitution was “laid down as a principle of English polity, that in it the
O'}
legislative, the executive and the judicial powers are quite divided” would become finally 
true. This idea has been already proposed by the Kilbrandon Commission, where the 
Memorandum of Dissent stated that there was a case for setting up a Constitutional Court583 
emphasising “that court adjudications of this constitutional kind [are] hardly a fundamental 
innovation in our legal system”. The functions of such a court must not be exclusively 
constitutional but it would provide a valuable forum for final arbitration of constitutional 
issues584. In fact, there is even a constitutional difference between a judicial challenge of the 
wide-ranging discretionary powers of a Minister of the Crown and an act made by a devolved
576 House of Lords Debates, Vol 593, cols 1963-68, 28 October 1998
577 Reed, Robert: Devolution and the Judiciary, in: Cambridge Centre for Public Law: Constitutional Reform in 
the UK. op cit, p 25
578 For Wales: Rawlings, Richard: The new model Wales, op cit, p 496 citing the case Morris v Crown Office 
[1970] 1 W.L.R. 792, where this happened already; also Reed, Robert: Devolution and the Judiciary, op cit, p 25
579 Lord Goodhart, Lord Lester proposed that the number of its members should be limited at nine, see: House of 
Lords Debates, Vol 593, cols 1963-68,28 October 1998; Robert Hazell proposed to increase the number at 
seven, see: Hazell, Robert: The new constitutional settlement, in: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 244
580 Hazell, Robert: Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State survive?, in: Public Law. Spring 1999, op cit, p 
93
581 Scotland’s Parliament, op cit, p 15
582 Bagehot, Walter: The English Constitution. Longman 1867, Fontana 1993 introduced by Richard Crossman,
p 61
583 Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), op cit, Vol II, para 308
584 Williams, David: Constitutional Issues facing the United Kingdom, in: The Law Librarian. Vol 30 (1), 
London, March 1999, also Bias; the judges and the Separation of powers, in: Public Law. Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, Spring 2000, p 59
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democratically elected parliament. The role of the Lord Chancellor could be of special interest 
in this context. Without prescribed and appropriate standards and criteria the way in which the 
senior Law Lord exercises his discretionary power of appointment to the Judicial Committee 
on the Lord Chancellor’s behalf could become a matter of controversy when the political 
composition in Westminster and the devolved assemblies differ. Such controversy would be, 
of course, a concern of independence and legitimacy of the judiciary. The Lord Chancellor, 
however, states that it is not “desirable to lay down any rigid principle” in view of his right 
to sit in his judicial capacity in constitutional and human right cases arising under the 
devolution legislation586.
It is to note, of course, that the judicial mechanisms described are asymmetrical in a manner 
that they do not entitle the devolved institutions to refer to the Privy Council where it is 
argued that the Westminster Parliament has overridden its “reserved” powers587, that means 
that it legislated on a topic which falls within the remit of the Scottish Parliament, for 
example588. That was the same in the devolution legislation 1978. Then, the limits set to the
C Q Q
powers of the Assembly have been described being “one way boundaries” . The resulting 
situation can be analysed in a way, which is completely compatible with the traditional view 
of parliamentary sovereignty590. Viewed from that point, the sovereign parliament at 
Westminster has established a subordinate body with law-making powers in compliance with 
the European Convention on Human Rights and other requirements mentioned in the Act. 
However, it has been argued591 that “naturally”, over time something like a convention may 
develop, that forbids Westminster to trespass into a non-reserved area.
585 House of Lords Debates, Vol 593, Written Answers 138, 20 October 1998
586 This might even be a breach of Art. 6 of ECHR, see Oliver, Dawn: Comment, in: Public Law, op cit, Spring 
2000
587 Craig, Paul: Constitutionalism, Regulation and Review, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 72
588 Scotland Act 1998, section 28 (7), Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 5 (6), for Wales, no such provision is 
necessary.
589 MacCormick, Neil: Constitutional points, in: Mackay, Donald (ed.): Scotland -  The framework of change. 
Harris, Edinburgh 1979, p 56
590 Lord Irvine of Lairg, in: House of Lords Debates, Vol 583, col 539, 18 November 1997
591 Barnett, Eric: Introduction to Constitutional Law, op cit, p 63
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VI. Conclusion
Devolution alters the governmental system of the United Kingdom significantly. As has been 
outlined in Chapter two, the political and constitutional culture of the United Kingdom was 
that of a unitary state. While there were special arrangements for the different “nations”, these 
arrangements were only featured for the implementation of Westminster- made policy1. 
Devolution has been defined as a partial transfer of power from the centre to the periphery2. 
This implies that the devolution has nothing to do with independence of the nations3, but with 
an attempt to re-organise the former centralised unitary-state to preserve its unity, as shown in 
Chapter three. How does devolution now change the character of the British State? How can 
we constitutionally characterise devolution?
The United Kingdom is no longer a unitary state, as the institution in the Nations establish 
new political centres. These institutions will challenge the centre at Westminster. The United 
Kingdom could therefore be seen as an evolving Union-state: As outlined in Chapter one, it 
means that pre-union rights survive and the infrastructure provides some degree of regional 
autonomy. The character of a Union-state could justify the asymmetrical nature of devolution. 
One is inclined to question, whether this asymmetry creates problems for the territorial 
organisation of the state. It has repeatedly been stated4 that the evolving union is unbalanced, 
or that it is even “messy, lopsided and asymmetrical”. The author of the phrase, Labour MP 
Tony Wright, believes that this has to do with the British “maxim of muddling along. [...] 
“Living with anomalies and preferring common sense to logical abstractions is supposed to be 
what the political genius of the English is all about”. As an explication, he finally cites Burke, 
who stated that “it is in the nature of all greatness not to be exact”5. However, nothing is 
“wrong with asymmetrical government” as Keating6 has pointed out. It is possible that certain 
areas of a state enjoy self-government whilst others do not. The Spanish example of 
devolution all round shows that asymmetry must not lead to the “slippery slope” of 
independence. However, the British case is in some way different from Spain. The powers of
1 See above
2 See above
3 Even though a recent poll showed that most people in Britain expect Scotland to leave the Union in ten or 
twenty years. See Wright, Tony: The English Question, op cit, p 9
4 Wright, Tony, in: The English Question, op cit, p 13; also Luff, Peter in: House of Commons Debates, Vol 308, 
cols 632, 16 January 1998
5 Wright, Tony, in: The English Question, op cit, p 13
6 See Keating, Michael: What’s wrong with asymmetrical government?, in: Elcock/ Keating: Remaking the
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the Spanish regions are entrenched and, most of all, although being intended otherwise at the 
beginning, all regions have gone down the devolutionary road. Thus, even if their respective 
powers may still be different for health and social security, there is at least equality of all 
other powers7.
Furthermore, arguments against asymmetry of devolution which are based on the issue of the 
described principle of complete parliamentary sovereignty are serious, but may become mere
o
theoretical features . Additionally, autonomy is a reasonable solution for areas with strong 
nationalist movements. Conceded self-government may be able to decrease the centrifugal 
effects. Besides, the argument of equality remains, in the context of the European Union, an 
academic issue, both for civil and social rights. The issue of equal representation (“West- 
Lothian”) can be resolved, even if there are currently no attempts to do so. Apart from that, 
the access of the regions to the European Union may be seen as a more problematic issue, as 
the asymmetry disfavours currently the poorer English regions. However, their demand to 
have directly elected Regional Assemblies is not excluded, even if the government imposes 
high obstacles. Finally, the material disadvantage of these regions is currently not due to their 
non-existing tax powers.
Generally, asymmetry is thus not the kernel of the problem. Devolution in its current form 
proves to create other problems. For example, there is the blurred structure of the 
administration, which disfavours the devolved bodies. Apart from the administration, there is 
the issue of finance; no fair and clear assessment has yet been undertaken. Lastly, 
asymmetrical devolution would not exclude an entrenchment of powers in a constitution. The 
self-governed areas want to be involved at the centre. However, their status can -theoretically 
-  be changed without their consent and they have currently no stake at the centre. All these 
issues make it difficult to believe that devolution is able to “strengthen the Union”. The issue 
is rather as to whether there is a better solution than asymmetrical devolution. But what could 
be the better solution for the United Kingdom?
Chapter five tried to outline the differences between devolution and a federal system. Whilst 
devolution is not federalism, there are important academics who argue to have already
Union, op cit, p 195
7 Barnes, John: Federal Britain. No longer unthinkable?. Centre for Policy Studies, London 1997, p 5
8 See Keating, Michael: What’s wrong with asymmetrical government?, in: Elcock/ Keating: Remaking the 
Union, op cit, p 195
181
identified quasi-federal9 structures within the current legislation of devolution. This implies, 
however, that the “British form of quasi-federalism” is also asymmetrical. Conversely, there 
are fears that the devolution settlement is only a move, to borrow a phrase, where the 
periphery changes so the centre can stay much the same10. This fear is based on the fact that 
quasi-federalism, in contrast to real federalism, does not entrench the division of powers11 and 
that the United Kingdom has not yet completely left the context of a unitary state . The 
question is, hence, what a real federal solution for the United Kingdom would imply and in 
which way devolution may evolve in a “federal direction”.
Federalism has been defined in Chapter One as a pattern of territorially diversified structures, 
with more or less centralised control mechanisms being only possible to amend by common 
decision. Hence, there are three salient points to show as to what degree federalism would 
match the aim of devolution and solve its deficiencies. It will be shown that federalism would 
clarify, firstly, the division of powers between the respective levels of government, and the 
allocation and review of these powers. Secondly, the issues of England’s position and the 
financial organisation can be refined. Thirdly, the general question of a “Constitution” for the 
United Kingdom would be necessary to address. However, as the current legislation is too 
recent for a judgement without taking into account future evolutions, we may also need to 
speculate about the evolution of the new constitutional settlement in ten years time.
In federal systems there are two different divisions of competences12. One line of division is
“vertical” that means that there is a general separation of federal and national competences.
Another division draws a horizontal line giving a power of “control” to the Nations on federal
matters, as for example by way of a Second “regional” Chamber. Concerning the vertical
division, we scrutinise the division between Westminster’s powers and the devolved bodies’
powers. Formally, the Scotland Act, the Government of Wales Act and, the Northern Ireland
Act divide the reserved and devolved legislative powers. The Scottish Parliament has open-
1 ^ended residuary powers . However, although being a devolved matter, the Scottish 
Parliament allowed Westminster recently to legislate for the Sexual Offences (Amendment) 
Bill. This Bill is the first example of the existence of a convention, which has been outlined in
9 Hazell, Robert: The new constitutional settlement, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 231 or 
Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, pp 289
10 See Osmond, John: The JMC and the BIC, in: Osmond, John: The National Assembly Agenda, op cit, p 353
11 Barnes, John: Federal Britain. No longer unthinkable?, op cit, p 7
12 See Hesse, Konrad: Grundziige des Verfassungsrechts. op cit, pp 94
13 Hazell, Robert: The new constitutional settlement, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 231
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Chapter five. Westminster did so only with the consent of the Scottish Executive and 
Parliament14. . Even though Westminster has the continuing power to legislate even on 
devolved matters, it will not normally do so under the “Sewel” convention. Thus, there is a 
clear draft for the division of legislative powers in the devolution settlement.
Concerning the powers on administration or the judiciary, the division is less evident. Even if
the Scottish Executive has some administrative powers, the primary division of power
remains the devolution of legislative competence15. Even worse, the judiciary is not
independent, but dominated by the apex of the Lord Chancellor, a member of the Executive.
This might indicate the lack of a clear division of powers. However, the political
establishment in the United Kingdom is used to living with such anomalies. Therefore, the
judiciary should be considered apart. Nevertheless, the lack of a transparent delimitation of
the functions of the devolved administrations from those of Whitehall have already put the
devolved Executives “in disarray”16. In Scotland, the resignation of the First Minister’s chief
of staff served to feed speculation about in-fighting and ministerial factions within the
Scottish Executive17. The issue of a loyal administration has, however, been more flagrant in
Wales when the Presiding First Officer of the Assembly could not get legal advice
1 8independent from an administration guided by a First Secretary in question . Thus, one could 
say that federalism implies a real division of administrative functions, which is not achieved 
with devolution. However, devolution requires also a clear position of the administration, 
which, unfortunately, is not achieved by the current legislation.
Examining the “horizontal” division of powers within the United Kingdom, we need to 
identify some form of “national” or “regional” influence on federal, i.e. reserved matters. In a 
federal context, the sub-units must have some sort of “control” on central government19. For 
example, this power of control is linked in Germany with the influence of the Lander 
(Nations) in administrative areas via the Bundesrat, as they have a large experience in this 
area. Horizontal federalism creates thus a certain balance of powers. However, it has been put
14 See Constitution Unit: Monitor. Vol 10, March 2000, p 3
15 Jeffery, Charlie: Multi-Layer democracy in Germany, op cit, p 3
16 See “Scottish Executive in Disarray”, in: The Scotsman. 27 January 2000
17 Scottish Council Foundation: Nations and regions: The dynamics of devolution. Second report, February 2000, 
p 1 (see http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-uni t/leverh/index.htm’)
18 Osmond, John: Devolution relaunched, IWA, March 2000, pp 20 (see http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution- 
unit/leverh/index.htm')
19 Hesse, Konrad: Grundziige des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik. op cit, p 95
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forward20 since the 1960s that the modem welfare state blurs the general spheres of federal 
and national power increasingly and leaves the nations only with a mere capacity co-operation 
instead of a power of co-ordination at the centre. It could be the same about devolution. It 
establishes no regional power of “control” of the centre, rather than an unforeseen need of co­
operation between the nations and central government. This can best be shown through the 
JMC. The JMC becomes the main forum of co-operation between central and devolved 
government, although it was not envisaged at the beginning and it was inserted later in the 
context of British-Irish co-operation. The JMC marks the interdependence21 between these 
governmental levels. The more the different levels are interdependent, the more central 
government has to accept their power. This may create good conditions for federalism. The 
JMC, although it is only composed by the Executives, could be seen as a “horizontal” 
institution. This is mostly because of its functions on European Union matters, which are 
reserved matters, but other reserved matters may be added to its work. Generally, however, 
the role and function of the JMC as a body existing only by “gentlemen’s” (i.e. Executives) 
agreement is too blurred and unclear given the premise that is should represent the nations of 
the United Kingdom at the centre. It is obvious that the reform of the House of Lords could
decide about the future of the regions’ and nations’ powers. A regional dominated House of
22Lords would be the first (and only) constitutional entrenchment of their powers at the centre .
Another issue is added. As the new bodies do not have clear ideas about their powers, they 
may be inclined to test them. One way to do that is through the debating powers of the 
devolved bodies of non-devolved matters. The Scottish Parliament has thus begun to debate 
matters within Westminster’s jurisdiction. Especially, the SNP tried to use their debating time 
on non-devolved issues. Hence, the Scottish Parliament had to debate a motion deploring the 
discrimination contained in the Act of Settlement 1700 preventing any Catholic from 
succeeding to the Crown. The Crown and its succession is a reserved matter. Hence, the 
Scottish Parliament cannot make laws in this area, but it can debate matters lying outside its 
legislative competence, as it has been outlined in Chapter five. The motion led the former 
Scottish Secretary Michael Forsyth to move in the Lords that parliament should consider 
removing the bar against Catholics succeeding to the Crown. This would require consultation 
with the other 15 Commonwealth governments where the Queen is still head of state.
20 Hesse, Konrad: Per unitarische Zentralstaat, Muller, Heidelberg 1962; Smend, Rudolf: Verfassung und 
Verfassungsrecht. Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen. 2nd ed., Muller, Heidelberg 1968, p 270; see also: Jeffery, 
Charlie: Multi-Layer democracy in Germany, op cit, p 4
21 See Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, pp 283
22 Also Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 289
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Effectively such action can only be taken by government, but the event shows the tensions 
and dynamics of the “debating powers44. This proves that the newly created institutions do not 
have only divided powers, but also interdependent powers23. Devolution is establishing also 
shared, and less divided, competences between Westminster and the devolved bodies24. This 
is a new experience in the United Kingdom, which has always been dominated by the centre. 
Therefore the action at the centre will attract the most attention. The question is as to whether 
Whitehall is able to move towards a more inter-dependent practice of policy making with the 
new bodies in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. In a comparison between Britain and federal 
Germany, Jeffery put forward the idea that the German federal government is “constrained”25 
and thus unable to ignore regional concerns. Whilst Britain was different before devolution, it 
is likely to be subsequently constrained too.
In a federal state, all constituent parts are treated equally. Devolution, however, is not given to 
all parts of the Union. Wales is to be, at the time being, quite a limited “political nation”
9 f \although an increase of its power seems to be quite likely . Even though Wales has a 
devolved institution, it has not real legislative power but the National Assembly is rather “a 
county council on stilts”. Wales is, however, a “normal” member of the JMC, for example. 
There is now a protocol establishing a procedure for legislative proposals of the Assembly on
97non-devolved matters to be put forward at Westminster by the Secretary of State . That half­
way-legislative situation led the former Secretary of State for Wales and the Presiding Officer 
of the Assembly to think about a Welsh “Speakers Conference” to expand the Assembly’s 
powers. Sir Thomas states that the Government of Wales Act cannot be a “new44 
constitutional settlement as it is too close to the 1978 legislation. In his view the present Act 
was rather merely the best that could be achieved in the circumstances of the time and the new 
legislation is not based on a clear legislative principle.
“It could be said to have elevated piecemeal development to an art form. [...] We are 
not at the beginning of a new constitution for Wales. We are at the beginning of the 
end of the old constitution [...] We have the least that could be established at the time. 
We shouldn’t say that a political fix is a national constitution. It is time we looked for
23 See above
24 Comes, Richard: Intergovernmental Relations in a devolved United Kingdom: Making devolution work, in: 
Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 157
25 Jeffery, Charlie: The decentralisation debate in the UK: Role-Modell Deutschland?, in: Scottish Affairs. N°
19, op cit, p 45
26 See M P’s for increase o f Assembly powers, Western Mail, 16/05/00
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more28”.
His statement may prove that the devolution legislation for Wales is not yet “settled”. Hence, 
it is questionable whether the Scotland and Wales Acts are really a new Constitution29 or if a 
Constitution would not need such an initiative. In contrast to England and Wales, the 
Northern Irish question is to be seen in a broader context, which is largely outside the remit of 
Westminster. The political will at Dublin and London to find one solution after the other is 
very strong. This can best be proved with the forthcoming Disqualifications Act 2000 
allowing Members of the Irish Parliament to become Member of the Executive of the United 
Kingdom. However, the problem and its conclusive solution lies in Ulster itself.
Chapter four stressed the fact that the treatment of England raises also questions30. On the one 
hand, there is the problem as to whether there should be an “English vote on English law31” in 
the House of Commons. However, the proposition32 of an English Parliament is impossible, 
as the Union would be completely imbalanced33 with this huge member. The Labour 
government seems to opt for the revival of the Regional Affairs Committee being already in 
use between 1976 and 1978. Whether England, however, will be satisfied with that solution is 
unclear. On the other hand, the government has internally not yet found a common position 
on the “regional future” of England. Whilst the Prime Minister seems to prefer a system of 
elected Mayors, his Minister of Transport seemingly favours the approach of Regional 
Chambers. The election of the London Mayor and the disastrous result for Labour may 
contribute to a regional module for England. England would best fit into a federal United 
Kingdom, if it is split into powerful regions. The argument that there is no popular 
identification with these regions is based on previous experiences with the alteration of these 
regions (see Chapter four). Also, the example of Germany shows that even artificial regions 
can develop a certain degree of popular identity in time. However, such a regionalisation of 
England cannot be made against the opinion of the population by some sort of “big bang”, but 
by a gradualist approach including the enduring maintenance of the existing regional 
boundaries and sensible political leadership. It would also be helpful if the threshold to
27 See Osmond, John: Devolution relaunched, op cit, p 37
28 Citation from Osmond, John: Devolution relaunched, op cit, p 26
29 Hazell, Robert: The new constitutional settlement, op cit, p 231
30 See Wright, Tony (ed.): The English question. Fabian Society, London 2000
31 See Hague, William, speech to the Centre for Policy Studies, London, 15/07/1999
32 Barnes, John: Federal Britain. No longer unthinkable?, op cit see also above the Bill of Conservative MP 
Theresa Gorman
33 See for example: Hazell, Robert: The new constitutional settlement, op cit, p 241 citing the example of Prussia
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establish regional government in England was not as high as it is currently. By all meanings, 
powerful English regions would be with respect to the population and the geography the most 
balanced solution for the Union.
A salient feature of devolution in the United Kingdom is that it is demanded from the poorer 
regions. That is with clear difference to other European states where it is generally demanded 
from the wealthier sub-national units34. That view, however, has already been taken when 
Northern Ireland enjoyed its “Home-Rule” scheme in the aftermath of 1921. As Northern 
Ireland’s Prime Minister put it already in 1940: “What keeps the matter right in Great Britain 
is the fact that there are great rich areas such as London which help to carry the burden of the 
areas not so favourably circumstanced. Our claim here is that as part of the UK we have the
*3 C
right to expect the same [social] security [as the other parts of the UK] ”. Thus, the 
centrifugal forces are coming from the part of the poorer regions. How long England’s 
population will accept that share of money is undetermined. As long as the precise bases of 
the Bamett-formula are not available and thus being able to be explained there is no financial 
settlement. The South-East is likely to contribute always more than other parts of the country. 
However, even in the short-term there have been signs for a change of the formula’s 
definition36. The issue is less about the tax-raising power of the devolved bodies themselves, 
but rather about their share of the budget in general and the determining factors. This seems to 
be a troublesome task, but it is of central concern for devolution. A fair and transparent “deal” 
between the wealthier and poorer parts of the country is needed to avoid the expected tensions 
over finance37.
The judicial review of Scottish Parliament has already started and the courts adopted a non­
constitutional interpretation of the Scotland Act38. On a petition for an interdict brought by the 
Countryside Alliance against the Protection of Wild Mammals Bill, moved by a MSP, the 
appeal court rejected the petition, but ruled that the courts have jurisdiction over the Scottish 
Parliament, as a body created by statute, and with powers limited by statute. The Lord 
President stated that the
in Germany of the “Weimar“ Republic
34 As in Spain or Germany
35 J.M. Andrews cited in: Boyce, D.G.: The Irish question and British politics, op cit, p 105
36 See Morgan, Rhodri, in: Wales on Sunday. 13 February 2000
37 See Hazell/ Cornes: Financing devolution: The centre retains control, op cit, p 196
38 Whaley v Scottish Parliamentary Corporate body, 16/02/00, see http://www.scotcourts. gov.uk/
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“Lord Ordinary gives [in the first decision] insufficient weight to the fundamental 
character of the Parliament as a body, which - however important its role - has been 
created by statute and derives its powers from statute. As such, it is a body which, like 
any other statutory body, must work within the scope of those powers. If it does not do 
so, then in an appropriate case the court may be asked to intervene and will require to 
do so, in a manner permitted by the legislation. In principle, therefore, the Parliament 
like any other body set up by law is subject to the law and to the courts which exist to 
uphold that law”39.
However, that case was a low-key matter that did not impinge on “constitutional” issues. 
Nevertheless, the statement is clear. As it has been outlined in Chapter five, devolution 
establishes parliaments as statutory bodies, which are under political control of Westminster. 
In contrast, federalism would require some sort of independent legal control. This implies the 
need for a constitutional court. This role has been given to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council, which is in some sense, however, not a real court but rather an advising 
council according to its constitutional position. The famous “conventions” guiding the British 
constitutional law are currently not reviewed by any court. Hence, the devolved institutions 
may well have interest in an independent body for appeal -  especially when there is no 
written constitution. Even if devolution is not federalism, the establishment of a constitutional 
court would create new “confidence” in the peripheral areas of the United Kingdom and thus 
being a huge contribution to a “strengthened” Union.
If devolution is constitutionally different from federalism, there are similar features under a 
political analysis40. Devolution leaves the Scottish Parliament as a subordinate body. 
Politically, however, its most important power lies in its representative function for the 
Scottish people. Thus, it may well be anything than subordinate41. Politically, different signs 
show that there is a movement of federalisation under way in the United Kingdom. The
internal organisation of the political parties had to deal with the handling of “regional”
conflicts and balances. This has been most apparent within the Labour party. The election of 
its London Mayor candidate showed the gap between the demands of the centre and the 
wishes of the local party members. Even if the centre “retained control” the independent 
candidate Ken Livingstone easily won the election and will thus be a powerful opposition to
39 Whaley v Scottish Parliamentary Corporate body, 16/02/00, op cit, p 7
40 See Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 287
41 See Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit, p 288
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“new Labour” at Westminster. In Wales, the former First secretary Alun Michael was widely 
perceived to be the choice of London rather than Wales. It was believed that this perception 
contributed already partly to his failing to win a majority in the Assembly elections42. 
Additionally, his continued emphasis on the need to take account of Wales’ links with Britain 
and reluctance to entertain distinctive Welsh initiatives led to his failing. This served to 
emphasise the perception that he was “Blair’s man in Wales”, and he lost finally the support 
of the Assembly and of its own party. Both events prove that the political structure and party 
organisation within the United Kingdom are changing in favour of the parties’ regional 
branches.
Constitutionally, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, as explained in Chapter two, 
remains unchanged. However, as Bogdanor writes, “the formal assertion of parliamentary 
supremacy will become empty when it is no longer accompanied by a real political 
supremacy”43. The experience of Northern Ireland proves that the political supremacy lies no 
longer at Westminster. Even in a context when devolution was given to a region which did 
not demand it, Westminster had difficulties to exercise its supremacy. Hence, the assertion of 
parliamentary supremacy could become “so empty that it could eventually be given effect 
only by what would be in reality be a revolutionary act”44. Devolution thus blows a second 
hole though the middle of Dicey’s doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty45 after the signing of 
the European treaties. This proves that the United Kingdom is no longer a unitary state, but 
rather a “de facto federal state”. Rhodri Morgan, after his confirmation as new Welsh First 
Secretary, reflected on the nature of devolution within the United Kingdom. In his view, a 
process towards greater self-determination was under way. He predicted that
“one day we are going to have a written constitution to demarcate the powers of the 
devolved assembly -  to decide what the balance of powers is between the lower and 
the upper chambers of the Houses of Parliament; and to demarcate the powers of 
Europe, the European Courts of Human Rights and the British Government. But at the 
moment, Britain muddles through. We don’t want to write it down. [...] It means that it 
is easier to make constitutional changes in the UK. This is wonderful -  as long as the 
constitutional changes are going in the direction that you want. It is dreadful -  if the
42 Osmond, John: Devolution relaunched, op cit, p 3
43 Bogdanor, Vernon: Devolution in the UK. op cit. p 291
44 Enoch Powell, in: House of Commons debates, Vol 924, col 458, 19 January 1977
45 See above
189
constitutional changes could also be removed in the direction that you don’t want. This 
is the issue of entrenchment.” 46
During the first year of the Assembly it became obvious that the public is unable to 
understand the division of powers between Westminster and the devolved bodies47. Therefore, 
Morgan concluded that
“it would be healthy for the Assembly if at some stage over the next ten or twenty 
years a written constitution entrenched the powers of the Scottish Parliament and the 
assembly. Because of this dreadful phrase ‘power devolved is power retained’ there 
was not what you could call a revolution to take the powers of the Welsh Assembly. It 
was all done in an orderly manner of party manifestos and elections and referenda and 
Houses of Parliament and so forth. Therefore in theory, with the theory of the elected 
dictatorship it could be reversed by a future Government. I do not think it ever will be. 
When you look at the last thousand years, rather than the last hundred years, you can 
see that in this tortured relationship between the Celts and Anglo-Saxons within these 
islands up to 1920, it was an imperial expansion of England into Wales initially, then 
into Scotland, and then into Ireland through various forms of Acts of Union. But then 
from about 1850 onwards the talk was gradually not about Acts of Union but about 
movements towards disunion, of redefining the rights for the Celtic nations of Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales”48.
What, in his view, differs in theory and practice, can be also seen as a gap between 
constitutional and political application. The elective dictatorship49 may thus come to an end 
even in practice in the foreseeable future. Devolution creates undoubtedly more “checks and 
balances” than the United Kingdom ever had before. Thus, the forthcoming process, but not 
the event of devolution itself, to borrow a phrase, may prove as to whether the current model 
of asymmetrical devolution evolves to federalism.
What can we now conclude about devolution and the Constitution? Everything changes in the
<6 Morgan, Rhodri: Variable Geometry UK. IWA, Cardiff 2000, p 10. This view is, however, not uncontested,
see e.g. MacCormick, Neil: The English Constitution, the British State, the Scottish Anomaly, op cit, p306
'7 See Just who is running this country, Western Mail. 12/05/00
<8 Morgan, Rhodri: Variable Geometry UK. op cit, p 10
*9 Hailsham, Q.: The dilemma of democracy. Collins, London 1978
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United Kingdom, but not the Constitution, one could say. The future balance of the two 
competing principles affected by devolution, sovereignty of parliament and self-government 
at a sub-national level is not yet adjusted or settled. This question must, however, be 
addressed50. There is a good reason that the dictum of Alan Peacock’s Memorandum of 
dissent prevails: “The system of government of the United Kingdom can only be based on 
equality of political rights for all citizens in the separate regions and nations.[... This] can only 
be brought about by increasing regional participation in the system of government”51. Hence, 
the “fundamental” constitutional principle of Britain, the sovereignty of parliament, could 
become a mere theoretical one. Obviously, the case for moving towards a really federal 
constitution is in 2000 much more likely than ever before52, because Britain is already to be 
governed by some sort of de-facto federalism as far as the devolved institutions are left “in
c -3
peace” -  as it was the case in Northern Ireland in the aftermath of 1920. Compared with the 
two hundred years of history of the United Kingdom in its current feature, this was evidently 
a long time.
For a federal scheme, there must be a “Constitution”. The United Kingdom does not have a 
written constitution, which has been deplored subsequently. However, constitutions of 
federations usually spring from a truly national constitutional assembly where the 
representatives of the constituent parts meet54. Such a meeting did not happen in 1998, but it 
would now be possible. That could be the revolution, which might be necessary for the 
change of parliamentary sovereignty. Following Wade55, that principle “is a rule which is 
unique in being unchangeable by parliament -  it is changed by revolution, not by legislation; 
it lies in the keeping of the courts, and no act of parliament can take it from them”. The 
current devolution legislation also moves more power over primary legislation to the courts. 
Thus, a reformed House of Lords with a “new” Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
becoming a real court may well be inclined to fulfil that revolution56. Britain’s Membership of 
European Union already eroded the principle and even the then Members of the Committee 
left the sovereignty of Parliament falling short . Federalism becomes thus a real prospect for 
the United Kingdom.
50 Keating, Michael: What’s wrong with asymmetrical government?, op cit, p 213
51 Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon), op cit, Vol II, p x
52 Brazier, Rodney: The Constitution o f the United Kingdom, in: C.L.J.. Vol 58(1), op cit, p 126
53 Brazier, Rodney: The Constitution o f the United Kingdom, in: C.L.J.. Vol 58(1), op cit, p 126
54 Brazier, Rodney: The Constitution o f the United Kingdom, in: C.L.J.. Vol 58(1), op cit, p 127
55 Wade, H.: The basis o f legal sovereignty, in: C.L.J.. Vol 25 (2), op cit, p 189
56 Olowofoyeku, Abimbola A: Decentralising the UK: The federal argument, in: Edinburgh Law Review, op cit, 
p 78
191
Federalism -in  whichever form -  would contribute to a more consensual and 
“interdependent” future of Britain’s constitutional settlement and, also, ensure its constituent 
parts of their entrenched rights and duties thereby “strengthening the Union”. The United 
Kingdom is passing a “European experience” with the granting of power to sub-national units 
and the resulting struggle for power between central and regional government. All arguments
r o
against federalism should remember the dictum of Jennings that a “federation is not a magic 
formula. It is nothing more than the name of a complicated system of government which 
nobody would wish to see established anywhere if he could think a better”. A clear structure 
of government could be one more factor that devolution is not supposed to prove to be the 
“stepping-stone” to disintegration59. Also, a step towards federalism would encounter the 
“gradual deterioration of Britain’s constitutional arrangements”60 in comparison with other 
European constitutional models61 and render the United Kingdom into a role of a constructive 
contributor in shaping the future constitution of Europe . Britain’s future is linked very 
deeply with the continent. As Gladstone put it more than hundred years ago: “We are part of 
the community of Europe, and we must do our duty as such!”63
57 See above
58 Jennings, Ivor: A federation for Western Europe. CUP, Cambridge 1940
59 Davies, Norman: The Isles, op cit, p 928
60 Walker, Neil: Constitutional Reform in a could climate, in: Tomkins, Adam: Devolution and the constitutional 
reform, op cit, p 79
61 See Walker, Neil: Constitutional Reform in a could climate, in: Tomkins, Adam: Devolution and the 
constitutional reform, op cit, p 79; also: Wurtenberger, Thomas: Speech at the annual meeting of the Young 
Christian Democrates (Germany), Furtwangen, 24 April 1999 stating the positive export of the German Basic 
Law.
62 See Hazell/ Comes: Introduction, in: Hazell, Robert: Constitutional Futures, op cit, p 4
63 Gladstone, William: Speech at Carnavon, 10 April 1888
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Appendix
Appendix 1
Relevant electoral results
General Elections 1997
% of Vote Seats
Labour 43.2 418
Conservatives 30.7 165
Liberals 16.8 46
SNP 2.0 6
SDLP 0.6 3
UUP 0.8 10
Plaid Cymru 0.5 4
Elections for the Scottish Parliament, May 1999
% of 
Vote
Seats
Labour 43.4 56
SNP 21A 35
Liberals 13.2 18
Conservatives 14.0 17
Others (Green, Socialist Party) 3
Elections for the National Assembly, May 1999
% of Vote Seats
Labour 36.5 28
Plaid Cymru 29.5 17
Conservatives 16.2 9
Liberals 13 6
Elections for the Northern Ireland Assem Dly, Jur
% of Vote Seats
UUP 21.3 28
SDLP 22.3 24
DUP 18.1 20
Sinn Fein 17.6 18
Others (Alliance, UK Unionist, 
Independent Unionist, NI Women)
20.7 18
Referendums in 1997
Date Turnout Yes-Vote Tax-Varying 
powers
Scotland 11/09/1997 60.4 % 74.3 % 63.5 %
Wales 18/09/1997 49.7 % 50.3 % —
(Sources: http://www.election.demon.co.uk/gel997.html.
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/whats happening/research/pdf res papers/rp99-01.pdf. National Assembly for Wales, 
1999)
Appendix 2
The regional boundaries in England: The GQRs and the regional associations
(source: Constitution Unit, Regional Government in England, London 1996)
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The regional Cham bers boundaries in England
(source: DETR, London 2000)
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